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ABSTRACT 
 
Why do states comply with international human rights laws and standards? Specifically, why do 
so many states create national human rights institutions (NHRIs) within their domestic spheres, 
when NHRIs are, in theory, designed to be watchdogs for the states’ wrongdoings? Although this 
state behavior seems paradoxical, the number of NHRIs has drastically increased in the last 
decades; as of 2017, there are 117 NHRIs in existence. The implementation of NHRI norms 
differs from state to state, and each state’s motivation for creating an NHRI is equally individual; 
therefore, the reasons behind each state’s creation of a self-limiting NHRI must be analyzed 
individually. Extant studies on NHRIs predominantly focus on identifying what contributed to 
the spread of NHRIs (e.g., pressure from inside or outside the country), attempting to identify the 
variables that caused the proliferation of NHRIs. This scholarship does not provide a full account 
of why states have come to realize it is in their interest to establish NHRIs and how it happened. 
In this dissertation, I examine the case of South Korea (herein called simply “Korea”) and the 
establishment of the National Human Rights Commission of Korea (NHRCK). I demonstrate 
that Korea established this institution, which presumably limits state power, as a (somewhat 
successful) means of gaining international legitimacy. Korea created and consolidated the 
NHRCK in an attempt to materialize its desired identity, that of a seonjinguk (advanced country). 
Korea therefore saw the establishment of the NHRCK as being in its national interest and as a 
ticket to join the seonjinguk nations. By tracing the rise and fall of the NHRCK over time (2001–
2012), I bring back the forgotten agent—the state; I contend that the state controlled decisions 
about whether to comply with or disregard the global human rights norms represented by NHRIs, 
and that the decision to comply was a policy preference, pursued in service of its goal of 
becoming seonjinguk.   
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Introduction 
Why do states comply with international human rights laws and standards? In particular, 
why do states comply with national human rights institutions (NHRIs),
 1
 which are designed to 
be watchdogs for each state’s human rights situation? As of January 2017, there are 117 NHRIs 
around the globe (Global Alliance of National Human Rights Institutions 2017a), and since the 
1990s, there has been a fifteen-fold increase in the number of NHRIs, with more than five new 
NHRIs being created each year (Kjaerum 2003, 5). How can we understand the global 
phenomenon of the proliferation of NHRIs? Scholarship on NHRIs has primarily focused on 
providing an answer to “why and under what conditions human rights institutions are created by 
states” (Goodman and Pegram 2011b, 3), but these studies fail to provide a full account of why 
states voluntarily comply with global standards on NHRIs; these studies have generally 
presumed that states’ compliance with the global norms on NHRIs is mostly “coerced” or 
“influenced” by external agents (e.g., pressure from inside or outside the country)—a position 
that marginalizes the state, framing it as a mere dependent agent. 
In this dissertation, I contend that a state’s adoption of NHRIs can only be sufficiently 
explained by taking seriously the state and its identity, especially in cases where state 
compliance was not “coerced” but voluntary. In order to answer why states comply with NHRIs, 
I undertake a case study of South Korea (Korea) and the National Human Rights Commission of 
Korea (NHRCK), focusing on Korea’s national identity—to be exact, the country’s desired 
                                                             
1
 NHRIs are broadly defined as a body which is established and designed by a government aimed at promoting and 
protecting human rights. They can be created under the constitution or by law or decree. 
2 
national identity, which is central to the shaping and re-shaping of its national interest and 
policies. I claim that NHRIs in Korea were principally adopted because of Korea’s desire and 
goal to be recognized as a seonjinguk (advanced country)
 2
 by other seonjinguk countries.
3
 
Korea’s desired identity was the core value that prompted domestic agents, including political 
leaders and activists, to proactively adopt NHRIs’ norms. In addition to these domestic agents, 
the international community, who strongly supported the push for an independent and credible 
NHRCK, also effectively appealed to Korea’s desire to be recognized as a “model country,” a 
“human rights state,” and a “regional leader” as they encouraged Korea to comply with the 
global human rights norms on NHRIs. 
This research uses a constructivist approach to compliance to demonstrate how this 
desired seonjinguk identity led Korea to see the establishment of the NHRCK as being in its 
national interest; Korea emulated what other advanced countries were doing (i.e., creating and 
supporting NHRIs) through a socialization process. In other words, Korea actively strove to gain 
international legitimacy by complying with the “appropriate” behavior of the time in pursuit of 
its goal of becoming seonjinguk. With the fall of the Soviet bloc in the early 1990s, Western 
liberal democracy rose to become the most “appropriate” form of governance, and with 
democracy, international human rights laws and norms that primarily originate in liberal theory 
and philosophy have also risen. The universalization of liberal democracy and human rights as 
global standards enhanced the status of NHRIs, which rose to global prominence in the 1990s 
                                                             
2
 Literally, seonjinguk translates as “forward-going country,” or advanced country. In Korea, the term seonjinguk is 
a notion that has been historically constructed over decades. It has justified Korea’s effort to “catch up” with more 
advanced seonjin states in a wide range of areas, from economic growth to social development to foreign policy to 
human rights policy. 
3
 In previously colonized countries, national identity is largely based on the perspective of its previous colonizer. For 
example, the policies of developmentalists in post-colonial countries (Brazil and Argentina) are fundamentally 
influenced by Western development models, and these countries’ intersubjective identities produce their acceptance 
of the hegemony of Western development (Sikkink 1991). 
3 
(Pegram 2010, 6; Koo and Ramirez 2009; Goodman and Pegram 2011a). Since that time, the 
creation of NHRIs has gradually become a way for countries to show how “legitimate” they are; 
NHRIs are seen as an indicator of good democratic governance, regardless of the political reality 
of a given state. This study investigates how, under these global circumstances, Korea sought 
international legitimacy by adopting the widely accepted global norms around NHRIs in order to 
become a seonjin (advanced) democratic human rights state, and how the “appropriateness” of 
NHRIs reshaped, for a time, Korea’s definition of seonjinguk to incorporate NHRIs standards as 
a key component. 
By tracing both the rise and fall of the NHRCK (from 2001 to 2012), this research 
examines the state’s control over accepting or disregarding global human rights norms via policy 
preference, setting aside the external influences from various global and domestic agents that so 
many previous researchers have focused on. This case study thus highlights the importance of 
answering why states voluntarily adopt NHRIs—an especially important question given that 
states have almost full autonomy in designing their NHRIs. As the case of Korea shows, external 
pressure was important, but only to a certain extent, and only when the state allowed it to be. 
This study does not aim to provide answers that can be generalized to all states’ 
motivations for creating NHRIs because each state has different motivation. However, through 
the case of Korea, I intend to improve our understanding of why states comply with international 
human rights standards and norms by investigating state identity in the context of the dynamic 
building, shifting, and redefining of Korean state interest as it was demonstrated by the rise and 
fall of the NHRCK. This study, which takes seriously identity and domestic context, aims to fill 
in the gaps in the constructivist approach to studying global norms; constructivism tends to focus 
on a top-down perspective on norms diffusion (seeing norms as primarily flowing from the 
4 
international level to the domestic level) and to underestimate domestic causes (Vanhala 2015, 
837). 
In addition, the case of Korea provides empirical evidence of how compliance with 
international human rights norms can actually strengthen a country’s power and legitimacy rather 
than limiting them. This dissertation illustrates how the NHRCK, an institution that presumably 
limited state power, ironically contributed to the enhancement of Korea’s national image and 
international legitimacy. In the sections that follow, I explore different theories of compliance in 
international relations (IR) and delve into the mechanisms of compliance that are most suitable 
for analyzing the case of Korea and the NHRCK. 
 
1.2 Theories of Compliance 
This section provides an overview of the two major schools of IR, rationalism and 
constructivism; it analyzes each school’s central arguments on compliance, assesses each 
school’s contributions and pitfalls, and identifies which approach best explains Korea’s 
compliant state behavior regarding NHRIs. 
1.2.1 Rationalist Approach to Compliance 
Until the end of the Cold War, the field of IR examined compliance mostly from a 
rationalistic view of world politics and international law (Ruggie 1998, Wendt 1992, Katzenstein, 
Keohane, and Krasner 1998), and these rationalists offered several different views on compliance.  
Some rationalists denied the notion of compliance per se, arguing that, unlike national 
laws, international human rights laws or norms can never be enforced (Koh 1997). This group of 
rationalists could not explain, however, why international human rights laws and norms are 
implemented and why they are not violated, despite the lack of a strong enforcement mechanism; 
5 
their position was further weakened by the argument, made by many scholars, that enforcement 
mechanisms for international laws or norms should be understood differently than enforcement 
mechanisms for domestic laws.
 
Even Hans Morgenthau, a strong critic of international law, does 
not deny that international law exists as a system of binding legal rules (Morgenthau 1954, 249–
252). Indeed, some scholars argue that human rights norms gained acceptance in almost every 
state after the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the entry into force of 
two covenants, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (Mutua 2007, 575–577).4 
Another group of rationalists claims that states comply with international laws or norms 
only insofar as compliance serves the state’s national interest. This claim is based upon the 
rationalist understanding of what a state is: the only unitary agent in a brutal international system. 
Under this understanding of the state, states act to pursue and maximize their interests, which 
include a combination of security, power, wealth, and so on (Katzenstein, Keohane, and Krasner 
1998, Keohane 1984, 1988). In this view, states exist to pursue their interests on a continuum 
that ranges from the survival of the state at one end to power maximization at the other (Waltz 
1979). This group interprets states’ compliance behavior—ratifying and implementing 
international human rights laws and norms—within the framework of self-interest. 
The Cold War–era rationalists’ cost-benefit analysis of compliance in terms of state 
interest is continued in the current era of global politics by a school known as the neo-realists. 
While the neo-realists acknowledge that the post–Cold War world environment has changed to 
one of increased collaboration and cooperation among states, the continue to interpret states’ 
                                                             
4 
This view is highly contested, because powerful states, especially the United States and the People’s Republic of 
China, do not fully comply with human rights laws and norms. For instance, the US has not ratified ICESCR and 
China has not ratified ICCPR. Scholars point out that the noncompliance of these two big powers is particularly 
important in light of the United States’ post-9/11 policy on torture and China’s persistent resistance to human rights 
pressure (Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink 2013, 4).
 
6 
increased compliance with global norms only within a framework of self-interest. For neo-
realists, states comply with international human rights regimes because norms and institutions 
operate as a mechanism for the maximization of state interests (Krasner 1983, 1993). 
It is often argued that the rationalists’ interpretation of compliance follows the logic of 
consequentalism, rather than the logic of appropriateness (March and Olsen 1998, Olsen and G. 
March 2004); the logic of consequentalism is based on coercion and requires the use of force or 
legal enforcement, while the logic of appropriateness is based on persuasion and discourse (Risse, 
Ropp, and Sikkink 2013, 12–16). Thomas Risse’s (2002) story illustrating the logic of 
consequentialism goes as follows: A driver who encounters a red light in the middle of the night 
with no one around may or may not stop and wait for the light to change, and her decision about 
whether or not to stop is based in the domain of rational choice. Under the logic of 
consequentialism, if the driver stops, it is because she engaged in a close calculation of the 
consequences of not stopping, which might include being fined by police hidden in the bushes.  
Using this same logic of consequentialism, rationalists claim that states ratify and implement 
international human rights treaties and norms because of the possible consequences that would 
follow noncompliance. This logic of consequentalism was long the most common explanation of 
states’ behavior in the fields of international studies and international human rights. 
1.2.2 Constructivist Approach to Compliance 
Constructivists, who stress the relationship between ideas (identity) and social processes 
in diverse issue areas, offer another interpretation of the story of the late-night driver (Adler 1997, 
Checkel 1998, Katzenstein 1996, Wendt 1992), one that emphasizes the logic of appropriateness: 
The driver stops simply because that is what one ought to do when encountering a red light. This 
explanation does not involve a calculation of her interests or preferences; she stops because it is 
7 
what she is expected to do—it is what she learned in driving school. Based on this logic of 
appropriateness, constructivists argue that states do not only “obey” international human rights 
laws; they willingly “comply” with these laws and norms, because following human rights laws 
and norms is an “appropriate behavior.” This is what international society expects good states to 
do; good states comply with international human rights laws and norms. (Recall that, beginning 
in the 1990s, human rights increasingly began to be treated as “the right thing.”) The 
constructivists thus challenge the interest-based logic of rationalists, who suggest that the 
guiding principle is “Do X to get Y”; constructivists shift that logic to “Good states do X.” 
Therefore, states that want to be regarded as good states do X—what good countries do. 
Constructivists do not dismiss the logic of consequence that underpins the rationalist argument; 
they do argue that states’ compliance with international norms are almost always utilitarian in the 
beginning (Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink 1999). Constructivists, however, pay attention to how this 
utilitarian approach develops by also examining the roles played by ideas (identity) and 
socialization. 
1.2.3 Constructivism and the Power of Norms 
Constructivists have a flexible understanding of the structure of the ever-evolving 
international system (Adler 2002). They do not see social structure as a given, static independent 
variable but as a malleable one, contending that “shared knowledge and intersubjective 
understanding may also shape and motivate actors [. . .] and the social structures may supply 
states with both preferences and strategies for pursuing those preferences” (Finnemore 1996, 15). 
Constructivists thus reverse the traditional causal arrows; instead of seeing states—the main 
agents of the international system—as a passive entity, influenced by other actors such as non-
governmental organizations or intergovernmental organizations, they see states as being 
8 
influenced by social norms produced by others. According to Katzenstein, norms “describe 
collective expectations for the proper behavior of actors with a given identity. In some situations, 
norms operate like rules that define the identity of an actor, thus having ‘constitutive effects’ that 
specify what actions will cause relevant others to recognize a particular identity” (Katzenstein 
1996, 5). In other words, although norms may lack enforcement power, they are very effective in 
shaping and strengthening state identity, interests, and behavior through the the concept of 
appropriateness; states learn what is “appropriate” and voluntarily comply with the norms of 
appropriateness (Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink 1999, Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, Goodman and 
Jinks 2013). 
Finnemore argues that the logic of appropriateness validates “thoughtful, intelligent 
political behavior” (Finnemore 1996, 29). Many examples illustrate how norms have changed 
state behavior by shaping states’ interests and preferences (Cortell and Davis 2000). For instance, 
Richard Price argues that many states have decided not to use chemical weapons—not just 
because the states are bound by treaties that forbid it, but because of the negative image of 
chemical weapons, which are constructed as poor man’s weapons. Chemical weapons are 
stigmatized and are associated with the identity “poor country,” and many states thus voluntarily 
agreed not to use them (Price 1997). This behavior was shaped by states’ desire that others not 
think of them as poor or weak. Similarly, Nina Tannenwald challenges the widely believed 
explanation that nuclear weapons are most useful as deterrents. She argues that a normative 
element must also be taken into account because the normative prohibition on the use of nuclear 
weapons has stigmatized them as “unacceptable weapons” of mass destruction (Tannenwald 
1999). These studies show the importance of identity—both subjective and intersubjective—in 
shaping the behavior of states. 
9 
A subgroup of constructivists, the post-structuralists, provide valuable insight into 
national identities for this study. They view national identities as discursive social identities that 
are constructed, deconstructed, reproduced, and transformed according to context: national 
identities should be understood as “dynamic, fragile, vulnerable” and “often incoherent” rather 
than “consistent, stable and immutable” (De Cellia et al. 1999, 154). Thinking in terms of 
national identity, which changes with context, enables me to examine Korea’s different national 
identities at different points in history. 
1.2.3.1 International Organizations as Teachers of Norms 
If norms are socially learned, who are the teachers of norms? Who are the agents that 
create the social structures that produce behavioral changes through the logic of appropriateness? 
Building upon Wendt’s argument, which claims that agents and structures are mutually 
constitutive, Finnemore argues that agents and social structures mutually constitute one another: 
agents shape social structures, and social structures, in turn, influence and reconstruct agents. 
Finnemore examines the activity of three international organizations (IOs) and describes how 
these IOs socialize “states to accept new political goals and new values that have lasting impacts 
on the conduct of war, the workings of the international political economy, and the structure of 
states themselves” (Finnemore 1996, 3). She also examines two intergovernmental organizations, 
the United Nations Educational Social and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) and the World 
Bank. She demonstrates how states learned through UNESCO that modern states establish 
science bureaucracies and became eager to establish the same science bureaucracies in their own 
government structures. Similarly, Finnemore’s case study of the World Bank shows that the 
notion of development changed from one based on measures such as GDP and GNP to one that 
began to incorporate distributional concern—a change that states accepted as being in their 
10 
interests. As is typical in the work of constructivists, Finnemore’s study reverses the traditional 
causal arrows, showing that not only do states influence IOs but international systems such as 
IOs change and reconstitute state identities, interests, and behavior. Many constructivist authors 
emphasize the role played by IOs as an agent of social-structural change in international relations, 
because IOs change the identity, interests and behavior of states (Finnemore 1996, Ruggie 1998, 
Barnett and Finnemore 2004). 
1.2.3.2 Nongovernmental Organizations as Teachers of Norms 
Other groups of constructivist scholars see nonstate “activists beyond borders” and their 
transnational advocacy networks (TANs) as a major force in social construction and in norms-
teaching (Keck and Sikkink 1998; Risse-Kappen 1995). Keck and Sikkink (1998) argue that state 
sovereignty is now challenged and diversified—states no longer look unitary from the outside 
world, and “the state does not monopolize the public sphere” (32); these scholars bridge the 
“increasingly artificial divide between international and national realms” (4) by elaborating the 
norms-teaching role of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and their transnational advocacy 
networks (TANs), positing what they call the “boomerang effect.” This “boomerang effect” 
model explains how TANs effectively link the domestic and international spheres: in a repressive 
state, domestic groups bypass the state, instead directly seeking international allies who can 
impose pressure on the state from outside (hence the boomerang analogy—the pressure, like a 
boomerang, leaves the state and then returns to its origin point). Keck and Sikkink describe how 
states’ identity, interest, and behavior has changed in response to pressure from TANs in specific 
thematic areas, such as the environmental movement and women’s rights; they show how TANs 
simultaneously exert pressure on the state from “below” (pressure from the domestic groups) and 
from “above” (pressure from other states, which have themselves been pressured by TANs). 
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1.2.3.3 States’ Agency Underestimated by Student Role 
In constructivist literature, the social structures of world politics that are shaped by agents 
in turn influence and reconstruct agents. In other words, constructivists perceive the relationship 
between agents and structures as mutually constitutive. Constructivists attempt to explain how 
social structures such as norms and rules shape state identity and interests. However, in 
constructivist studies, states often seem to be dependent variables, entities that behave only in the 
way they are “taught” by others; states are demoted to recipients of norms without much 
autonomy or self-determination. While this refreshing approach emphasizes how structure 
shapes world politics, it erases the salience of the state. As Finnemore puts it, “states are what 
they do. States are socially constructed entities. [. . .] States are continually evolving. They take 
on new tasks and create new bureaucracies to carry out those tasks” (Finnemore 1996, 4–5). 
Constructivists, perhaps driven by the need to differentiate their approach from that of the 
rationalists and particularly the neo-realists, spoke less of the state than of the agents that 
influence the state. But this constructivist erasure of the state becomes problematic when one 
attempts to explain why some states actively learn and others do not. States learn differently 
depending on the nature of each state, its society, and its state–society relations; some states are 
more autonomous than others, and some states are more susceptible to pressure than others. In 
examining states’ norms compliance, the salience, autonomy, and variety of states must be 
accounted for (Evans, Rueschemeyer, and Theda 1985, Schedler, Diamond, and Plattner 1999, 
Lake 2007), as well as states’ domestic political agency (Subotic, 2007; Goodman and Jinks 
2004). Recently, constructivist scholars have begun to put the state back into consideration, 
seeing “statehood” as an important determinant of states’ compliance with human rights and 
arguing that some states are incapable of complying, regardless of their intentions (Börzel and 
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Risse 2013). This suggests that studies of norms compliance cannot take place in a vacuum, but 
must pay attention to the particular circumstances of each state. 
1.2.4 Constructivism, National Identity, and International Legitimacy 
The constructivist argument that the logic of appropriateness shapes particular identities 
and interests can be applied to states’ international legitimacy-seeking behaviors. The literature 
of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries addressing the standard of civilization formed the 
foundation of theories of modern international society, which developed into the current-day 
discourse on international legitimacy. Scholars who assert the importance of international 
legitimacy often argue that states adopt, ratify, and implement international human rights treaties 
for reasons of identity, influenced by the logic of appropriateness. The state’s behavior 
represents and is shaped by its identity—both its current identity (who I am) and its desired 
identity (who I want to be): if you want to be like someone, you behave as the person you want 
to be like behaves. 
For example, in a Pierre Bourdieu-influenced account of Japanese leisure policy, David 
Leheny argues that Japanese government officials try to shape the leisure activities of citizens to 
reflect the country’s desired identity, encouraging them to spend their private time in ways 
suitable for citizens of an “industrialized advanced modern country” like other Western 
European countries (Leheny 2003).
 
 In this account, Japan’s desired identity plays a key role in 
its leisure policy; because Japan wishes to be seen as an advanced country, different from its 
poor Asian neighbors, government officials instituted policies aimed at encouraging Japanese 
citizens to behave in their leisure time like the citizens of a rich European country. Leheny’s 
work also suggests the importance of intersubjective identity: states imitate the behavior of their 
role models, regardless of the reality of their current national identity. Japanese leisure policy 
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was aimed at encouraging citizens to behave in ways that citizens of Western European countries 
do, because Japan wished to be recognized as one of those rich, advanced countries. 
States’ international legitimacy-seeking behavior can be seen even more clearly in the 
field of international human rights. The power and stability of political regimes comes from 
consent; even repressive regimes govern by a combination of coercion and consent, and consent 
is the basis from which states derive their legitimation.
 
In addition to securing domestic consent 
and legitimacy, states also seek international legitimacy (Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink 1999). A state 
seeking international legitimacy is “seeking to be a part of a community; being a legitimate actor 
in a community not only requires internalizing an external standard but also depends on 
intersubjective identity formation with others in the community and differentiating the self from 
others” (Flowers 2009, 24). States comply with international human rights norms both because 
they want to think well of themselves and because they want other states to think well of them—
to view them as a legitimate member of a community. To understand states’ compliance with 
human rights norms, scholars must understand state identities—who they are, who they want to 
be—and the logic of appropriateness. National identities should be understood as malleable and 
dynamic concepts that are constructed, de-constructed, and reconstructed over time. 
When the acceptance of international human rights norms became an indicator for a 
“good democratic country,” it also, in turn, became one of the very important ways for states to 
pursue international legitimacy in service of changing or reinforcing national identities. 
According to Petrice Flowers, who examined refugee women’s employment and land mine 
policies in Japan, Japan and other states ratify and implement international human rights treaties 
because they believe these treaties will enhance their international legitimacy (Flowers 2009). 
According to Carl Stychin, Australia reinvented its national image and increased its international 
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legitimacy by speaking the language of international human rights, especially that of gay and 
lesbian rights (Stychin 1998a, 145–193). Jelena Subotic investigates how the Balkan states 
manipulated their transitional justice institution—institutions that are established in disgraced 
post-war states to address past state wrongdoings, including human rights violations—in order to 
reestablish their international legitimacy, using it to attain membership in prestigious 
international clubs such as the European Union (Subotic 2009). As these examples demonstrate, 
states pervasively appropriate international human rights, a value of “good” nations, to reinvent 
their public images or to obtain international legitimacy. 
1.2.4.1 The Importance of Domestic Context 
Although many states comply with international human rights regimes to gain 
international legitimacy and be seen as an appropriate member of the international community, 
the degree to which states seek domestic or international legitimacy differs from country to 
country. Some states are more eager to obtain domestic legitimacy, while others care more about 
international legitimacy. To understand how intently a state pursues international legitimacy, the 
state’s identity-building process must be examined. Pursuing legitimacy by adopting 
international human rights norms means changes to the state’s domestic and national identity, 
which are created by the new norms: “Participation in transnational legal process creates a 
normative and constitutive dynamic. By interpreting global norms, and internalizing them into 
domestic law, that process leads to reconstruction of national interests, and eventually national 
identities” (Koh 1997, 2659). As Beth Simmons argues, this adjustment may be even more 
complex after ratification, when the international norms arrive at home: “for most countries, an 
internationally negotiated treaty is an exogenous event in the flow of national policymaking and 
legislation. Very few countries have both the political power and the will to fashion on 
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international human rights agenda that matches exactly their own legislative agenda” (Simmons 
2009, 127). Even countries that are, in principle, genuinely committed to the values encoded in 
treaties can be barred from acting on those values by domestic opposition. What happens when 
international human rights treaties or norms that represent compromises in external sovereignty 
come home as an “exogenous” agenda?  
International norms are not automatically diffused in the domestic sphere. Much research 
has examined the impact of global norms on domestic politics, but much less research has 
attended to how these diffused global norms work or do not work in the domestic sphere. Most 
studies are limited to analyzing the diffusion process at the vertical level: in these scholarly 
models, norms flow down from the global level to the domestic sphere, and the subsequent 
process of norms domestication within the state is ignored. However, some scholars have given 
due consideration to the process of domestication. In particular, Sally Engle Merry contends that 
global norms are not diffused intact; they go through a unique process of “vernacularization,” or 
localization, which translates the global norms into the domestic political structure and local 
culture. Merry discusses the role played by “translators,” who “translate” the global language of 
human rights norms and laws focusing on women’s rights into local contexts (Merry 2006). 
Other scholars recognize that the lack of attention to norms diffusion in the domestic context is a 
problem for the field; according to Vanhala, IR theories are weakened by their lack of attention 
to domestic political and institutional structures, and the biggest theoretical pitfall of the logic of 
appropriateness is its disproportionate emphasis on international structural features: the “top-
down perspective tends to narrow the focus onto international organizations as the driver of 
domestic change, ignoring other potential domestic causes” (Vanhala 2015, 837). It is important, 
then, to study norms diffusion in both international and domestic contexts; domestic, political, 
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and institutional structures affect how international norms are diffused and understood, and 
understanding domestic contexts can help to explain both why certain norms are accepted in a 
country and others are not, and why some states adopt certain norms while other states do not. 
 
1.3 A Note on Methodology 
The constructivist model positing causal relations between external pressure (from IOs, 
NGOs, etc.) and state compliance does not provide a full account of compliance, because it 
leaves out several crucial variables that affect compliance, including domestic political agency 
(Subotic 2007). These models are often criticized as problematic by IR scholars (Hobson 2000) 
because they disregard intervening variables and contingencies; these oversimplified causal 
relations cannot explain why some states voluntarily adopt NHRIs without any pressure from 
outside, and they often assume that international norms are “implemented” without considering 
how they are diffused at local levels. 
A recent comparative study of a number of European NHRIs demonstrates the 
importance of domestic context in establishing and strengthening NHRIs (Mertus 2009). 
Although this study does not attempt to explain why states establish NHRIs, it successfully 
overcomes the rather hackneyed approach to NHRIs that primarily examines the roles played by 
IOs and NGOs; it takes domestic context into account and examines multiple case studies. This 
comparative approach, examining multiple cases to analyze why NHRIs are established and why 
they work well, is a fairly common one (Stokke 2007, Byrnes, Durbach, and Renshaw 2008, Koo 
and Ramirez 2009), because it is conducive to creating general theories about NHRIs and to 
understanding the variations among NHRIs (Cardenas 2002, Reif 2000). However, when 
exploring the question of why states would create watchdogs for themselves, these comparative 
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studies may lack the in-depth analysis that is possible in single case studies. There is thus a gap 
in the literature, and a need for in-depth single case studies addressing this question; according to 
Hong, “although the past two decades have seen the proliferation of national human rights 
institutions (NHRIs) throughout the world, an analysis of the status and functions of an NHRI in 
a particular country has not been actively conducted” (Hong 2010, 193). 
The need to do an in-depth study on one NHRI is clear, given the various forms and 
functions the organizations take across the world and given the impact of domestic context upon 
NHRIs; similarly, understanding the motivations behind a state’s creation of an NHRI requires 
an in-depth ethnographic study of a single country’s national identity-construction process. The 
single case study presented in this dissertation aims to fill gaps in the study of NHRIs and shed 
light on why states create NHRIs. This ethnographic method enables me to unravel the complex 
domestic context that enables norm diffusion and to trace how norm diffusion changes over time 
in the same domestic space. 
This study examined official documents from the Korean government and from the 
international human rights community to see whether and how the establishment of Korea’s 
NHRI was connected to the concept of seonjinguk. The government documents included 
statements made at international meetings, public statements from Korean presidents, and 
records of the National Assembly of Korea discussing the promotion of the NHRCK as a means 
to become a seonjinguk. These government records indicate that Korea’s adoption of global 
human rights norms, including the norms on NHRIs, was often linked to the idea of Korea’s 
becoming a seonjinguk. Statements and reports from domestic NGOs and the international 
human rights community, including international NGOs and the UN, show how external pressure 
from these organizations, which instigated Korea’s desire to seek international legitimacy and 
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become a seonjin human rights state, effected change in the domestic sphere over time. And the 
analysis of newspaper articles focused on Korea’s becoming seonjinguk and especially on 
Korea’s becoming a human rights seonjinguk uncovers changes in reporting on this concept, 
showing that the definitions of seonjinguk changed over time, first incorporating human rights 
into the definition and then removing them. 
In addition, I conducted interviews with key persons who are experts in NHRIs and who 
are knowledgeable about the creation, development, and diminishment of the NHRCK. The 
interviews were valuable in filling in the gaps of textual analysis and offered a more in-depth, 
ethnographical account of the story of the NHRCK. The interviewees include Mr. Brian 
Burdekin (former Special Advisor on National Institutions to the UN High Commissioner for 
Human Rights); Mr. Park Kyung-seo
5
 (the former Ambassador in Human Rights at Large, 
appointed by President Kim Dae-jung); Mr. Cho Yong-whan (a lawyer, one of the key drafters of 
the NGO-initiated NHRCK bill and the key negotiator with the Ministry of Justice); Ms. Choi 
Young-ae (former Secretary-General of the NHRCK); Mr. Lee Seong-hoon (the executive 
director of Korean Human Rights Foundation and the former Human Rights Policy Director at 
the NHRCK); Mr. Kim Hyung-wan (the former manager of the Human Rights Policy Division, 
NHRCK); and Ms. Kim Giyoun (of the Asian Forum for Human Rights and Development 
[FORUM-ASIA]). 
 
1.4 Organization of the Dissertation 
This dissertation consists of seven chapters. In this introductory chapter, I have explained 
the central research question, laid out the line of argument, offered a brief literature review on 
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Korean names are written with the family name first, followed by the first name. 
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theories of compliance, and included a note on the methodology employed for this work. Chapter 
2 explains how NHRIs began to be standardized in the 1990s, rising into prominence with the 
standardization of the global human rights norms and eventually achieving the status of an 
“appropriate” institution. The chapter also provides a review of existing studies of NHRIs and 
identifies gaps found in existing research. 
Chapter 3 demonstrates how Korea constructed its seonjinguk identity through nation-
building and explores Korea’s state–society relations. I show how Korea came to follow the 
logic of appropriateness through seeking approval of others; I describe how the desire to become 
seonjinguk was internalized by the state and by the people as a shared national goal over time, 
and how this national identity paved the way for the acceptance of global human rights norms 
relating to NHRIs. 
Chapter 4 discusses how the global norms regarding NHRIs were diffused and actively 
accepted in Korea. I show the domestic struggle to accept NHRI norms and describe the national 
debate (which lasted for more than three years and involved multiple domestic and international 
actors) over whether to create the NHRCK as an independent governmental institution or as a 
private foundation. In this debate, one side appealed to Korea’s desired seonjinguk identity and 
to the increased international legitimacy that an NHRI would bring, and this rhetorical strategy 
helped win the debate: the NHRCK was established as an independent institution, in adherence 
to the global standard. 
Chapter 5 assesses how the NHRCK rose to become a model institution, praised by the 
international community and its peer NHRIs, under President Roh Moo-hyun. I investigate how 
the nation’s concept of seonjinguk, in which human rights were at first deeply embedded, led the 
government to promote the NHRCK even when the NHRCK directly challenged the government 
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over a highly sensitive political issue (the president’s decision to deploy troops to Iraq in 2003). 
The government absorbed this challenge, recognizing that the independence of the NHRCK was 
the most important standard for NHRIs and that its national image was at stake. The government 
understood that allowing the NHRCK to challenge the government’s actions would enhance 
Korea’s reputation as a seonjin human rights state in the international community. Chapter 5 also 
provides evidence that Korea’s strategy was working: several Koreans were appointed to high-
level positions in international organizations, including Ban Ki-moon’s appointment as the UN 
Secretary-General. 
The final substantive chapter, chapter 6, examines the reduction in the NHRCK’s power 
in Korea after the inauguration of Lee Myung-bak, a political conservative who was inhospitable 
to human rights. I illustrate how the NHRCK was excluded from government policy preferences 
and was targeted for deliberate weakening. For Lee Myung-bak, the NHRCK was a hindrance to 
the pursuit of seonjinguk status rather than an asset to it. Chapter 6 proves how important a 
nation’s domestic political context is in norm diffusion and reconstruction, showing how the 
change in the Korean domestic political climate—its increasing disregard of global human rights 
norms—changed the reputation and the enforcing power of the NHRCK. 
Chapter 7 offers conclusions, examines limitations and gaps in the study, and makes 
suggestions for further research.   
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CHAPTER 2 
STANDARDIZATION PROCESS OF NHRIS 
 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter builds upon the previously surveyed literature of compliance to show how 
the NHRI came to be accepted by many states as an “appropriate” institution that indicated a 
good democratic country. In so doing, I will trace the history of the ideas that led to NHRIs and 
examine how the norms and principles around NHRIs developed over time, and I will connect 
these developments with contemporaneous changes in world politics: the accelerated 
democratization process in many countries, the end of the Cold War, the rise of civil society, and 
the increasing standardization of global human rights norms. This chapter includes elaboration 
on the types of NHRIs and how they function in different settings—information that is important 
to understanding the flexible and distinctive characteristics of NHRIs. 
This chapter examines the literature on NHRIs, including the methodologies used. It will 
identify the gaps and problems of existing studies, which primarily focus on the functions and 
effectiveness of NHRIs in the promotion and protection of human rights and the role of NHRIs 
in relation to other human rights actors such as courts, civil society, and international 
organizations. Existing studies are largely focused on what prompts states to create NHRIs, and 
they usually discover their answers in forces outside the state, such as influence from 
international organizations and pressure from NGOs. I contend that this approach is not 
appropriate for answering the question of why states adopt NHRIs, because it ignores the role of 
the state, which is of fundamental importance. This chapter justifies the study methodology, 
showing why an ethnographic study of one country adds to our understanding of how state 
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behavior is shaped by identity and interest in its adoption of global human rights norms and 
associated institutions. This chapter thus builds the groundwork for the case study of Korea that 
follows, as Korea’s NHRI adoption is bound up with its national identity and its desire to be a 
seonjin human rights state. 
 
2.2 Evolution of NHRIs 
2.2.1 Early Development of NHRIs and Human Rights 
The initial discussion of NHRIs dates back to 1946, when the international group of 
experts under the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), who were “preparing the future 
work of the Commission on Human Rights,” “proposed that governments should set up ‘national 
committees’ or ‘information groups’ to provide the Commission with information on states’ 
observance of human rights” (Pohjolainen 2006,119). This proposal from the expert group was 
later endorsed by ECOSOC and became a “common standard of achievement for all peoples and 
all nations” (Global Alliance of National Human Rights Institutions 2017b). The earliest NHRIs 
were aimed at enlisting governments’ participation in international human rights meetings, and 
particularly in the work of the Human Rights Commission; they were not originally intended to 
have the broad functions of promoting and protecting human rights that they now perform. In 
1962, this initial concept was revised by the resolution of the Commission on Human Rights, 
changing the “national committees” or “information groups” into “national advisory committees 
for human rights,” designed to examine human rights at the national level, to offer advice to 
governments, and to create public awareness about human rights. Pohjolainen views this revision 
as a milestone that “set out the first blueprint for the basic functions of national institutions, 
namely monitoring, advice and education” (Pohjolainen 2006, 119). During this period, the 
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mandate of the organizations that would become NHRIs began to broaden, but key details of 
their status, structure, and powers were not yet laid out. The ECOSOC also at this time began to 
recognize the role of these soon-to-be NHRIs in promoting and protecting human rights at the 
domestic level, a shift that gained momentum once international human rights treaties were 
adopted and opened for signature and ratification in the late 1960s (Kim 2009a, 4–6). 
Between the late 1970s and the late 1980s, simultaneous changes occurred that affected 
both the national advisory committees for human rights (the putative NHRIs) and global-level 
human rights activities: treaty-monitoring bodies were strengthened, fact-finding missions were 
undertaken, and working groups were created, all aimed at effectively responding to states’ 
human rights violations (Ramcharan 1989, 514–515). The International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR) and International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(ICESCR) both entered into force in 1976, and this energized the discussion of the role of NHRIs 
might play in the domestic implementation of human rights treaties. In addition, the 1978 
Seminar on National and Local Institutions for the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights in 
Geneva laid out the first broad guidelines for the structure and functioning of NHRIs (United 
Nations Division on Human Rights 1978). 
The two covenants initiated a global movement toward the standardization of human 
rights. Shortly after the two covenants entered into force, major international human rights 
treaties were adopted; these treaties set a standard for what it meant to comply with international 
human rights laws and standards in various thematic areas ranging from racial discrimination to 
torture to women’s and children’s rights. 
In this climate of increasing internationalization of human rights, the Commission on 
Human Rights proposed guidelines in 1978 that laid out recommendations for states about the 
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structure and functioning of NHRIs. These guidelines, which grew out of the Seminar on 
National and Local Institutions for the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, offered a 
detailed set of recommendations for NHRIs’ functions, their autonomous, impartial status, and 
their pluralistic composition. These guidelines were subsequently endorsed by both the 
Commission on Human Rights and the General Assembly. 
2.2.2 The Paris Principles and NHRIs 
The NHRI as we know it today was developed with the Paris Principles in 1991, at the 
International Workshop on National Institutions for the Promotion and Protection of Human 
Rights. This workshop, which took place in Paris, adopted comprehensive and detailed 
international guidelines governing the status, mandate, composition, and power of NHRIs. These 
guidelines, called the Paris Principles, were endorsed by the UN Commission on Human Rights 
in 1992 and the World Conference on Human Rights in 1993; they were adopted by the UN 
General Assembly in Resolution 48/134 in December 1993. Since then, the Paris Principles have 
become “the most authoritative normative basis that exists at the international level for defining 
the characteristic of national institutions for the promotion and protection of human rights” 
(Pohjolainen 2006, 9); they are now considered a standard-setting tool for testing the legitimacy 
and credibility of NHRIs. The Principles are further legitimized by the fact that they were 
originally drafted by representatives of NHRIs rather than by government representatives or 
diplomats (Goodman and Pegram 2011b, 6). 
The Paris Principles require an NHRI to  
 have as broad a mandate as possible, based on international human rights standards 
and norms; 
 have its mandate set out in a constitutional or legislative text; 
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 have pluralist representation and be able to collaborate with all parts of society, 
including nongovernmental organizations; and  
 have adequate resources to ensure its independent and stable functioning. 
The Paris Principles are used by the International Coordinating Committee of National 
Institutions for Promotion and Protection of Human Rights (ICC) as the single most significant 
determinant in deciding the accreditation status of each NHRI.
6
 In 2015, de Beco and Murray 
published a detailed commentary on the Paris Principles aimed at providing guidance for the 
application of the Principles (de Beco and Murray 2015). The role of the ICC has been an 
interesting subject for scholars studying NHRIs; for instance, Meg Brodie discusses the role 
played by the ICC in promoting norms socialization through its membership granting function 
(Brodie 2011). 
Compliance with the Paris Principles is also used regionally, to determine whether a 
given NHRI should be admitted to different regional NHRI mechanisms, gaining access to 
privileges (Brodie 2006). In other words, for an NHRI to be taken as a legitimate institution, 
globally and regionally, it must meet the criteria set out in the Paris Principles. The Sub-
committee on Accreditation, a subsidiary body of the ICC, evaluates the status of NHRIs in 
accordance with the Paris Principles. The ICC uses the following classifications:
 7
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 The ICC, a network of the world’s NHRIs, has several functions: it facilitates and supports NHRI engagement with 
the UN Human Rights Council and Treaty Bodies; it encourages cooperation and information sharing among NHRIs; 
it promotes to other international agencies the role of NHRIs in the United Nations and in states; it helps NHRIs 
build capacity, in cooperation with the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights; and it evaluates which 
NHRIs are under threat and which governments should establish NHRIs (Global Alliance of National Human Rights 
Institutions 2017b). The ICC changed its name to the Global Alliance of National Human Rights Institutions 
(GANHRI) at the annual meeting of the NHRIs in March 2016. In this dissertation, the title ICC will be used for 
activities before February 2016, and the new name, GANHRI, will be used when referring to activities that took 
place after March 2016. 
7
 If an NHRI has an A status, it is a full voting member and is allowed to participate in international human rights as 
a legitimate actor. As voting members, NHRIs with an A status can participate fully in the international and regional 
work and meetings of National Institutions and are eligible to hold office in the Bureau of the ICC or its subsidiary 
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A: compliant with the Paris Principles 
B: not fully compliant with the Paris Principles 
C: noncompliant with the Paris Principles 
As of January 2017, there are 74 NHRIs with an A status, 33 NHRIs with a B status, and 
10 NHRIs with a C status across the world. 
Byrnes, Durbach, and Renshaw argue that while the Paris Principles set out minimum 
criteria for an effective and functioning NHRI, they should not function as standards for NHRIs. 
The authors question both the incompleteness of the principles and their pragmatic approach to 
measuring NHRIs’ effectiveness and independence, noting that the Paris Principles reflect 
political realities: they are a compromise aimed at keeping governments from appearing to 
promote human rights by creating institutions without full independence and responding powers. 
In short, “the Principles are thus an attempt to forestall the creation of hollow institutions and to 
provide protection against the undermining of functioning NHRIs, as well as to promote the 
protection of human rights across the board” (Byrnes, Durbach, and Renshaw 2008, 65–66). 
Other scholars make similar observations about the Paris Principles; according to Goodman and 
Pegram, the “diluted” standards contained in the Principles were intended to cover many 
different forms of NHRIs, including weaker ones (Goodman and Pegram 2011b, 6). 
Brian Burdekin, who played a fundamental role in the drafting of the Paris Principles and 
served as a Special Advisor on National Institutions, Regional Arrangements, and Preventive 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
bodies. They can participate in the Human Rights Council sessions and be officially given the floor to intervene 
during sessions. NHRIs with a B status may participate in the regional and international meetings of NHRIs, but 
cannot vote or hold offices with the ICC. They are not given NHRI badges nor allowed to take the floor during 
Council sessions. Institutions with a C status have no rights or privileges with the ICC or in the UN human rights 
forums, including the Human Rights Council. See http://nhri.ohchr.org/EN/AboutUs/GANHRIAccreditation/Pages 
/default.aspx. 
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Strategies to the first three United Nations High Commissioners for Human Rights, explained the 
dilemmas that were posed when the drafters were negotiating the language in the Paris Principles: 
In an attempt to give a broad mandate to NHRIs, we had to make a choice about whether 
to insist on language for a strong commission or to adopt language aimed at promoting 
the wide involvement of as many states as possible. We made a strategic decision and 
went with the latter, but without compromising the core functions of the NHRIs and its 
independence and effectiveness. My conviction was that we had to have a language for 
which we could obtain the approval of the UN General Assembly.
8
 
 
Kim Giyoun, a UN Advocate from an NGO called the Asian Forum for Human Rights 
and Development (FORUM-ASIA) that has done an extensive program on NHRIs, suggested a 
different view on the Paris Principles, especially regarding its accreditation mechanism: 
The Paris Principles is somewhat limited in its ability to discern which are the 
credentialed and functioning NHRIs. We have NHRIs that have an A status because they 
meet the criteria of the Paris Principles, while the reality does not always come close to 
being a credible and effective NHRI. The criteria contained in the Paris Principles are not 
sufficient in evaluating NHRIs.
9
 
Other scholars share Kim Giyoun’s view. In a study examining the Paris Principles, 
Rachel Murray concludes that the Principles provide a useful starting point but lack appropriate 
criteria for measuring the performance and impact of NHRIs, and that other measurement tools 
are needed to properly evaluate individual NHRIs (Murray 2007). According to Petersen, the 
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 Brian Burdekin (Former Special Advisor on National Institutions to the UN High Commissioner for Human 
Rights), in discussion with the author, Geneva, Switzerland, April 6, 2011; copy on file with author. 
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ICC review that is based on the Paris Principles could “create the wrong incentives for the 
governments” because of the Principles’ weak, vague, and narrow criteria (Petersen 2011, 176, 
199–209). 
Despite these weaknesses in the Paris Principles, they have not been revised since their 
adoption. Sidoti argues that this is because of the Principles’ strong legitimizing effects on 
NHRIs—in effect produced, in part, because NHRIs themselves played an important role in the 
drafting of the Paris Principles (Sidoti 2011). 
2.2.3 Distinctiveness of NHRIs 
NHRIs are distinctive institutions in several ways; for example, Anne Smith examines the 
institutions’ distinctive positioning and accountability mechanisms, which exist in a “conceptual 
space” between the government and civil society. She calls this a “mixed blessing,” pointing out 
that NHRIs are accountable in two directions: “downwards” to their constituencies, including 
partners, beneficiaries, staff, and supporters, and “upwards” to the government (Smith 2006, 
905–906). The NHRI’s distinctive positioning is important, according to the UN: It notes that 
while the states are the primary duty-bearer of protecting and promoting human rights, they are 
often limited because they “cannot always find a neutral space in which to interact and exchange 
ideas with other actors, especially civil society” (United Nations 2010, 20). This need is filled by 
NHRIs, which “occupy a unique terrain, one that can link civil society to the Government”; 
NHRIs are effective in “providing a neutral meeting point and focal point for human rights,” 
which “encourages dialogue and facilitates cooperation” (United Nations 2010, 20). 
Other scholars focus on the distinctive role played by some NHRIs in monitoring and 
implementing international human rights laws and norms. For example, Carver observes the 
increasing tendency among NHRIs to invoke international human rights standards in their 
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domestic monitoring and case handling (Carver 2010).  Other scholars have argued that these 
NHRIs can be regarded as proxies for international human rights law operating in domestic 
spaces (Hong 2010, 174). Despite the often-notable roles played by NHRIs in implementing 
international human rights laws and norms, NHRIs’ autonomy is limited by their mandates; these 
mandates are designed by the host states, who initially determine to what extent each NHRI may 
apply international human rights standards within that state.
 10
 
NHRIs are distinct from other state agencies, especially the judiciary, which is the 
traditional remedy mechanism for human rights violations. In general, judicial decisions are 
limited by existing laws and jurisprudence; therefore, courts’ decisions may not always promote 
or protect human rights (United Nations 2010, 43). NHRIs, in contrast, often base their views on 
widely accepted universal human rights, whether or not those rights are protected in domestic 
statues and whether or not there is existing domestic legal precedent for protecting those rights. 
However, NHRIs (unlike the judiciary) are not given the power to enforce compliance using 
coercion. NHRIs may make progressive, proactive decisions from a perspective of human rights 
advocacy, but these decisions can only be enforced by the “soft power” of the NHRI, and the 
acceptance of NHRI recommendations varies from country to country (Hong 2010, 168–169). In 
this regard, NHRIs are somewhat at the mercy of their host states: they are, in some regards, 
what states make of them. 
2.2.4 Diversities of NHRIs 
An NHRI is defined by the United Nations as “a body which is established by a 
government under the constitution, or by law or decree, the functions of which are specifically 
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 For instance, Canada, Zambia, and the Philippines do not have the mandate to apply international human rights 
treaties. 
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designed in terms of the promotion and protection of human rights” (United Nations 2010). 
Although the Paris Principles promote NHRIs and provide a general set of criteria for the 
institutions, NHRIs are fundamentally a governmental body designed by a government. The role 
of the state in the design of NHRIs is therefore crucial; states enjoy almost full autonomy in 
designing their NHRIs, deciding on its legal status, its level of independence, and the scope of its 
mandates. Consequently, NHRIs vary a great deal from state to state—some NHRIs are given 
power to investigate and litigate complaints while others are limited to promotional and advisory 
roles (Petersen 2011, 198). For example, while several NHRIs have mandates to apply 
international human rights treaties, the NHRIs in Canada, Zambia, and the Philippines do not 
(Goodman and Pegram 2011a, 11). 
Most NHRIs focus on domestic human rights issues, but some NHRIs’ mandates enable 
them to promote and protect human rights outside their domestic sphere. For example, the 
Danish Institute for Human Rights has a mandate to protect and promote human rights both at 
home and abroad—a mandate that reflects the Danish government’s foreign policy in human 
rights (Mertus 2009, 14–37). And some NHRIs are established by support from other NHRIs 
acting internationally. Canada’s trans-governmental activism presents an interesting case of this 
kind of international NHRI work. In an attempt to support NHRIs outside Canada, the Canadian 
commission has been very active in several campaigns: it organized the first African Conference 
on National Institutions for the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, held in 1996 in 
support of NHRIs in Africa; it supported and funded India’s NHRC, together with the Canadian 
International Development Agency; and it provided technical assistance to numerous countries 
establishing NHRCs, including Cameroon, South Africa, Bolivia, Peru, Mexico, Indonesia, 
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Thailand, and Cambodia (Cardenas 2003b). NHRIs are thus highly diverse; they have different 
mandates, and they may work in different settings—domestic, international, or bilateral. 
NHRIs can also take different forms, including (1) the National Human Rights 
Commission model, in which the institution has multiple members and a broad mandate to 
monitor and promote national and international human rights within the domestic realm; (2) the 
ombudsman model, which consists of a single member and staff mandated to receive complaints 
alleging certain violations of domestic norms; (3) specialized commissions designed to tackle a 
particular human rights issue, such as racial discrimination; and (4) hybrid institutions, which 
combine various aspects of the other three models. Within these structures, NHRIs can, among 
other things, offer advice to governments on proposed and existing legislation, monitor 
international treaty implementation at the domestic level, provide training and research 
opportunities to both governmental and nongovernmental actors, and, in some cases, assist with 
individual complaints. Although some NHRIs have jurisdiction over both government and 
private conduct, most NHRIs do not (Mertus 2009, 3). 
NHRIs’ functions vary according to their host state’s level of democracy. Linda Reif 
asserts that NHRIs in established or consolidated democracies perform their functions “as part of 
a wider network of domestic machinery, including courts and specialized tribunals,” while 
NHRIs in democratizing states provide “a viable forum for the investigation and resolution of 
human rights complaints in countries where the judicial system is weak, politicized, slow or 
otherwise incapacitated.” In states in transition, says Reif, NHRIs may contribute to the 
democratization process (Reif 2000, 3). Similarly, Kwak No-hyun explains that in transitional 
democratic societies, NHRIs’ primary functions tend to focus on investigation and provision of 
remedy, replacing or complementing the weak state governance and legal systems. In more 
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developed states, NHRIs prioritize the provision of advice and  the promotion of human rights 
(Kwak 1999, 88). 
Models of NHRIs vary by region as well: the Iberian human rights and ombudsman 
models are predominant in Latin America; the multimember human rights commission model 
prevails in Africa, Asia–Pacific, and the Arabic world; and the ombudsman model is frequently 
found in Europe (Pegram 2010, 748–749). NHRI regional associations and networks seem to 
have influenced inter-NHRI emulation at the regional level. For instance, the Asia–Pacific 
Forum, a regional network of NHRIs, has played an important role in the creation and 
development of the region’s NHRIs (Renshaw and Fitzpatrick 2011), and some regional NHRIs, 
such as the Polish NHRI, have served as models that other regional NHRIs emulate (Carver 
2011). 
2.3 Development of NHRIs as an “Appropriate” Institution 
As of January 24, 2017, there are 117 NHRIs in existence, meaning that more than 60% 
of United Nations member states host an NHRI (Global Alliance of National Human Rights 
Institutions 2017a). While the number of NHRIs has steadily increased over time, several studies 
indicate that there was a sudden worldwide increase in NHRIs in the 1990s. In their study on 
national strategies for advancing human rights, Pinheiro and Baluarete demonstrate that the 
number of NHRIs quadrupled in the 1990s (Pinheiro and Baluarte 2000). Before the 1990s, there 
were only about twenty NHRIs worldwide; in the year 2000, there were one hundred—a 280% 
increase in ten years (Kim 2009a, 113). During the same decade, international human rights 
norms became extensively accepted in both Western and non-Western countries (Alves 2000), 
including the Arab world, which saw the creation in the 1990s of NHRIs in Morocco, Palestine, 
and Jordan (Pegram 2010, 749). 
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The norms promoted by NHRIs have been accepted as “appropriate” behavior in recent 
decades. The normative status of NHRIs is evident in the recommendations of a wide range of 
human rights–monitoring bodies, including bodies that monitor civil and political rights, racial 
discrimination, children’s rights, and women’s rights; since the 1990s, these bodies have nearly 
always recommended establishing or strengthening NHRIs. For instance, available data shows 
that between 1999 and 2007, ninety-nine treaty bodies (whose mandate remains within the scope 
of the treaty that they monitor: CPR, ESCR, Women, Children, etc.) recommended that party 
states establish an independent NHRI in accordance with the Paris Principles; nineteen 
recommendations called for strengthening existing NHRIs (see Table 1). This shows that treaty 
bodies perceived NHRIs as a mechanism to enhance human rights in their own respective fields 
(Müller and Seidensticker 2007).  
In addition, two international human rights treaties—the Optional Protocol to the 
Convention against Torture and the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 
(CRPD)—include a formal monitoring mechanism based on the Paris Principles (Lagoutte, 
Kristiansen, and Thonbo 2016, 6–7). Two of the twenty-first century’s first human rights 
treaties—the Optional Protocol to the Torture Convention and the CRPD—create an 
unprecedentedly large role for NHRIs in monitoring and implementing multilateral treaty 
obligations;
11
 De Beco has pointed out the extensive role NHRIs play in the implementation and 
monitoring of the CRPD (de Beco 2013, 2011). NHRIs have also arisen as important actors in 
negotiating international human rights norms; they were deeply involved in negotiations on the 
UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous People (Sidoti 2011). NHRIs have a formal seat at 
the UN Human Rights Council and are one of the three entities (the others are governments and 
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 For a recent discussion of these developments and their prospects for closing the compliance gap, see Carver 
(2010). 
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civil societies) that can submit independent reports to the Council, a right that makes NHRIs 
distinctive actors in the international community. NHRIs and the normative framework they 
offer, based on the Paris Principles, now seem to be recognized as an “appropriate” global 
standard.
12
 In 2016 alone, the UN’s Universal Periodic Review (UPR) process refers to NHRIs 
124 times, usually to express concerns or recommend that a government strengthen or create an 
NHRI.
13
 Between 1999 and 2007, when treaty bodies referred to NHRIs in their concluding 
observation, 99 of these references recommended establishing an NHRI and 19 of them 
recommended strengthening an existing NHRI. 
14
  
 
2.4 The Proliferation of NHRIs in the 1990s 
A series of events in global human rights movements facilitated the 1990s proliferation of 
NHRIs. First, “the rise in NHRIs [. . .] overlapped with a global wave of democratization” 
(Cardenas 2003a: 28); the 1990s saw the beginning of this movement toward democratization, 
which demanded that states be held accountable for their actions (Schedler, Diamond, and 
Plattner 1999). Second, as democratization promoted citizen participation and state cooperation 
with civil society groups (Smith, Pagnucco, and Lopez 1998, Alagappa 2004), civil society 
groups such as NGOs flourished (Lee and Arrington 2008, Keck and Sikkink 1998, Boli and 
Thomas 1999, Reiman 2006), both domestically and internationally. The number of civil society 
organizations rapidly increased in the 1990s (see Figure 1).  
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 The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights formally recognized the important role played by NHRIs 
in the implementation of rights contained in the ICESCR through its General Comment No. 10: The Role of 
National Human Rights Institutions in the Protection of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. 
13
 The database in which this data appears, the Universal Human Rights Index, does not allow searches for UN 
documents related to NHRIs in other years. 
14
 Universal Human Rights Index, Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, data compiled by author. 
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The early 1990s saw the end of the Cold War and a wave of democratization after the fall 
of the Soviet bloc; the end of the Cold War “provided new opportunities for strengthening 
human rights as a number of Communist countries and other totalitarian states began a 
democratization process,” with more than sixty countries democratized between 1990 and 1996. 
In turn, this global wave of democratization facilitated the establishment of democratic 
institutions (Kjaerum 2003, 5). Cardenas argues that without the end of the Cold War, NHRIs 
would have been “unlikely to have proliferated as extensively” as they did during the 1990s 
(Cardenas 2009, 30). 
 
Figure 1 Number of NGOs in consultative status with ECOSOC, 1945–2007. 
 
Source: United Nations (2007). Consultative Status with ECOSOC. Available from 
http://www.un.org/esa/coordination/ngo/about.htm. 
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The end of the Cold War also brought the international status of the two extant covenants 
of rights into closer alignment. Since the 1966 adoption of both covenants—the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR)—the ICCPR had been “regarded as the most important 
human rights documents, [. . .] characterized by their emphasis on individual rights, perhaps the 
most essential element of the rule of law in a Western liberal democratic state”; the ICESCR had 
been “much maligned and regarded by many as the ‘other’ covenant” (Mutua 2007, 576). Yet 
after the end of the Cold War, economic and social rights began to “lose some of their 
Communist stigma” (Mutua 2007, 953). The end of the Cold War also enabled both Western 
countries and former Soviet states to participate in the World Conference on Human Rights, 
convened in Vienna in 1993, which proclaimed that all rights are indivisible and interdependent. 
The end of the Cold War thus not only brought together the two isolated sets of rights—civil and 
political rights with economic, social, and cultural rights—but also enabled the World 
Conference, which produced many of the most important decisions for the global human rights 
regime and for NHRIs (Boyle 1995). 
The international human rights regime has continued to strengthen since that time. For 
example, in 1994, the UN General Assembly created a UN human rights agency, the Office of 
the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), which has a broad mandate to 
promote and protect human rights;
15
 in April 2006, the UN General Assembly passed resolution 
A/RES/60/251, a landmark decision to replace the Commission on Human Rights with the 
Human Rights Council (HRC). The creation of the HRC promoted the commission to a council, 
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 The history of the OHCHR shows the growth of the UN human rights programs. It started in the 1940s as a small 
division at the UN. It was upgraded to the Center for Human Rights in the 1980s, but it had limited functions and 
budget. The OHCHR, established in 1994, reports directly to the UN Human Rights Council and the UN General 
Assembly, and is a more independent organization, monitoring global human rights situations and mainstream 
human rights. 
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implying an institutional promotion of human rights within the UN human rights system.
 
The 
Commission on Human Rights reported to the Economic and Social Council, a subsidiary body 
of the General Assembly; the HRC now reports directly to the General Assembly. The HRC was 
given an expanded mandate and broader responsibilities, including making recommendations to 
the General Assembly and undertaking a new mechanism called the Universal Periodic Review 
(UPR). UPR is different from other human rights–monitoring mechanisms. A state must be party 
to certain international human rights treaties to subject itself to international monitoring, and the 
monitoring can only be done within the purview of each treaty. But the UPR process obliges all 
member states—regardless of their ratification status—to subject themselves to regular peer 
monitoring, carried out by peer states (other monitoring mechanisms are carried out by human 
rights experts or the UN itself). UPR is based on a peer review process, and it is therefore often 
regarded as more political than other monitoring bodies. 
Since 2006, international human rights regimes have been legitimized by an increasing 
number of countries, and being a “human rights state” has become an ideal for modern 
developed states (Ignatieff 2001, Mutua 2002, Stychin 1998b). The “holy trinity” of human 
rights development—democratization, the rise of civil society, and the strengthened human 
rights regime—created a conducive environment for NHRIs in the 1990s (Mutua 2002), and in 
this context, NHRIs became widely accepted norms, being successfully diffused into a wide 
range of governance systems (Pegram 2010). Globalization speeded up in the 1990s, very likely 
making the “norms cascade” (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998) easier and facilitating the regional 
and international spread of NHRIs. Gradually, it seemed that an NHRI became a membership 
card that served as an indicator for a “good country” and enabled one to join the group of liberal 
democratic countries (Reif 2000, Kumar 2003). 
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2.5 Studying NHRIs 
Studies of NHRIs predominantly focus on reporting on the situation of NHRIs or on 
examining the organizations’ effectiveness16 (Burdekin 2007; Müller and Seidensticker 2007; 
Murray 2007; Gomez and Ramcharan 2016; Lagoutte, Kristiansen, and Thonbo 2016). However, 
several studies have elaborated on why and under what conditions states create NHRIs.
17
 For 
instance, some states adopt NHRIs to deflect pressure aimed at their political regime or at human 
rights violations, even when the adoption may seem to be against their material self-interest. 
Examples of this include Suharto’s decision to create Komnas Ham, the Indonesian NHRI 
(Carver 2000), and India’s creation of the National Human Rights Commission of India 
(Goodman and Pegram 2011a, 10). And Amanda Whiting suggests that the government of 
Malaysia may have established an NHRI to assuage widespread criticism of the ill treatment of 
its former deputy prime minister (Whiting 2003, 77). Similarly, some states created NHRIs based 
on material calculations, hoping to polish up their image for foreign donors and to gain status in 
the international and regional communities (Renshaw and Fitzpatrick 2011). 
However, these studies tend to assume that states create NHRIs primarily because of 
exogenous reasons; this assumption marginalizes states, treating them as helpless dependent 
variables that change in response to external variables—mainly pressure from the UN, other 
states, or nonstate actors and their networks. These studies are valuable in understanding what 
triggers states to create NHRIs, but they fail to recognize the state as the fundamental decision 
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 The effectiveness of NHRIs has received sustained attention within both academic and policy circles. This 
discussion marks a departure from earlier contributions, which focus more narrowly on the legal form of NHRIs. 
Important initial advances in descriptive accounts can be found in Carver (2000), Reif (2004), Carver (2005), and 
Murray (2007). 
17
 See Cardenas (2003a) and Koo and Ramirez (2009). 
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maker—an entity with full autonomy. This focus on external reasons is also limiting, as it cannot 
explain why states voluntarily accept NHRIs rather than adopting them as a result of external 
coercion. Although the process of creating NHRIs involves the interplay of multiple actors, 
states are almost always at the center of all decision making, regardless of the existence or extent 
of external pressure. 
The following sections provide a review of studies that have attempted to answer why 
states create NHRIs, showing that these studies have typically focused on external factors such 
as the influence of international organizations and civil society groups. 
2.5.1 Influence of International Organizations 
Several empirical studies that examine state–NHRI relations focus on international 
organizations (IOs), which include the UN and its human rights bodies. Many scholars see IOs as 
the most significant agent in the establishment and strengthening of NHRIs. For example, Linda 
Reif, in her work analyzing various types of NHRIs, stresses the role played by the UN and the 
international community in the creation of NHRIs (Reif 2000). And according to Cardenas, “the 
diffusion of NHRIs would not have been possible with the active support provided by 
international organizations like the UN,” particularly in the areas of standard-setting, capacity 
building, network facilitating, and membership granting (Cardenas 2003a: 28). Cardenas 
presents a strong causal relation between UN assistance and the 1990s increase in the number of 
NHRIs, which also implies a positive causal relation between the development of the 
international human rights regime and the rise of NHRIs (Cardenas 2003a, 31). 
Similarly, Pohjolainen argues that although many factors influenced the proliferation of 
NHRIs, the UN’s role was essential, as it “has actively advocated the expansion of national 
institutions” (Pohjolainen 2006, 1). The UN acknowledges this in the 2002 report of the UN 
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Secretary-General, which states that “building strong human rights institutions at the country 
level is what in the long run will ensure that human rights are protected and advanced in a 
sustained manner. The emplacement [. . .] or enhancement of a national protection system in 
each country [. . .] should therefore be a principal objective of the Organization” (United Nations 
General Assembly 2002, ¶ 50). In more recent work, Thomas Pegram has stressed the role of the 
UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) as a “dedicated orchestrator” 
in inducing states’ compliance with human rights through NHRIs (Pegram 2015). Other scholars 
also discuss the role played by the OHCHR’s leadership in promoting NHRIs (Sidoti 2011, Reif 
2011). 
These studies provide valuable insights into how international organizations orchestrate, 
regulate, and impose pressure on state behavior. These approaches, however, oversimplify the 
casual relation between state behavior and external pressure from IOs and international regimes, 
because they assume that states and their societies are passive, static entities. States do not 
establish NHRIs only because of influence from IOs. States create NHRIs for complicated 
reasons—perhaps more complicated than those behind the domestication of other international 
laws and standards. By adopting NHRIs, states not only incorporate international norms into 
their domestic system but also establish within their borders a permanent independent human 
rights agency, designed by themselves. The state and its society are not passive entities in this 
process; in fact, they exercise more autonomy and flexibility in designing the NHRI within their 
domestic sphere than they do when ratifying an existing treaty. 
2.5.2 Nonstate Actors and Their Networks 
Another well-studied exogenous variable is the role of nonstate actors and their networks. 
Increasing numbers of scholars highlight the role played by civil society groups, such as NGOs 
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and their transnational advocacy networks (TANs), in bringing effective pressure to bear on both 
IOs and states (Keck and Sikkink 1998; Reiman 2006). These arguments are convincing, as 
NGOs have become powerful, legitimized actors, both domestically and internationally. The UN 
has empowered NGOs through its international human rights regime making; like states, NGOs 
are invited to submit reports, participate in UN meetings, and make interventions as a legitimate 
actor in international society. 
Civil society has also become increasingly influential in domestic state affairs (Risse-
Kappen 1995, Reiman 2006). Because NHRIs are uniquely located between state and civil 
society (Smith 2006), research into NHRIs pays extensive attention to the work of NGOs, which 
are often treated as the single most important agent in making and sustaining NHRIs. 
The Paris Principles, in their discussion of the composition of NHRIs, firmly state the 
importance of involving civil society in establishing and strengthening NHRIs, which must 
“ensure the pluralist representation of the social forces (of civil society) involved in the 
promotion and protection of human rights.” The Principles further direct that “effective 
cooperation [. . .] be established with, or through the presence of, representatives of 
nongovernmental organisations.” The Paris Principles recognize that NGOs are able to reach 
sectors of society that are often out of the focus or ambit of state institutions. When NHRIs are 
able to harness the ability of NGOs to connect with social groups at the grassroots level, they 
increase access for marginalized groups and individuals who might resist direct contact with a 
state entity, enabling them to bring issues of human rights protections to the NHRI, enhancing its 
effectiveness. 
According to Kim, human rights NGOs pressured states to adopt the UN policy 
innovation of NHRIs; his cross-national statistical results show significant causality between 
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NGOs and NHRIs (Kim 2009a). Another study that focused specifically on NGOs in the Asia–
Pacific region discusses the synergic effect that NGOs and NHRIs created in working together to 
protect and promote human rights in the region (Renshaw and Taylor 2008). However, whether 
NGOs play a role beyond catalysis is still an open question. The influence of NGOs varies in 
countries that have NHRIs. Some NHRIs were engaged with NGOs from the beginning, and 
others were founded with almost no influence from NGOs. However, a review of the literature 
indicates that NGOs have influenced the founding of an extraordinary number of NHRIs by 
creating environments conducive to the creation and better performance of NHRIs. 
However, the relation of society and state should be examined in an integrated manner 
that considers their mutually transforming and constituting relationship (Migdal 2001). NGOs 
undeniably emerged as important actors in the international human rights movement; however, it 
makes more sense to study the interplay of NGOs with states rather than separating them into 
categories of “influencer” and “influenced.” 
 
2.6 Conclusion 
This chapter demonstrated how NHRIs became an “appropriate” institution that was 
widely accepted by many countries, one that was sometimes used to qualify a state as a 
democratic human rights states, respected by other peer states. This chapter first gave an 
overview of the development of NHRI norms at the international level, especially during the 
1990s, when NHRIs proliferated globally in the wake of the end of the Cold War and the 
attendant democratization and strengthening of the global human rights regime. It also elaborated 
on the functions, diversity, and distinctive qualities of NHRIs. 
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In this chapter, I described the amount of autonomy states have in NHRI adoption 
process, thereby establishing why it is important to take states seriously. This chapter also 
reviewed different approaches to the scholarly study of NHRIs, showing that previous studies 
that examined why states create NHRIs mainly focus on exogenous factors (e.g., influence of 
international organizations, pressure from civil society, etc.). While these exogenous factors are 
useful in identifying variables that influenced state creation of NHRIs, I argue that this approach 
is ultimately limiting, as it marginalizes the fundamental role played by the states themselves in 
adopting NHRIs. I therefore propose an integrated approach that takes seriously both external 
factors and the state’s autonomy in order to provide a full account of state motivations for 
creating NHRIs. In the next chapter, I examine the statehood of Korea and its state–society 
relationship through the lens of national identity, and I provide an objective answer to the 
question of why Korea chose to establish an NHRI.   
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CHAPTER 3 
KOREA, SEONJINGUK, AND THE NHRCK 
 
3.1 Introduction 
In previous chapters, I reviewed IR theories of compliance and provided explanations of 
the sudden worldwide proliferation of NHRIs in order to shed light on states’ puzzling voluntary 
compliance with international norms, including NHRI norms. I also explained that studying 
compliance requires attention to the process by which international norms are diffused into the 
domestic sphere and described the ways this diffusion is affected by each country’s historical and 
political contexts. 
In this chapter, I examine how Korea’s national identity was constructed by analyzing the 
pathways of Korean nation-building and the Korean modernization process through the changing 
definition of seonjinguk. I explain how the identity of the Korean state and its society were 
constructed through its path to modernization, explaining why the country is so eager to pursue 
international legitimacy in order to become a seonjinkuk. The construction of the modern Korean 
state, and its contentious state–society relations, are crucial factors that have shaped Korea’s 
adoption of an NHRI as well as the process of norms diffusion in Korean society. 
This chapter then discusses the relevance of the logic of appropriateness in the Korean 
context, focusing on how Korea actively adopted international human rights norms to become 
seonjinguk. More specifically, I argue that Korea’s developmental identity encouraged the 
country to behave like “who they want to be” and to do what others think is “appropriate,” and 
that these behaviors included adopting international human rights norms and establishing an 
NHRI. This chapter demonstrates why Korea is such a suitable case study for the logic of 
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appropriateness, analyzing Korea’s eager pursuit of international legitimacy through human 
rights policies in order to become seonjinguk. 
 
3.2 Korea’s Nation-Building Process 
3.2.1 Korea’s State-Centered Nation-Building in Modern Times 
In the Western tradition, based as it is in the Western experience of nation-state building, 
industrialization, and modernization, the state and society are generally understood as two 
separate, distinctive entities. For example, Karl Marx argued that the state is an impediment to 
transforming the class structure, and that a unified civil society would eventually overthrow the 
state—a theory grounded in the opposition of state and society (Marx and Friedrich 1998, Marx 
1998). Gramsci’s notion of hegemony, which conceptualizes civil society less optimistically than 
Marx’s theory, also assumes a distinction between state and society, although, according to 
Gramsci, hegemony is practiced by both: political hegemony by the state and social/cultural 
hegemony by society (Gramsci 1971). The industrialization of eighteenth- and nineteenth-
century Western Europe produced this structure of state versus society and positioned society 
above the state, creating a kind of critical reluctance to grant autonomy to states—a feeling that 
is still prevalent in the era of neoliberalism. The triumphs of industrial capitalism, civil society, 
and the market seemed to justify the rejection of the state as a unit of analysis and as a central 
autonomous force. This distaste for the state is embedded in accounts of the rise of democracy in 
the West; history tells the story of the rise of civil society against various forms of states, such as 
feudalism and monarchy. According to the narrative of these economic and political events, 
relations between the state and society have always been oppositional and contentious. 
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Scholars eventually began to reframe this adversarial relation between state and society in 
more integrated terms (Mitchell 1991, Migdal 2001), and the study of state–society relations 
took a new turn, going “beyond the unnecessary dichotomy of these two approaches and [paying] 
direct attention to complex and dynamic relationships between the state and society and [to the] 
dialectic processes through which their relationships change” (Koo 1993, 231). Understanding 
state–society relations as they are today conceptualized, even in a single country, is a tricky 
matter. And in order to accurately characterize state–society relations, one must delve into one 
country’s nation-building process, historical contingencies, economic development, and 
democratization experiences. 
How, then, were Korean state–society relations constructed? It seems accurate to say that 
“Korea’s path to modernity and industrialization is not determined by some immutable logic of 
modernism but by historical contingencies and a dialectical process of social change” (Koo 1993, 
231). Other countries developed into modern nation-states in response to internal pressure from 
within their own societies; Korea’s processes of modernization and industrialization were 
initiated by an external force, the Japanese colonial rule of Korea from 1910 to 1945. The legacy 
of Japanese colonization in Korean modernization and economic development remains 
controversial, but it is an undeniably important element in understanding Korea’s past, present, 
and future, and many argue that the colonial legacy still influences Korea’s industrialization and 
economic development in the twenty-first century. 
After Japanese colonization, Korean independence came in 1945, once again brought 
about by outsiders. Soon after independence, the nation underwent the Korean War (1950–1953), 
fighting against its own nation. The consequence of that war was the division of one nation into 
two different states, North and South Korea. This division did not only create a physical 
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separation; it also introduced a discrepancy between national identity (one nation) and state 
identity (two countries). The series of incidents that occurred at the birth of the nation-state of 
Korea—the Korean War, the separation of the nation, the United States military government—
had an enormous and lasting impact, distorting the nation-building process, the state–society 
relations, and the political landscape. These historical contingencies that affected the nation-
building process shaped the unique Korean economic development and democratization 
processes. 
Understanding the initial deformation of the nation-building process is important to 
understanding Korea’s current state–society relations, because the interpretation of the past 
remains an important political and economic agenda in Korea. After independence from Japan in 
1945, one of the priorities for Koreans was how to handle people who had collaborated with 
Japanese rule. In dealing with this matter, the North and South of the Korean peninsula came to 
be represented by different ideological groups. The North mainly consisted of anti-Japanese, 
communist, and nationalist believers; the South was where pro-Japanese came to settle, not 
necessarily because they favored liberalism, but often because they were afraid of land reform 
under the communists, fearing confiscation of their property (Kim 2006). The South Korean 
groups constructed their society around a misrepresentation of liberal democracy—one founded 
on anti-communism and pro-Americanism, not upon traditional democratic values. These 
ideological and political viewpoints were strengthened during the Korean War, which increased 
the already strong national stigma against communism and was followed by the establishment of 
the Republic of Korea in 1948, with the support of the American government. This mixture of 
anti-communism and pro-Americanism, disguised as liberal democracy, at first provided 
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justifications for economic development and authoritarian dictatorship, but it eventually 
motivated social forces to mobilize and challenge the dictatorship. 
Under these authoritarian regimes there was rapid economic development, especially 
from the 1960s to the 1980s; this development, driven by and centered on the Korean state, 
offers empirical evidence that, in the case of Korea, the typical Western position that the state 
has little authority is not applicable. The American political science tradition, which labored 
under pluralist and structure-functionalist perspectives until the 1970s, must revise its idea that 
the “strong state” is an outdated model and that the only way to successful economic 
development is through a free market and capital that is free from the hand of the state (Evans, 
Rueschemeyer, and Theda 1985). Korea’s late economic development, which was planned and 
executed entirely by the central state, is often described as state-directed development, or the 
developmental state. 
Korea’s successful state-sponsored economic development does not fit with existing 
scholarly perspectives: it fits with neither the socialist model, in which both ownership and 
management remain in the hand of the state, nor the free market model, in which private control 
coincides with private ownership and there is minimum intervention from the state. Like that of 
its Northeast Asian neighbors, Korea’s economic development is best explained as a function of 
the plan-rational capitalist developmental state, which is a hybrid of private ownership and state 
control. There is no major disagreement over the fact that the Korean state and capitalists played 
joint roles in the state’s economic development; however, scholarly accounts offer differing 
explanations of where the developmental state model came from, what the developmental state’s 
key to success was, how state intervention was made possible, and (most importantly) how the 
developmental state affected state–society relations in Korea. 
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In a capitalist society, the major driving force for economic development comes from 
society—from private entities. But in some countries in Asia, especially Japan and Korea, the 
state has been deeply involved in economic development. According to Kohli, the successful 
Korean state-led development model grew out of the strong state legacy inherited from the 
Japanese colonial government (Kohli 2004). Kohli argues that Korean state–society relations, 
which were shaped by Japanese colonial rule—society complying with the strong state’s 
directions—were the key to Korea’s rapid economic development, which is characterized by 
cohesive–intensive industry. Bruce Comings acknowledges that while the Japanese did create a 
kind of developmental state in South Korea, it was a predatory state; he also notes that Korea had 
experienced rapid industrial growth before Japanese occupation—growth that cannot be 
explained by the Japanese inception of the developmental state (Woo-Cumings 1999a). Some 
authors also counter Kohli’s argument by pointing to the example of North Korea, whose 
economic development has not been as successful as South Korea’s, although both states share 
the same Japanese colonial legacy. 
Other scholars are less interested in identifying the source of the Korean developmental 
state than in attempting to classify it. Evans, for example, who focuses on Korean state–society 
relations in his discussion of the Korean developmental state, defines the 1960s Rhee Seung-Man 
regime as being more predatory than developmental; he argues that Park Chung-hee’s regime 
successfully transformed Korean society because it realized the importance of state autonomy’s 
embeddedness within society (Evans 1995), and therefore began to incorporate the state into 
society by harnessing private entrepreneurship. The “embeddedness” approach taken under Park, 
Evans argues, was a much more “top down” affair than the Japanese model, and it was not 
always successful; for example, the Korean model produced a conglomerate business group 
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known as Chaebol, and the state–Chaebol relationship led to a very unproductive rent-seeking 
structure. During the early period of industrialization, Korea’s state–society boundary was 
blurrier than Western ones. 
The developmental state was founded upon the Weberian concept of bureaucratic 
government, and bureaucratic capacities are thus also important in understanding state–society 
relations in developmental states. In Japan, for example, the highly competent bureaucrats at the 
Ministry of International Trade and Industry designed, planned, and led the market in accordance 
with the most logical economic sense, free from political intervention (Johnson 1982). The role 
of bureaucrats in Korea’s developmental state differed somewhat; Korea had a comparable state 
agency, but the bureaucrats there were never free from political intervention, and economic 
planning did not depend only on rational economic calculation—it also considered politics and 
security issues in creating economic policies. The Korean state economic policies gave too much 
power to a small group of market players, the aforementioned Chaebol. This economic society 
was incorporated with state power, and it enjoyed the protection of the state until the late 1990s. 
The power of the Korean developmental state was not limited to its control over 
economic policies. Woo-Cumings states that “the power of the developmental state grows both 
out of the barrel of the gun and out of its ability to convince the population of its political, 
economic, and moral mandate” (Woo-Cumings 1999b, 20). Chang Ha-Joon argues that the 
developmental state’s importance lies in its ability to politically manage the economy, and the 
Korean authoritarian regime was very effective in spreading its political, economic, and moral 
hegemony, as its authority remained almost unassailable until the late 1980s (Chang 1999). The 
state hegemony may have been more effective because of Cold War politics and political interest 
groups that were welded into a developmental coalition. 
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Western economic development is often seen as being based on the differentiation of 
economic classes: the increasing importance of the bourgeois in the early industrialization stage, 
the collective actions of laborers, and the empowerment of the middle class that industrialization 
and capitalism depend upon (Poggi 1978). Capitalist development did not happen in this 
sequence in Korea, however. In Korea, economic development was rapidly adopted from outside, 
leaving no time for society to construct a notion of class. Because industrialization was led by 
the state under dictatorship, there was no time to build class capacities such as class 
consciousness, class organization, and class representation. In Western Europe, capitalists played 
a crucial social role in early industrialization, where they created class identities in society rather 
than affecting the state; in Korea, capitalists instead played a crucial role in forming the state 
itself. Under the authoritarian regime and the exploitative capitalists, who were working hand in 
hand with the state and were under its protection, there was very little room for Korean people to 
construct their own class identities in society. This shaped distinctive state–society relations in 
Korea. 
To understand these state–society relations, we must take into account many variables 
that affect economic development and the emergence of democracy in Korea. Modernization 
theorists argue that economic development and democracy go hand in hand, but scholars 
disagree over which must come first. Some argue that economic development triggers 
democracy, because economic development politically empowers the middle class, whose 
demand for democracy is likely to be achieved. Others argue that democracy creates favorable 
circumstances for economic development and for the emergence of a middle class. However, 
neither of these accounts explains countries like Korea, where the state, not capitalism, directed 
economic development, and where economic development did not necessarily encourage 
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political democratization. For example, Korea underwent a long period of military 
authoritarianism during a period of great economic development, and it is questionable whether 
the middle class triggered democracy in Korea in the 1970s and 1980s; indeed, some argue that 
the middle class did not exist during that period. Many scholars argue that two variables, 
economic development and democracy, are not enough to explain state–society relations; 
changes in class and social structures caused by industrialization and urbanization are also likely 
to produce democracy. According to these scholars, democracy is about power and power 
sharing, and they argue that it is crucial to understand variables that they call “power clusters,” 
which include the balance of class power, the nature of the state and state–society relations, and 
international political geography (Rueschemeyer, Huber, and Stephens 1992). Taking these 
“power clusters” into account opens up possibilities for accurate and precise interpretation of 
Korea’s state–society relations. 
As I have explained, Korea, economic development was directed by the state, capitalists 
were collaborators with the authoritarian military regime, and the middle class was not 
empowered; what, then, triggered the democratization of Korea? How was political change 
possible under the authoritarian regime? And how did democratization restructure state–society 
relations? The path to democracy in Korea did not happen “logically,” as it did in Western 
European countries; it happened as a product of contingent events. And although most people 
believe that democracy was realized in Korea with the fall of the authoritarian military regime in 
1987, Korea had actually foreseen its “predestined” type of liberal democracy in the influence of 
the United States at the birth of Korea’s modern nation-state under the United States military 
government. This is completely unlike any Western country’s organic experience of 
democratization: from Korea’s very birth, its eventual political system was a given. Liberal 
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democracy was predestined for Korea by outsiders, rather than growing out of Korean society 
and people. And in the 1990s, the gap between the official liberal democratic government and 
the authoritarian reality created opposing civil societies in Korea. It is thus accurate to say that 
“Korea’s democracy is both old and new” (Alagappa 2004, 138). More importantly, Korea’s 
political regime, created without the support of the Korean people, had to seek legitimacy in 
other ways; the authoritarian regime lacked internal legitimacy, and so it would pursue 
international legitimacy, seeking approval and recognition from peer countries. 
During this period, there was worldwide excitement about the victories of democracy: 
“by the mid-1990s, liberal political leaders, scholars, and activists were celebrating the triumph 
of democracy, free market capitalism, and human rights throughout the world” (Alagappa 2004, 
3). This worldwide wave of democratization wave washed over Korea, although Korea’s 
transition from authoritarian regime to democracy and its democratic consolidation process were 
extolled as exceptional: Korea “tend[s] to place greater emphasis on individual rights [. . .] these 
cultural values of individualism and authoritarianism [. . .] are likely to help Korea stay on the 
path to the further democratization that consolidated democracies in Europe took many decades 
to achieve” (Diamond and Shin 2000, 36). Amid the excitement, questions still remain. Who was 
the agent of this political change? Did it happen with the mobilized power of the new class, 
through a labor movement, or through something else? 
Any discussion of democratization in Korea must take Minjung into account. Minjung is 
a unique concept that emerged through a series of social movements in Korea; it resisted the 
authoritarian regime and eventually, in 1987, achieved the collapse of that regime. Minjung 
means roughly a social group of oppressed people. Lee Namhee elaborates on the concept, 
saying that Minjung is a “materially or historically grounded” notion (Lee 2007, 6) that defines 
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those who are “capable of rising up” against oppression (Lee 2007, 5). The 1980s discourse on 
Minjung provides a good example of the interplay of power and resistance and the mutual 
constitution of state and society. According to Lee, Minjung, a mobilized association of students, 
intellectuals, and workers, grew out of the realization of the “failure of Korean history”: the 
group reminded the world of the 1980 Gwangju Massacre and of the United States’ inaction in 
the face of the regime’s military violence. Minjung recognized that Korea had failed to own its 
own history and destiny, and the group built their identity upon the notion of historical 
subjectivity, opposing the state hegemony and aiming to emancipate the whole society. The 
Korean social movement of the 1980s, centered on Minjung, created a counterpublic sphere in 
which “the practitioners developed counterdiscourses that challenged the state-established public 
agenda and redefined the grounds of social and political discourses in Korea in the 1980s” (Lee 
2007, 2); however, some scholars argue that the Minjung practitioners employed the same 
hegemonic discourses as the authoritarian regime they opposed, and it is still questionable 
whether they were truly democratic. Some scholars, like Choi Jang-jip, are critical of the 
Minjung way of resistance. Jang-jip argues that civil movements in the 1980s should not have 
chosen to resist the regime from outside, but should instead have tried to be politically 
institutionalized—that is, they should have fought the system from within (Choi 2005). However, 
others question whether the social forces resisting authoritarianism in the 1980s had any choice 
but to create a counter-hegemonic sphere. While incorporation into political society sounds ideal, 
that was not an option under the circumstances, because under the authoritarian regime, political 
society and civil society were strictly separated. 
While Minjung practitioners played a significant role in Korea’s democratization, other 
social groups, such as urban middle-class people, also supported the movement to bring down 
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the authoritarian regime. Lee Namhee argues that “the energy of Korean democratization in 
the ’80s, stems from the findings and awakening of the collectivity, Minjung, rather than 
[framing] the emancipation of individuals as classical liberal democratic thinkers would envision” 
(Lee 2007). Wha happened to this once densely mobilized political power base in Korea in the 
1980s? Did the coalition break down because of the lack of common class identities, or did they 
dissolve because democratization was achieved? There may be no one simple answer to this 
question. But following the ’80s Minjung movement, another social movement was born in the 
1990s—a movement based upon liberal democratic values: liberty, emancipation of individuals, 
human rights, and civil societies. 
3.2.2 State–Society Relations Since the 1990s 
The ’80s movement changed Korean state–society relations, bringing down the 
dictatorship and creating space for civil society. But after the economic development and 
political democratization of the 1980s, the social force that had effectively resisted the 
authoritarian regime dissolved and fragmented, because their association was based on being 
against the authoritarian regime, not on shared class identity and association. After achieving 
their common goal, they drifted back to where they had come from. The rapidly formed urban 
middle class, an important part of the resistance to the dictatorship, went back to their daily lives; 
the labor unions of the 1980s narrowed into interest groups in the 1990s; and the nationalistic 
intellectuals were influenced by the notion of “professionalization,” which shaped their activity, 
identity, and organization in the 1990s. As Kim Dae-jung, the former president of Korea, noted, 
professionalization demanded society’s intellectuals to provide expert testimony to the state and 
the market; the dominant mode of intellectuals’ social participation thus changed in the 1990s 
from “political” to “cultural” (Lee 2007, 300). These groups—the middle class, the labor unions 
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and the nationalistic intellectuals—became the key actors in initiating and strengthening the 
dominant social norms of the 1990s, such as NGO movements, participatory democracy, and 
individualism. 
Another major structural change occurred in Korean state–society relations after 1997. 
The Korean financial crisis of 1997–98, which occurred amid rapid globalization, shaped the 
Korean state and society in accordance with neoliberalism. The financial crisis revealed old 
problems caused by long-term state manipulation of the Korean financial structure, and the 
accumulated mistakes of the developmental state erupted in the crisis. However, the emergence 
of neoliberalism in Korea did not downsize the strong state; instead, it resurrected the 
authoritarian developmental bureaucrats, newly dressed in free market values (Kim 2006, 106). 
The developmental state, which had convinced the population that its developmental, economic, 
and moral mandates were correct, was now able to convince the people that the free market was 
the only way to break through the national financial crisis. Kim Dongchun claims that the strong 
market force that had been fostered by the state since the 1960s was finally able to colonize 
Korean society during this period (Kim 2006). 
But why did the civil society that took down the authoritarian regime become vulnerable 
once again to the state hegemony? The answer can be found in how the characteristics of society 
changed in the 1990s. In accordance with the worldwide trend, Korean civil society in the 1990s 
moved toward the values of individualism, the rule of law, citizen participation, and human 
rights. The number of NGOs on the ground, and the scope of the work they did, expanded greatly 
in the 1990s, seemingly suggesting that democracy was being consolidated; according to the 
perspective of the liberal democratic school, the aim of civil society is to “liberate society [. . .], 
recover social autonomy, [and] expand civil liberties and human rights” (Alagappa 2004, 31), but 
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the expansion of civil society does not always mean the expansion of democracy. For example, 
in Japan, there are great numbers of NGOs that are densely networked with each other, but they 
tend to be powerless and unable to mobilize effectively around political issues (Lee and 
Arrington 2008). The problem in Japan is with the characteristics and capacities of the mobilized 
power, which is very strong on cultural issues but weak on political issues; this is because after 
democratization, Japanese civil society groups shifted their goals from political ones to cultural 
ones, as civil society groups did in Korea. 
Civil society’s efforts, which are based upon liberal democratic values, are expected to 
make the state more accountable and more responsive to the demands of civil society itself 
(Schedler, Diamond, and Plattner 1999). However, civil society must develop its activities within 
the public sphere established by the state; citizens’ movements show how civil society works 
within the “citizen” identity, which can only be realized in relation to the state. The methods of 
1990s Korean civil society relied heavily on campaigning to change public opinion and on 
lawsuits—techniques that operate within the system, rather than fighting the system from outside, 
as it had done before. The counterpublic sphere, which had allowed society to build 
counterdiscourses against state hegemony, no longer existed in the 1990s, because the citizens’ 
movement that replaced the social movement of the 1980s worked inside the hegemonic public 
sphere defined by the state. 
It is important to understand the structural changes that have taken place in Korea since 
1997 in order to fully grasp the domestic political terrain into which NHRI norms were adopted. 
The establishment of the NHRCK was made possible by the political regime change in the late 
1990s, because the new regime was more engaged with human rights. I analyze the discourses 
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around the NHRCK’s creation, consolidation, and regression processes in the context of the 
Korean state–society relations at that time. 
 
3.3 Identity, the Logic of Appropriateness, and International Legitimacy 
Because of Korea’s nation-building process and its modern political history, Korea is 
keenly conscious of how other countries see it and has been actively promoting international 
norms in its domestic space. But not all states seek to obtain international legitimacy in this same 
way; Korea’s desire for international legitimacy is “historically contingent, context based, and 
intersubjective” (Flowers 2009, 26). There are two faces of sovereignty, internal and 
international, and in Korea, they do not coincide (Lake 2007). Because of the decades of 
authoritarian rule in Korea, Korea had weak grounds of internal sovereignty; the Korean political 
elites, lacking internal legitimacy, had to rely on outside recognition. This created a distorted 
state that is more concerned with international reputation than with their own citizens’ opinions 
of it (Kim 2006). 
The recognition or approval of other countries—especially of rich, advanced countries—
is central to Korea’s highly sensitive intersubjective national identity. In this section, I provide an 
analysis of Korea’s desired identity—becoming a seonjinguk—a goal that has been in place since 
the establishment of the country, with some variations depending on political regimes. I also 
explain how this desired identity was expressed in concrete policies that attempted to obtain 
international legitimacy by doing what other seonjin states were doing. 
3.3.1 Korea’s National Goal of Being Seonjinguk 
The concept of seonjinguk is historically created, and it has been constructed and 
reconstructed throughout Korea’s history, beginning with Korea’s very first political regime, led 
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by its first president, Rhee Seung-man. Kim Jongtae argues that the seonjinguk discourse in 
Korea developed out of a Eurocentric development model that made hierarchical distinctions 
between seonjinguk (developed country) and hujinguk (underdeveloped country), and that Korea 
rejected their own previous hujinguk identity in its attempts to “catch up” with or become seonjin 
(Kim 2011a, Kim 2012b).
18
 Similarly, John Jojin contends that the seonjinguk identity, which 
became important to Korea in the initial stage of modernization in the 1960s, became “the most 
influential discursive framework for the interpretation of Korean national identity in the world” 
(John 2015, 41). Seonjinguk has not only been a desired identity but a Korean national goal since 
the establishment of the country. 
The seonjinguk identity has changed its characteristics over time, reflecting changes in 
Korea’s conditions and different political regimes’ specific policy preferences.19 According to 
Kim, seonjinguk has  remained a goal for all regimes, but the  what it means to be a seonjinguk 
has changed with each regime: the definition of seonjinguk is “affected by various factors at the 
national and global levels, such as governmental goals and policies, public sentiments and 
participation, world political economic situation, and global discourses” (Kim 2011b, 325). He 
argues that during Park Chung-hee’s era (1963–1979), the Korean national identity was 
drastically downgraded to hujinguk status, and that during this period, Korean seonjinguk 
discourse focused on escaping hujinguk status and problematized the status of underdevelopment. 
The same model of seonjinguk discourse characterized the regimes of Chun Doo-hwan and Roh 
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 In the post-World War II era, development became another unit of analysis that provides the theoretical 
framework in discussions of national identity and countries’ worldviews. See Escobar (1995) and Nederveen (2009). 
19
 Drawing on post-structural theories of identity, De Cellia argues that national identities are specific forms of 
discursive social identities, produced, reproduced, transformed, and destroyed by means of language and other 
semiotic systems (De Cellia et al. 1999, 153). De Cellia assumes that there is no single national identity in an 
essentializing sense; different identities are discursively constructed and correspond to context, social field, 
situational setting of the discursive act, and the topic being discussed. Thus, De Cellia suggests that national 
identities should be understood as dynamic, fragile, vulnerable, and often incoherent against the conventional 
understanding of national identity as consistent, stable and immutable (De Cellia et al. 1999, 154). 
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Tae-woo (1980–1993), which largely followed the model set out by Park Chung-hee: economic 
growth based on anti-communism and nationalism (Kim 2013). 
Under Kim Young-sam’s administration (1993–1997), seonjinguk changed course as the 
regime took notable pains to meet “global standards”—a goal that was touted as a method of 
achieving seonjinguk.
20
 With its avid interest in globalization in the post–Cold War period, the 
Korean government also vigorously pursued segyehwa (globalization), which was viewed as a 
suitable way for Korea to become seonjinguk (John 2015, 40–41). According to Kim, seonjinguk 
during this period had three distinctive characteristics: (1) the desire to be seonjinguk was far 
stronger under Kim Young-sam’s administration than during any other period, (2) the national 
goal of achieving seonjinguk status was widely shared by a broad range of Korean citizens, and 
(3) the efforts to become seonjinguk were not limited to few fields of industry or technology, but 
appeared in every corner of society (Kim 2011b, 329–338). As Kim summarizes it, “the 
discourse of seonjinguk far strengthened its hegemonic status in this period as a dominant way of 
representing national self and the world” (Kim 2011b, 332).  
The zeal to become seonjinguk continued under Kim Dae-jung (1998–2002), becoming 
more aggressively neoliberalistic. In the late 1990s, the IMF intervention into the Korean 
economy provided justification for transforming the economic system; neoliberalism was seen as 
the only way to survive in the face of global competition. During this period, seonjinguk 
discourse became ever more popular and efforts to meet global standards became naturalized, 
achieving “taken-for-granted” status (Kim 2011b, 342). What is notable during this period is the 
conflation under seonjinguk of three separate Korean national identities: the identity being 
promulgated by Kim’s regime, the global “appropriate” identity based on democracy and human 
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 Cho (2003) states that this change was a transition from the old developmental model to a “neo-developmental 
regime” based on the neo-modernization discourse of segyehwa. 
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rights, and the long-lasting seonjinguk identity. While Kim’s regime prioritized a quick 
graduation from the IMF in its attempts to become seonjinguk, the “promotion of human rights” 
element of the seonjinguk identity gathered increasing momentum during Roh Moo-hyun’s 
administration. The Roh Moo-hyun regime actively promoted human rights as a policy 
preference, and it was under these two regimes— Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun—that the 
NHRCK was created and consolidated. 
In an initial assessment of Lee Myung-bak’s administration, which followed Roh Moo-
hyun’s (2003–2007), Scott Snyder states that one of the two core objectives of the regime was its 
“desire to be recognized as having the international stature commensurate with [its] 
accomplishments” (Snyder 2009, 43). Jojin John argues that under the articulated slogan of 
“Global Korea,” Lee’s administration vigorously pursued seonjinguk status, mainly through 
neoliberal economic policies and through hosting major international meetings such as G20. 
Hosting these meetings was seen both as an achievement and as an indication that Korea was 
advancing shoulder to shoulder with other rich, advanced countries (John 2015). In a reflection 
of this administration’s conservative identity, human rights were never a priority for Lee, despite 
his pursuit of seonjinguk and his attempts to meet global standards; indeed, under Lee, the 
definition of seonjinguk changed to reflect his administration’s priorities, losing its emphasis on 
human rights and gaining additional emphasis on economic success. 
In sum, even though each administration has a unique, characteristic definition of 
seonjinguk and different policies for achieving their vision of seonjinguk, the discourse on 
seonjinguk in Korea consistently represents a conventional notion of a modernization project 
whose developmental model is Western modernity (Smith 1973; Webster 1984; Rist 1997; 
Mehmet 1999). Indeed, Kim states that the discourse on seonjinguk has a tendency to 
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“circumscribe South Koreans’ imagination within the conventional modern paradigm” (Kim 
2011b, 345). The near-universal discourse of seonjinguk in Korea meant that pressure to meet 
global standards was applied in every aspect of Korean public life, including Korean foreign 
policy (John 2015, 40), and it therefore became increasingly important for Korea to vigorously 
adopt and comply with global human rights laws and norms. 
3.3.2 Becoming Seonjinguk: Doing What Other Seonjin States Do 
Korea’s goal of achieving seonjinguk status prevailed in every corner of society and 
shaped a wide range of policies aimed at doing what seonjinguk countries do. This section 
provides concrete examples of Korea’s international legitimacy-seeking activities that followed 
the logic of appropriateness and were carried out in Korea’s attempt to be seonjinguk. 
One such legitimacy-seeking activity was the establishment of the Korea International 
Cooperation Agency (KOICA) on April 1, 1991, to implement the government’s grant aid and 
technical cooperation programs. KOICA followed the models of such agencies in other 
seonjinguk countries, such as the United States Agency for International Development 
(established 1961), the Canadian International Development Agency (established 1968), and the 
Japan International Cooperation Agency (established 1974). The effort to claim international 
legitimacy through KOICA has been continuously growing, as have the funds disbursed through 
the agency (see Figure 2). In the early 1990s, Korea attempted to change its image from that of a 
recipient of aid to that of a donor of aid through government agencies such as KOICA—a direct 
attempt to reach seonjinguk status by imitating other advanced countries. 
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Figure 2 South Korea’s Official Development Assistance, 1991–2010 
 
Source: KOICA. Data collected and sorted by the author. 
An excellent example of how deeply Korea has been influenced by international norms is 
found in a study on the decline of son preference in Korea (Chung and Gupta 2007). In this 
comparative study of four countries in Asia that traditionally prefer a male child over a female 
child (China, India, Northwest India, and Korea), only Korea’s son preference declined in the 
1990s; the authors explain this puzzling exception by reference to Korea’s membership to the 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD; Chung and Gupta 2007). 
This study shows that, following Korea’s entry into OECD membership, the Korean 
government’s new public policies changed local son preference norms; son preference was not 
appropriate in seonjin Korea. 
Korea’s lack of a strong sense of its own legitimacy made Korea imitate other seonjinguk. 
Koreans did not feel confident about what they should or should not do; they felt far more 
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comfortable following what people in rich countries did, because following rich countries gave 
Koreans a sense of confidence that they were imitating appropriate behavior. For example, 
education and social regulations focused on teaching and enforcing behaviors from developed 
countries. One of the major newspaper corporations, Kyunghyang Shinmun, delivered a series of 
civic campaigns in the early 1990s on “the kindness campaign of the world—what people in 
foreign countries do.” The exemplary “foreign countries” were all Western European and North 
American countries. Such newspaper campaigns targeting the general public illustrate how the 
developmental agenda controlled not only economic mandates but also social and cultural 
mandates. 
A campaign executed by the Ministry of Land, Transport and Maritime urged citizens to 
“walk on the right side of the road”—a shift from the previous recommendation to walk on the 
left. This campaign presents an especially interesting case; the government was attempting to 
persuade its citizens to walk on the right side because that is what the seonjin world (e.g., USA, 
Canada, Spain and France) does. The campaign suggests that by meeting this global standard, 
Korea will be walking toward seonjinguk  (see Figure 3). There is nothing wrong with the 
government promoting the best way of doing things in their own country, of course, but we must 
pay attention to the rationale behind it. There are other practical reasons for encouraging 
pedestrians to walk on the right side, but it is notable that the Korean government decided to use 
becoming a seonjinguk as its tool of persuasion in this campaign. 
These attempts to use the Korean desire to be seonjinguk as a tool of persuasion were not 
always successful. For example, the mayor of Gwangju promised in his election manifesto to 
have the city enrolled as a United Nations–designated Human Rights City; however, after 
winning the election, he found out that it would be impossible for Gwangju to receive the 
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designation, because it does not exist (Huh 2010). Whether or not this particular election promise 
enabled him to win, it seems that even local politicians saw international human rights 
legitimacy and the desire to be seonjinguk as attractive strategies. These seemingly trivial 
campaigns are grounded in constituents’ presumed desire to become like the citizens of 
developed countries, and this zeal for becoming seonjinguk is treated as a legitimate motive, 
indicating Korea’s eagerness for global acceptance. 
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Figure 3 Government poster promoting “Walk on the Right Side of the Road” 
 
Source:  (KoROAD, n.d.).  
 
 
3.4 NHRCK as a Means to Become a Seonjin Human Rights State 
Korea’s desire to be seonjinguk reached the level of hegemony in the 1990s, coinciding 
with the moment when human rights and NHRI norms became widely accepted around the 
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globe.
21
 In 1991, Korea, along with North Korea, joined the UN; Korea became a member of the 
OECD in 1996, which was extolled as a great step toward becoming seonjinguk. In the early 
1990s, Korea, like most other states in the world, ratified two significant human rights treaties, 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR),
22
 as well as the Convention on the Rights of 
the Child and the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel Inhuman or Degrading Treatment 
or Punishment (see Table 1). 
 
Table 1. Ratification of International Human Rights and Relevant Treaties in the 1990s 
Treaty title 
Global records Korea’s records 
Date of adoption 
(entry into force) 
Number of 
state parties* 
Date of 
accession 
Date of entry 
into force 
International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights 
Dec. 16, 1966. 
(Jan. 3, 1976) 
149 
June 3, 2004 
Apr. 10, 1990 July 10, 1990 
International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights 
Dec. 16, 1966 
(Mar. 23, 1976) 
152 
June 3, 2004 
Apr. 10, 1990 July 10, 1990 
Optional Protocol to the 
International Covenant on 
Dec. 16, 1966 
(Mar. 23, 1976) 
104 
June 3, 2004 
Apr. 10, 1990 July 10, 1990 
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 See chapter 2 for a discussion of the standardization of human rights and NHRIs. 
22
 In addition to these two conventions, Korea also ratified the Optional Protocol to ICCPR, which allows 
individuals in Korea to claim violation of rights contained in the ICCPR directly to the monitoring body of the 
ICCPR. In general, states are reluctant to ratify the Optional Protocols because they are perceived as being too 
intrusive on state sovereignty. 
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Civil and Political Rights 
Convention on the Rights of the 
Child 
Nov. 20, 1989 
(Sep. 2, 1990) 
192 
June 3, 2004 
Nov. 20, 1991 Dec. 20, 1991 
Convention Concerning 
Employment Policy (No.122) 
July 9, 1964 
(July 15, 1966) 
94 
Dec. 17, 2003 
Dec. 9, 1992 Dec. 9, 1993 
Convention Relating to the 
Status of Refugees 
July 28, 1951 
(Apr. 22, 1954) 
140 
Feb. 5, 2002 
Dec. 3, 1992 Mar. 3, 1993 
Convention Against Torture and 
Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment 
Dec. 10, 1984 
(June 26, 1987) 
136 
June 3, 2004 
Jan. 9, 1995 Feb. 8, 1995 
Convention Concerning Equal 
Remuneration for Men and 
Women Workers for Work of 
Equal Value (No.100) 
June 29, 1951 
(May 23, 1953) 
161 
Dec. 17, 2003 
Dec. 8, 1997 Dec. 8, 1998 
Convention Concerning 
Discrimination in respect to 
Employment and Occupation 
(No.111) 
(June 15, 1960) 159 
Dec. 17, 2003 
Dec. 4, 1998 Dec. 4, 1999 
Source: NHRCK 2003, 167–168. 
*as of date indicated.  
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Since this period, Korea’s intersubjective identity led it to seek recognition from others in 
pursuit of seonjinguk status and to actively shape its policies toward adopting global standards, 
including prevailing global human rights norms and the adoption of NHRIs (Kim 2016). 
 
3.5 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I examined Korea’s state–society relations and reviewed the state-
building and identity-construction processes that produced these relations in order to unpack 
Korea’s desire to become seonjinguk—a desire that, in combination with the logic of 
appropriateness, offers important context for understanding why Korea accepted global human 
rights norms. Korea saw accepting these norms as a means of reaching its long-standing national 
goal of becoming seonjinguk. 
In the following chapters, I will examine the history and trajectory of the NHRCK, 
including its creation (1993–2002), strengthening (2003–2007), and weakening (2008–2012). I 
will show how Korea’s pursuit of international legitimacy affected each stage of the process. I 
will also address different political regimes’ differing definitions of seonjinguk identity, which 
produced different policy preferences: some regimes embraced human rights and others 
deliberately excluded human rights in their policy making, although all political regimes, 
whether conservative or progressive, desired the developmental state seonjin identity. By tracing 
these changes in domestic politics and context, I lay the groundwork for my examination of the 
diffusion of global human rights norms in Korea’s domestic sphere over time, which enables me 
to show that national identity and state interests are neither static nor timeless.   
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CHAPTER 4 
ESTABLISHMENT OF THE NHRCK (1993–2002) 
The enactment of the National Human Rights Commission of Korea Act and the 
establishment of the Commission serve as a momentum for Korea to leap toward human 
rights seonjinguk. 
—President Kim Dae-jung’s remarks after appointing commissioners for the NHRCK 
October 9, 2001 (NHRCK 2009) 
[The establishment of the NHRCK] is the realistic and indisputable institutional 
mechanism to enter into the human rights seonjinguk. 
—First Chairperson of the NHRCK, Kim Chang-guk 
November 7, 2001 (Kim 2001) 
 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter traces the processes of norm diffusion and political negotiation in Korea 
between the 1990s and 2002 as it discusses how the NHRCK was established. Because “the 
conditions under which states create a permanent national institution that can hold themselves 
accountable and impose unexpected sociopolitical constraints on their policies on the human 
rights issues” (Kim 2009a, 11) are still not clear, in this chapter, I will explicate the conditions—
the interplay of domestic and international contexts—that laid the groundwork for the 
establishment of the NHRCK. I will demonstrate how the international human rights norms 
represented by the NHRCK were determinant in shaping Korean state policy preferences to 
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ensure that the NHRCK was established as an independent institution, despite years of rigorous 
opposition from the Ministry of Justice. In so doing, I will show how the effectively coordinated 
advocacy of domestic and international agents strategically appealed to Korea’s desire to seek 
international legitimacy by meeting global human rights standards—in this case, by creating the 
NHRCK in accordance with the Paris Principles. By laying out the establishment process in 
detail, I will also show the importance of the Korean domestic context in norm diffusion. 
First, I discuss how the global norms around NHRIs were introduced and diffused 
between 1993 and 1997—the same period during which Korea ratified several human rights 
treaties to meet the “global standards” of seonjinguk countries. Then, I move on to the actual 
establishment process, which required more than three years of negotiations among various 
actors, including the president, the Ministry of Justice, domestic NGOs, and international human 
rights communities. All these actors appropriated the desired seonjinguk identity to attempt to 
persuade each other to create the NHRI they envisioned. This section identifies a critical catalyst 
in this process, the Nobel Prize Committee’s announcement in 2000 that President Kim was to 
receive the Nobel Peace Prize, which ended the three-year struggle over the establishment of the 
NHRCK. Finally, I provide an assessment of the NHRCK one year into its operation under Kim 
Dae-jung and show that at this time, the NHRCK was not yet firmly rooted in Korean society. 
 
4.2 Korea’s Awakening to NHRIs (1993–1997) 
4.2.1 Introduction of NHRIs to Korea 
How did global norms about NHRIs travel to Korea? The very first contact was made by 
a group of human rights activists who participated in the World Conference on Human Rights in 
Vienna in 1993, where the global norms on NHRIs were actively discussed (NHRCK 2002A, 5). 
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A group of Korean NGOs participated in the conference; their participation influenced the 
domestic human rights NGOs and paved the way for the eventual creation of the NHRCK. At the 
conference, Korean activists were exposed to the global human rights forum and established an 
initial network with transnational human rights activists. The experience of the 1993 Vienna 
conference is vividly captured in the words of South Korean human rights activists from the 
Sarangbang Group for Human Rights, published in newsletters put out after the conference, and 
which Kim (2009) reproduces:  
Vienna was a great cultural shock. Not just our organization but also Korea’s human 
rights movements became aware of international human rights for the first time. Strictly 
speaking, we knew them already, but Vienna introduced a showcase for 
internationalization to us... Originally, the Vienna Conference was an intergovernmental 
meeting, but NGOs gathered together to form a bazaar. I learned a lot from there, and 
there were many new and wonderful things there. At that time, I also came to know about 
‘East Timor’ for the first time in my life... International solidarity had always belonged to 
only a handful of organizations in our society. After Vienna, it spread as something that 
all the movements shared... I had never bothered to take a look at the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenants, but I felt it necessary to 
study them. I also realized that there is more to international solidarity than just calling 
for help to solve our problems. I learned all I had to know all at once for a fleeting 
moment... To tell the truth, we heard discussions about the establishment of national 
human rights institutions through Vienna (Sarangbang Group for Human Rights 2002, 
51–52; quoted in Kim 2009a, 214). 
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According to Kim’s analysis, the Korean NGO participants who attended the conference 
learned there about UN policy innovations in the human rights field, including the Paris 
Principles. Upon returning home, they used this new knowledge to frame and orient their 
activism in two main ways (Kim 2009a). First, they mainstreamed the idea of NHRIs and the 
Paris Principles within the domestic human rights activist groups. The Sarangbang Group for 
Human Rights, a leading Korean human rights organization, was part of the NGO delegation to 
the 1993 Vienna Conference, and on July 15, 1994, they published a special issue of Human 
Rights Daily News about NHRIs, in which they suggested that NHRIs were a feasible institution 
for remedying human rights problems in Korea. The News issue covered the history of NHRIs, 
the 1991 Paris Principles, the 1993 Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, the types of 
NHRIs, and the criteria that marked an independent, effective, and credible NHRI. 
4.2.2 Diffusion of NHRIs in Korea 
After they were introduced to NHRIs, Korean human rights NGOs demanded that the 
government establish an NHRI to promote and protect human rights and to restrain abuses of 
state power. In June 1993, the NGO participants who attended the Vienna Conference submitted 
their written opinion urging the Korean government to enact a comprehensive human rights law 
and to establish an NHRI. Later, in 1998, human rights NGOs organized a committee called the 
Joint Committee of the Korean NGOs Coalition for Enacting the Human Rights Law and 
Establishing the National Human Rights Commission. Korean NGOs also participated in the 
third UN Workshop for the Asian and Pacific Region on Human Rights Issues, held in Seoul 
from July 18 to July 20, 1994, where they reiterated their position on the establishment of an 
NHRI in Korea. In November 1995, during the celebration of the fiftieth anniversary of Korea’s 
Independence Day, nine NGOs hosted an international meeting called the Symposium on South 
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Korea’s National Security Law, the Post-Cold War New International Order and Human Rights 
in Seoul. After the symposium, Korean NGOs, supported by transnational human rights NGOs 
that included Amnesty International, the International Center against Censorship, SOS Torture, 
and HURIGHTS OSAKA, again urged the Korean government to establish an NHRI (Kim 
2009a, 216). 
After the 1993 World Conference, a group of NGOs who had participated in the Asia–
Pacific Human Rights Conference held in New Delhi in November 1996 demanded the 
establishment of a Korean NHRI (NHRCK 2002A, 6). Although the political regime at the time, 
the government of Kim Young-sam (February 1993–February 1998), was very interested in 
meeting global standards in order to become seonjinguk, the government remained mostly 
indifferent to these calls for the establishment of an NHRI. There are a few possible explanations 
for this indifference. It could be that there was not enough time; the concept had only been 
introduced in 1993, and perhaps the Korean state and society needed time to understand what 
NHRIs were, and what the implications of establishing one would be. It could be because Kim’s 
regime felt Korea had already earned enough international legitimacy in the field of human rights; 
Korea had become a UN member in 1991 and ratified two key international human rights treaties 
in 1990. It could be that the government assumed that the inauguration of Korea’s first 
nonmilitary government indicated sufficient human rights improvement (Baek 2002, 31). Or it 
could be that the call was made at the wrong moment; according to Lee Seong-hoon, the 
executive director of the Korean Human Rights Foundation and the former Human Rights Policy 
Director at the NHRCK, the call for a Korean NHRI went unanswered at the time because NGOs 
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had other human rights issues to deal with that took priority.
23
 Although an NHRI was not 
established during this time, Korean society became aware of the global norms around NHRIs. 
 
4.3 NHRCK as a Policy Agenda during the Presidential Election in 1997 
4.3.1 Kim Dae-jung’s Political Determination 
The breakthrough for the efforts to establish a Korean NHRI came from a political 
opportunity. One of the presidential candidates, and the eventual winner of the presidential race, 
was Kim Dae-jung, who made a campaign promise in December 1997 to establish an NHRI if he 
were elected. After winning the election, President Kim adopted the “legislation of the Human 
Rights Commission Act and establishment of the National Human Rights Commission” as one of 
“One Hundred Main National Tasks” of the new administration (NHRCK 2002A, 6). Kim Dae-
jung was the only candidate that accepted Amnesty International’s recommendation to create an 
NHRI;
24
 human rights were an important standard in shaping the policies of the Kim 
administration (Ahn 2009a, 55). During his term, Kim Dae-jung put a lot of effort into promoting 
human rights legislation, including the Law on Compensation for the Democratization 
Movement, the Law on the Investigation of Suspicious Death, and the National Human Rights 
Committee Act. He also supported the revision of the controversial National Security Law. 
Kim Dae-jung was firmly committed to establishing an NHRI, although detailed plans for 
the NHRI’s structure and capacities were not yet spelled out. Park Kyung-seo, the former 
Ambassador in Human Rights at Large, explained that President Kim’s political will was a key 
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 Lee, Seong-hoon (executive director of the Korean Human Rights Foundation and the former Human Rights 
Policy Director at the NHRCK). Interview with the author, September 16, 2010; copy on file with author. 
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 Published on October 16, 1997, in Amnesty International’s letter entitled “South Korea: A human Rights Agenda 
for The Presidential Election: Open Letter to All Candidates.” This letter called the candidates to create an NHRI 
should they be elected (Amnesty International 1997). 
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determinant in bringing to the table the issue of establishing an NHRI in Korea (Park 2010). 
Kim’s pledge to create an NHRI may have been influenced by his political background; Kim is 
known as the “Nelson Mandela of Asia.” According to Koo, Kim’s commitment to human rights 
and his determination to create an NHRI, risking its possible constraints on state sovereignty, 
were rooted in Kim’s own experiences of being oppressed by authoritarian governments for 
decades. Kim was at one time sentenced to death, and he underwent several years of 
imprisonment, exile, and house arrest; these experiences led Kim to want to be “the president of 
human rights” (Koo 2011b, 87); as president, he strategically used the discourse of international 
human rights and emphasized the state’s commitment to international human rights standards 
(Koo 2011b, 87).
 25
 
4.3.2 NGO Advocacy’s Effect on Kim’s Agenda-Setting 
It is clear that without the political will of President Kim Dae-jung, the creation of an 
NHRI would have not been a priority political agenda. But what went on before he made a firm 
decision about prioritizing an NHRI? There are several factors. For instance, Cho states that 
there were political considerations in play: 
There was a consolidation of the two prominent candidates—Kim Dae-jung and Kim 
Jong-pil—from the opposition parties, and Kim Dae-jung was chosen as the sole 
candidate to represent both opposition parties. After this, Kim Dae-jung couldn’t insist on 
the abolishment of the National Security Law. If he had done so, he would have not been 
able to win the votes that had supported Kim Jong-pil. In lieu of proposing the 
abolishment of the National Security Law, Kim instead proposed the establishment of the 
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 Koo argues that international human rights standards were implemented and a national institution created in order 
to consolidate democratic institutions and prevent the “rebirth of a quasi-authoritarian regime.” He states that the 
establishment of NHRI was explicitly linked to deterring future authoritarian regimes. 
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NHRCK in his campaign. In this election strategy, Chun Jong-bae’s intervention and 
roles were instrumental.
26
 
Chun Jung-Bae, the Vice-Chairman of the Policy Committee for Kim Dae-Jung’s 
political party during the presidential election, was a strong proponent of an independent Korean 
NHRI. A former human rights lawyer, Chun was a founding member of MINBYUN–Lawyers 
for a Democratic Society (founded in 1988), one of the most active and influential human rights 
NGOs in South Korea. More importantly, he was one of the initial “translators” of the 
international norms on NHRIs, and he helped to introduce them to Korean society after 
participating in the 1993 World Conference on Human Rights as a lead South Korean NGO 
delegate (Chun 2000). 
According to some scholars, then, President Kim’s decision to create the NHRK was at 
least partly influenced by domestic human rights NGOs’ efforts to mainstream the idea of NHRIs 
throughout the mid-1990s, and human rights NGOs played a pivotal role in persuading Kim Dae-
jung to make his campaign pledge to create an NHRI. For instance, the National Council of 
Churches, which has always been vocal about social issues, including human rights, demanded 
the establishment of an independent NHRI as one of the criteria for presidential election (Baek 
2002, 34). Domestic human rights NGOs thus played an important role both in diffusing the UN 
idea into Korea and in putting NHRIs on the national agenda during the 1997 presidential 
election campaign (Kim 2009a, 217). By late 1997, argues Kim Dong Wook, the global norms 
around NHRIs had largely been diffused in Korea, creating a social demand for an NHRI that 
was then framed as part of the political agenda during the election (Kim 2009a, 217). The 
political agenda-setting by the Kim Dae-jung administration and the NGOs’ advocacy only 
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 Cho Yong-hwan, in discussion with the author, Seoul, South Korea, October 1, 2010; copy on file with author. 
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accelerated the already lively “domestic policy debate on the establishment of NHRC in motion” 
(Kim 2009a, 217). 
Burdekin concurred that the above reasons were determinant for Korea to create an NHRI. 
He elaborated his view on Korea in comparison to Japan:
27
 
People compare Korea’s and Japan’s efforts in creating NHRIs: both countries started to 
discuss creating an institution around the same time, and both countries had conflicts 
between the government and NGOs. What made the difference between the two? Why 
was Korea able to create one, while Japan wasn’t? I think that Korea, despite its years of 
struggle, was able to create an independent institution because several factors came 
together: there was the political determination of the president, mobilized pressure from 
domestic NGOs, and well-coordinated advocacy from the international community. Japan 
did not have what Korea had. In addition, I am still skeptical about Japan’s ability to 
successfully establish an NHRI because of three contentious issues—namely, Burakumin 
(Japan’s “untouchables”), refugees, and Koreans living in Japan.28 
 
4.4 Struggle for an Independent Institution (1998–2001) 
The president’s commitment to creating an NHRI was strong, but the detailed design of 
the NHRI did not come easily. The first problem was deciding who would take the lead on 
designing the institution. The Ministry of Justice (MoJ) was placed to draft the legislation for the 
proposed NHRI, and the draft legislation that it produced was the beginning of the long and 
contentious struggle between the government, the ruling party, and the NGOs for an independent 
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 Japan still doesn’t have an NHRI. 
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 Brian Burdekin (Special Advisor on National Institutions to the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights), in 
discussion with the author, Geneva, Switzerland, April 6, 2011; copy on file with author. 
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Korean NHRI. The government had to amend the MoJ’s draft bill several times (Cho 2000, 2). 
The strong position of the MoJ, and its ability to limit the independence of the fledgling NHRCK, 
triggered a great deal of opposition to its draft, and to its position in drafting the institution’s 
design, from international human rights community, including the UN and domestic human 
rights NGOs. 
However, all the actors involved—the president, the MoJ, the political parties, the 
domestic NGOs, and the international human rights community—were responsive to the rhetoric 
of global standards and were keenly concerned that the NHRCK be recognized as a legitimate 
institution by the international community. In the next section, I will first examine the resistance 
of the Ministry of Justice, and the oppositional drafts it produced. I will then describe how the 
three-year struggle was finally brought to a close by an unexpected catalyst: President Kim was 
awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. Finally, I will explore how Korea’s long-term desired seonjinguk 
identity worked with the Kim government’s strong policy preference on human rights to 
facilitate the creation of an independent NHRI. 
4.4.1 Design of the NHRCK by the Ministry of Justice 
It is difficult to understand why the MoJ was assigned to deal with the creation of the 
NHRCK. An answer to this question, given by Kim Hyung-wan, a former staff member at 
NHRCK, reveals the fact that in Korea, human rights were then understood in bureaucratic terms: 
“it was simply because when you think of any government body to draft such a proposal, the first 
body that logically comes to mind is the Ministry of Justice.”29 Ironically, his answer reveals that 
the mis-assignment took place precisely because an NHRI did not exist in Korea; before the 
NHRCK, there was no single credible, competent government body that could take charge of the 
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 Kim Hyung-wan (former staff member at the NHRCK), in an interview with the author. 
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creation of an NHRI besides the Ministry of Justice—the only government body that dealt 
closely with human rights issues. 
From the very beginning, many human rights groups were nervous about possible 
conflicts of interest between the MoJ’s leadership role and the key concept of NHRI 
independence, as codified in the Paris Principles. The Paris Principles stipulate that an NHRI 
should be independent de facto and de jure, should be financially independent from all 
government branches, and should be given as broad a mandate as possible, preferably with 
jurisdiction to hear and consider complaints and to investigate human rights violations.
30
 Few 
people expected an MoJ-designed NHRI to have credibility or legitimacy; the MoJ was a law 
enforcement authority that had been heavily criticized for collaborating with human rights abuses 
and violations under the authoritarian regime (Cho 2000, 92–116). 
Amid the doubts, on September 25, 1998, the Ministry released a draft law that limited 
the mandate of the NHRI, consigning it to a ceremonial role and giving it only an advisory 
function. The MoJ proposed that the NHRCK be not a government institution but a private 
foundation—a special legal entity without investigative rights and without full independence. It 
also proposed that the MoJ itself would be the competent authority in charge of the NHRCK, and 
that the Minister of Justice would have the authority to recommend commissioners of the NHRI 
to the president for his approval. The MoJ argued that their proposed NHRI was an ideal form of 
an NHRI and that it followed the recommendations of the UN (Chung 2011c, 208). The Ministry 
intended to enact this draft law as soon as possible so that the NHRCK would be in place in time 
for the fiftieth anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, to be held on 
December 10, 1998; they wanted the launch to be publicized as a huge achievement for Korea’s 
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human rights record (Amnesty International 1998c). Of course, the MoJ proposal brought 
massive resistance from human rights groups. From that moment, an exhausting struggle began 
between the Ministry and human rights communities at both the global and domestic levels, a 
struggle that centered on the independent status of the NHRI and that would last for more than 
three years. 
During this struggle, the Ministry attempted to push through its version of the draft bill 
by trying to get the UN’s endorsement rather than by persuading its own domestic constituencies. 
In January 1999, the Secretary of Legal Affairs to the President, a former prosecutor, Park Joo-
sun, met with staff of OHCHR in New York regarding the creation of the Korean NHRI. He 
reported to the president that the UN experts supported the MoJ-drafted NHRCK bill. The 
Korean NGOs complained about this false report to the president; Park responded that his report 
to the president was objective, but he did not deny that he consulted the UN (Sarangbang Group 
1999a).  
Burdekin remembers one significant incident clearly: 
 
I remember the national institution building process in Korea very well. It was very 
unusual to see a ministry, the Ministry of Justice, tirelessly trying to get the institution in 
the way they wanted, even if the president wanted a genuinely independent National 
Institution —not to mention NGOs and the UN wanting the same way. I also remember 
that a representative of the Korean government flew all the way to New York, met with 
one OHCHR officer (who did not specialize in National Institutions), and tricked her so 
that they could report to the president that the Ministry’s proposal had the UN 
endorsement. It became a huge issue because it was simply not correct. I actually had to 
threaten a senior representative of the Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs that unless they 
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corrected this information I would fly to Seoul and hold a press conference and announce 
that the Justice ministry was deliberately misleading the government and the public about 
the real position.
31
 
As this incident demonstrates, government officials from the Ministry of Justice were more keen 
to obtain international recognition than to persuade or gain the consent of domestic 
constituencies. The Ministry officials may have thought that the issue would be more easily 
resolved at the domestic level after UN endorsement. 
4.4.2 Advocacy of International Human Rights NGOs 
International human rights NGOs played a crucial role in ensuring that the Korean NHRI 
would meet international standards, persistently pressuring the Korean government and 
reminding them of international human rights norms, especially the Paris Principles. Amnesty 
International, a high-profile international human rights NGO, was exceptionally active in 
engaging with Kim’s administration. Amnesty International’s letters reveal that the organization 
had a very good understanding of Korea’s desire to be the foremost seonjin human rights state in 
the region. 
In February 1998, shortly after Kim’s inauguration, Amnesty International issued a 
public statement urging President Kim Dae-jung to “ensure that Korean law and practice is in 
conformity with international human rights standards [to] improve human rights situations in 
Korea,” and urged “him to ensure that the commission’s statute is consistent with international 
standards for human rights commissions” (Amnesty International 1998a). I n May 1998, 
Amnesty International issued another paper proposing detailed standards for the Korean NHRI 
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and making a series of recommendations to the Korean government. In the paper, it mentioned 
that “South Korea now has the potential to develop one of the best human rights institutions in 
the region,” playing on Korea’s desire to be a human rights leader in the Asia–Pacific region 
(Amnesty International 1998b). 
After the Ministry’s draft proposal was published in September 1998, Amnesty 
International issued an open letter urging the president to reconsider the proposal. In letter dated 
October 23, 1998, Amnesty International’s Secretary-General, Pierre Sane, criticized various 
elements of the proposal: the limited mandate granted to the NHRI, the Ministry-led financial 
structure, and the proposal-drafting process’s lack of participation. He specifically stated that the 
proposed NHRI would not meet international norms: 
The draft legislation prepared by your Ministry of Justice does not in its present form 
conform to international human rights standards. It would result in a commission which 
lacks independence and investigative powers and does not have the authority to enforce 
its recommendations. It will also have a very limited mandate. If the legislation is 
adopted in this form, there is a serious risk not only of establishing a poor human rights 
commission but also of undermining the credibility of your human rights reform program 
[. . .] The draft law was drawn up by the Ministry of Justice in secret, without any 
consultation with human rights experts in South Korea (Amnesty International 1998c). 
Sane’s letter provided insight into why the government had decided to enact the 
problematic law on December 10, 1998, the fiftieth anniversary of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights; it stated that “we understand the symbolic importance of this date and your desire 
to show the South Korean people and world that South Korea has developed into a country 
which respects human rights,” and it encouraged the government to postpone the adoption of the 
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law, saying, “in this way, you will leave an important human rights legacy for all South Koreans.” 
Here, Amnesty International purposefully and effectively appealed to Korea’s desire to be 
recognized as a good human rights country by demanding that it comply with widely accepted 
international human rights standards. Amnesty International’s advocacy was one of the key 
determinants in changing the government’s plan; its efforts also created space for the activities of 
Korean human rights NGOs, who were diffusing the international norms of credible, independent 
NHRIs. 
4.4.3 Advocacy of Network of Transnational Actors 
In the fight to ensure that the NHRCK would be in line with the Paris Principles, 
domestic human rights NGOs successfully collaborated with international human rights 
communities, including international human rights NGOs and the UN. This network of actors 
was critical in swaying President Kim Dae-jung to redraft the NHRI bill to guarantee the 
independent status of the proposed NHRCK. 
On September 17, 1998, thirty Korean human rights NGOs came together, creating the 
Joint Committee of the Korean NGOs Coalition for Enacting the Human Rights Law and 
Establishing the National Human Rights Commission, a group that was designed to contest the 
Ministry’s attempts and proposals (Koo 2011a, 89–93). Coalition participants included a wide 
range of NGOs that focused on different issue areas (e.g., women’s rights, disability rights, labor 
rights activists, religious groups, etc.). A working group within the committee was created to 
draft an alternative human rights law and NHRI bill; at the same time, domestic NGOs 
demanded that the Ministry amend its draft law. These nonstate actors countered the Ministry’s 
domestic proposal by effectively appealing to global human rights norms. The NGOs 
coordinated with the international community, making use of the “boomerang effect” theorized 
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by Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink in Activists beyond Borders (1998), putting pressure on 
the government from both domestic and international fronts. 
The domestic NGOs also met with authoritative international figures on the issue. For 
instance, on October 19, 1998, the NGOs organized a meeting with Burdekin, the Special 
Advisor on National Institutions to the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights. The NGOs 
also met with Burdekin and with Mary Robinson, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights 
in Geneva, in April 1999, before Robinson’s visit to Korea in October of the same year (Koo 
2011b, 92). The domestic NGOs asserted their views disagreeing with the draft proposal 
prepared by the Ministry of Justice, with some success. Burdekin was well-aware of the struggle 
between the Ministry and the NGOs, and made the High Commissioner fully aware of the 
situation in Korea before her visit there, during which she met with President Kim and expressed 
her support for an independent institution.. 
On October 29, 1998, President Kim Dae-jung met with Korean human rights NGO 
representatives and promised a draft of legislation that would meet the demands of the NGOs. 
Following the meeting, he requested that his party, the National Congress for New Politics 
(NCNP), draft a new NHRI bill conforming to the UN Paris Principles (Cho 2000, 99). The 
NCNP proposal suggested an independent national institution with a broad mandate, as per the 
Paris Principles; it also provided the institution with the authority to investigate human rights 
violations perpetrated by law enforcement agencies (Korea Herald 1998). The ruling party’s 
draft accommodated the NGOs’ demands, but it was not welcomed by the MoJ. On November 
28, 1998, the MoJ submitted a revised version of its earlier draft with no substantial changes, and 
they deliberately delayed several meetings that were organized to discuss the draft bill with the 
ruling party and the president (Choi 2008, 76). 
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In the meantime, an unexpected announcement was made on March 22, 1999. The NCNP 
revoked its proposal for an independent NHRI and agreed to the Ministry’s proposal that the 
NHRCK would be a private institution; this version of the MoJ’s bill was submitted to the 
National Assembly on April 7, 1999. The bill was not adopted due to a furious outcry from the 
NGOs.
32
 This incident pushed the NGOs into the streets; about thirty activists from eighteen 
NGOs went on a week-long hunger strike at the Myongdong Cathedral in Seoul (Kim 2010b). A 
group of domestic and international NGOs issued a public statement criticizing the government 
for its failure to follow the Paris Principles and urging the government to follow the advice of the 
UN High Commissioner for Human Rights: 
We, the undersigned, reaffirm the importance of public consultation and transparency as 
emphasized by the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights; urge strongly that the 
government withdraw the draft human rights law and make full consultation with human 
rights NGOs concerned; and request the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, inter 
alia, to provide the necessary expertise and technical assistance in order to ensure the 
establishment of a human rights commission in full compliance with the relevant 
international standards on the national human rights institutions such as the Paris 
Principles (Sarangbang Group 1999b). 
 
 
On April 9, 1999, Amnesty International issued another open letter to President Kim 
Dae-jung, stressing that the proposed private NHRI would not have sufficient authority to 
function effectively and to be independent from the government, especially from the Ministry of 
Justice, and that it therefore would not be respected by the international community: 
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A weak commission which lacks independence and does not have the confidence of the 
human rights community will be ineffective and will not command the respect of the 
international community. We are also concerned at reports that the new draft does not 
conform with international standards on the establishment of national human rights 
commissions. [. . .] We are concerned that provisions of this draft, and the commission’s 
legal status as a “corporate body,” will not give it sufficient independence from the 
Ministry of Justice. [. . .] Amnesty International believes that South Korea could establish 
a human rights commission which is a powerful institution for the protection and 
promotion of human rights and a lasting testimony of your government’s commitment to 
human rights reform (Amnesty International 1999).  
When these negotiations failed to shift the deadlock, another international voice joined 
the NGOs appealing to Korea’s identity, interests, and desire to be seonjinguk. The October 1999 
visit of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Mary Robinson, was another major 
determinant of President Kim’s decision to reconsider the MoJ proposal. Lee Seong-hoon, the 
former Director-General of the Human Rights Policy Bureau of the NHRCK, says that Robinson 
influenced President Kim: 
In the creation of an NHRI, each country goes through a different process and different 
variables come into play. For the Korean case, both domestic and international efforts 
joined forces. I think the international variables were quite critical in the creation of the 
NHRCK—the international opinion, especially, shifted the course of discussion over the 
independence of the institution. One of the critical moments was when the UN High 
Commissioner for Human Rights, Mary Robinson, met with the president, Kim Dae-jung, 
in October 1999 in Seoul. I believe the president must have been puzzled about the 
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struggle between his trusted staff and his long-time supporters—human rights activists. 
At the meeting, the president asked Mary Robinson her views about how the Korean 
NHRI should be shaped. Mary Robinson answered that if the institution turned out to be a 
private foundation, the institution would not have legitimacy in the eyes of the 
international community. Mary Robinson’s timely and straightforward intervention was 
crucial in shifting President Kim’s mind toward creating an independent institution.33 
After her visit, Mary Robinson praised Korea and President Kim for accepting international 
human rights norms: 
Another example I would mention is South Korea. A few weeks ago, I visited South 
Korea, where I met President Kim Dae-jung, who has championed the cause of a national 
human rights institution. I stressed to the Korean officials I met, as I do to all 
governments, that there are certain basic requirements for national human rights 
institutions to be effective, notably that they must be genuinely independent and have 
powers consistent with a capacity to discharge their functions (Robinson 1999). 
According to Koo, the joint efforts of the domestic NGOs and the international human 
rights community were crucial in ensuring that the NHRCK was founded as an impartial, 
independent institution with enforcement power: “the domestic human rights movement might 
not have been able to effectively pressure the government to commit to creating an independent 
and well-funded national institution if the movement had not been tied to the formation of the 
world human rights movement that was led by human rights IGOs and INGOs” (Koo 2011a, 93). 
The cumulative endeavors of both the domestic and the international human rights community, 
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including the UN, were largely successful, appealing as they did to the country’s desire to be a 
seonjin human rights state. 
4.4.4 Critical Catalyst to End the Struggle: Kim’s Nobel Peace Prize 
The government and the ruling party decided to postpone the adoption of the bill, and the 
negotiation over the NHRCK bill remained largely inactive until an unexpected event made the 
Ministry of Justice give in. On October 13, 2000, the Nobel Prize Committee announced that 
President Kim Dae-jung was the winner of the Nobel Peace Prize of 2000. This surprising news 
turned the world’s attention on human rights in Korea (Robinson 2000) and on President Kim’s 
efforts to promote democracy and human rights. In the award ceremony speech, Gunnar Berge, 
the Chairman of the Norwegian Nobel Prize Committee, elaborated on the committee’s reasons 
for awarding the prize to President Kim, stressing the role he had played in advancing human 
rights and democracy: 
Kim Dae-jung’s work for human rights made him a worthy candidate [. . .] Today, Kim 
Dae-jung is the president of a democratic South Korea. His path to power has been 
long—extremely long. For decades, he fought a seemingly hopeless fight against an 
authoritarian regime. [. . .] In a democratic perspective, South Korea still has some way to 
go where reform of the legal system and of security legislation is concerned. [. . .] Our 
reply is that we feel confident that Kim Dae-jung will complete the process of 
democratisation of which he has been the foremost spokesman for almost half a century 
(Berge 2000).
 
 
Kim calls this announcement a “breakthrough” in negotiations (Kim 2009a, 228), and he 
quotes Hankyoreh as saying that the ruling party’s attitude changed because they realized that “it 
would not look good [at home and abroad] if the Korean government were to enact no other law 
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than the Human Rights Law in a way opposed by human rights NGOs” (Kim 2009a, 228). Media 
also started to pay attention, wondering whether President Kim’s Nobel Peace Prize would 
change the positions of the politicians and the Ministry of Justice with Korea’s international 
reputation at stake (Hankyoreh 2000a, 2000b). Cho Yong-whan, one of the key drafters of the 
NGO-initiated NHRCK bill and the key negotiator with the Ministry of Justice, concurs with 
Kim that the announcement of the Nobel Prize Committee was the beginning of the end of the 
three-year struggle with the Ministry. Cho explains the background to the Ministry’s change in 
position and the environment in which the struggle took place: 
The course of discussion was changing and the Ministry was almost isolated, insisting on 
its position alone. Amid the negotiation, the announcement of the Nobel Prize Committee 
came along, and I think it was an instrumental catalyst that finally ended the long back-
and-forth negotiation process over the status of the NHRCK. The Ministry finally gave in. 
It was because the Ministry could not afford to let the world to see Korea as a country 
where a Ministry was fighting against domestic and international human rights 
communities; the world was focusing on Korea and its human rights advancement due to 
the Nobel Peace Prize. It was a reasonable decision on the Ministry’s part. 
It was quite rare, the amount of international attention the NHRCK received in the 
establishment process. I believe international human rights communities, especially 
Amnesty International and the UN OHCHR, saw Korea as a good human rights model 
that had achieved democratization in a rapid period, and thought that it could serve as an 
example for other Asian countries. President Kim’s international fame also attracted the 
attention of international communities to Korea’s human rights situation and the NHRCK 
building process. The international community’s persuasion was critical in creating the 
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NHRCK as an independent institution. Of course, there was persistent and strong 
mobilized advocacy from the domestic NGOs, who tirelessly informed international 
actors of the situation. 
This rare deadlocked struggle between the Ministry and civil society, which lasted 
over three years, may be seen as a traditional conflict between the state and society, but I 
think it was more of a disagreement between the traditional state bureaucracy and newly 
emerged civil society. I had several extensive and heated discussions with the Ministry 
over the draft bill. I experienced a lot of frustrations, and I was somewhat surprised at its 
unyielding position no matter what until the announcement of the Nobel Prize Committee. 
But I do not think the Ministry had any malicious intentions. I think it was merely a result 
of a conventional bureaucratic approach to human rights (Cho 2000). 
Lee Seong-hoon, the executive director of the Korean Human Rights Foundation and the 
former Human Rights Policy Director at the NHRCK, elaborates further on the events of that 
period: 
The course of negotiation was already going against the Ministry of Justice, which was 
almost alone in its insistence on a private institution, but I agree that the Nobel Peace 
Prize announcement was a catalyst in changing the position of the Ministry. The global 
level of attention on the Korean human rights situation incurred by the announcement 
pressured the Ministry to change its position. It was Korea’s first chance to shine as a 
democratic human rights state, to show a different image to the world than the previous 
image of Korea as an authoritarian human rights abuser. Korea had too much to lose in 
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terms of international reputation and its pathway to becoming an advanced democratic 
country for the Ministry not to change its position.
34
 
After President Kim received the Nobel Peace Prize in October of 2000, efforts to push 
the NHRCK bill through accelerated. It was decided that a government-drafted bill from the 
National Assembly would best minimize the influence of the Ministry of Justice in the 
establishment of the NHRCK (Kim 2009a, 228–229). The NCNP ruling party began debating the 
bill on February 27, 2001, at least partly in response to appeals that equated establishing an 
independent and effective NHRC with Korea’s desired seonjinguk status. During the debate over 
the adoption of the bill, the main drafter of the act, Congresswoman Lee Mi-kyung, explained the 
justifications for this version of the draft proposal while stressing that efforts to continue 
advancing human rights should continue: 
With the trend of internalizing human rights enforcement within countries, the 
international community is paying more and more attention to each country’s human 
rights situation; however, South Korea has not yet escaped from its negative human rights 
image from previous human rights violations under the authoritarian regimes of the past. 
Therefore, it is our historical mandate to build and realize a seonjin democratic society 
where human dignity, rules, and human rights are respected without discrimination and 
without human rights violations (Lee 2001, 21). 
This amended bill, which was largely in compliance with the Paris Principles and 
institutionalized the NHRCK as an independent governmental body with a broad mandate, was 
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formally adopted and became effective as of May 24, 2001. This bill provided the legal grounds 
for the creation of the NHRCK. 
 
4.5 Launch of the NHRCK in 2001 and Its Limitations 
The National Human Rights Commission of Korea was finally launched on November 25, 
2001; its first chairperson, Kim Chang-guk, and other commissioners had been appointed earlier 
in October. The NHRC Act incorporated many of the demands of the NGOs and the international 
community, generally complying with the Paris Principles and making the NHRC an 
independent governmental body: 
On August 1, 2001, it was informally decided to appoint Kim Chang-guk, an 
accomplished lawyer, to be the First President of the Commission, and the “Preparation 
& Planning Team for Establishment of National Human Rights Commission (hereinafter 
‘Planning Team’)” was organized under the Prime Minister's Directive No. 420 on 
August 20, only three months ahead of November 25, the date given for the official 
launch of the Commission. The Planning Team set out to gather information and prepare 
draft bills in order to comply with the Enforcement Decree and the Rules for the 
Commission Act, and began to outline the necessary logistical procedures and proposed 
organization of the Secretariat. However, progress was not made as planned because of 
the delay in appointment of Human Rights Commissioners for Human Rights and other 
difficulties. It was October 9, only 40 days ahead of the launch, when the President 
officially appointed 11 persons to the Human Rights Commission including 4 
Commissioners selected by the National Assembly, 3 Commissioners nominated by 
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Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and 4 Commissioners nominated by President 
himself (NHRCK 2002a, 8). 
The mandate of the Commission was broad enough to protect the fundamental human 
rights of all individuals, including non-Koreans residing in Korea (Articles 1 and 4), and 
guaranteed the NHRCK’s independence (Article 2). It also imposed pluralism, one of the key 
components of the Paris Principles, on the composition of the Commission: four or more of the 
commissioners must be women, and commissioners could be either selected by the National 
Assembly or nominated by the President of the Republic of Korea or by the Chief Justice of the 
Supreme Court (Article 5). The Act provided the Commission the power to make 
recommendations to improve or rectify policies and practices (Article 25) and to present 
opinions to courts and Constitutional courts (Article 28). Articles 24 and 31 provided the 
Commission with authority to visit and inspect government facilities to protect the rights of 
people in those facilities. 
The detailed mandates and functions of the NHRCK are as follows: 
 Developing human rights policies through conducting human rights research and 
issuing policy recommendations 
 Investigating discrimination and human rights violation cases and providing access to 
remedies 
 Promoting human rights education and raising public awareness of human rights 
 Promoting and monitoring the national implementation of international human rights 
treaties 
95 
 Cooperating with government agencies, civil society organizations, UN human rights 
bodies, and national human rights institutions (Asia–Pacific Forum [APF], 
International Criminal Court [ICC]) 
 Other matters deemed necessary to protect and promote human rights (NHRCK, n.d.).  
Although the NHRCK was granted the status of an independent national institution, not a 
subsidiary body of the MoJ—the most fundamental defining element of a strong NHRI—the 
NHRCK nevertheless launched with many structural and operational weaknesses. For example, 
many key issues, such as staffing and the institution’s legal status, were not laid out in the 
NHRCK’s constitution (which would guarantee the institution’s independent control over these 
matters) but premised on the NHRCK law. As Kim Hyung-wan has said, having won the battle 
for the NHRCK’s independent status, there was very little room for further negotiation about the 
organization’s size, structure, working mechanisms, etc. The NHRCK had to accept limitations 
on even key issues (Kim 2010b).  
The NHRCK’s first annual report calls the organization’s establishment a “half victory” 
and describes several unsatisfactory elements in the Act: “the privilege of exemption from 
liability for defamation under civil law or criminal law is not given to the Commission or the 
Commissioners; the procedure of a hearing and consent from the National Assembly is not 
provided adequately for appointment of Commissioners for Human Rights; independence in 
personnel management and budget is not sufficiently provided for; the governmental organs and 
agencies over which the Commission has jurisdiction for investigation are limited; the 
Commission has no power to order a person to come along for investigation; and an interrogation 
system for witnesses is not available” (NHRCK 2002a, 7). The NHRCK assessed the importance 
of its own creation in this way: 
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First, the creation of the Commission means [the] domestic materialization of an 
international institution for human rights, i.e., the domestic launch of a “quasi-
international institution” in connection with human rights [. . .] Second, it is significant in 
that a national institution, independent from legislative, administrative and judiciary 
bodies of the government, has been created so that it can check and monitor the existing 
powerful government agencies [. . .] Third, the Commission performs its role as the 
“watch-guard for human rights” that can illuminate the “dead zone of human rights” and 
take preventative measures against human rights violations. [. . .] Fourth, The 
Commission carries out its function as an advocate for human rights (NHRCK 2002a, 
10–11). 
The organization thus connected one of its key functions—to “improve laws and systems 
and also to raise ordinary citizens’ sensitivity of human rights in order for us to develop to the 
level of other advanced countries in human rights”—to its intention to match other seonjin 
human rights states’ level of human rights understanding (NHRCK 2002a, 11). 
Although in the beginning the Commission was still figuring out its institutional structure 
and priorities, it executed many of its functions in the year 2002, it presented opinions on fifteen 
cases of statutes and systems, including presenting a dissenting voice on a draft of the “Anti-
Terrorism Act”; made six recommendations for improvement in governmental policies; and 
produced four recommendations to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, urging the government to 
establish plans for domestic implementation of the state obligations to implement international 
human rights laws and norms (NHRCK 2002a, 24–27). In addition, the Commission processed 
1,360 cases out of 2,833 complaints of alleged human rights violations, registered from 
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November 2001 to December 2002, while working toward resolving the remaining 1,473 cases 
(NHRCK 2002a, 60). 
However, the NHRCK’s position as an independent institution that did not belong to any 
government body was yet not understood; it was constantly challenged, and the government had 
not taken a firm stance on the NHRCK’s independent status. An exemplary case that illustrates 
the conflict between the government and the NHRCK about the Commission’s independence is 
found in Chung (2011c). In November 2002, the chairperson, Kim Chang-guk, traveled to the 
APF annual meeting, held in New Delhi, for six days. He did not seek prior approval for this 
travel, as the rules for minister-level government officials do not require it. However, on 
November 11, 2002, the president’s office gave a stark warning to the NHRCK: it claimed that, 
because the NHRCK chairperson is at the level of a minister, the NHRCK chairperson should 
have submitted a request for travel approval through the Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Prime 
Minister for the president’s final approval. The Commission responded to the warning with a 
press release stating that the travel rules are for officials belonging to the administrative branch 
of the government, and that the chairperson of the NHRCK, an independent institution, should 
not be bound by such rules (NHRCK 2002b). Chung, who reports this incident, stresses that a 
governmental institution had never before in Korean history outright challenged the president’s 
authority in a public statement (Chung 2011c, 207–209). 
As Lee Seong-hoon explains, the political environment under Kim’s government was not 
conducive to the NHRCK’s positioning itself firmly as an independent human rights body for 
several reasons: 
There are many reasons why the NHRCK was not able to establish its authority during 
Kim Dae-jung’s time. First, Kim Dae-jung’s administration inherited the traditional 
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invested bureaucrats from previous regimes, so Kim had relatively weak authority, not 
having full control over the bureaucrats. Second of all, the NGOs advanced a lot during 
this time, but they were still not fully effectively mobilized. Lastly, Kim, as a politician, 
was probably not able to completely disregard the Ministry of Justice, which is one of the 
most powerful ministries. But things changed, and the NHRCK changed drastically as the 
next president, Roh Moo-hyun, came on board.
35
  
 
4.6 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I traced the process of diffusion of global human rights norms into the 
Korean domestic arena in order to show how Korea used human rights as an international 
legitimacy–seeking strategy from the early 1990s to the establishment of the NHRCK in 2001. 
The norms-diffusion process was possible because Korea’s national identity, and the national 
identity of the Korean people, was undergoing a reshaping process: Korea was changing from a 
developing country with a poor human rights record to a respected member of the human-rights-
respecting “good nations club”—an exclusive club that can only be entered by doing what other 
seonjin countries do. 
The NHRCK was established due to synergic effects that were generated by domestic and 
international advocacy groups, who used rhetoric based on Korea’s desire to be a good country. 
The road that would lead to the establishment of the NHRCK began when NHRIs rose to 
prominence in the 1990s as indicators of human rights states; the international legitimacy 
attached to NHRIs provided support to the efforts of Korean domestic groups and politicians to 
establish their own NHRI. This support was both indirect and (at times) direct, as key 
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international human rights figures such as Amnesty International, the UN High Commissioner 
for Human Rights, and the network of international human rights groups stepped in to advocate 
for the creation of an NHRI in Korea. At the domestic level, one significant factor in the 
founding of the NHRCK was the political will of President Kim, who was determined to 
establish an institution that would be internationally recognized as a properly functioning NHRI; 
another was the years of assiduous resistance and advocacy that had come from Korean human 
rights groups. Yet even after its founding, the NHRCK was not yet firmly rooted in Korea as an 
independent human rights agency; its authority was still being challenged.   
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CHAPTER 5 
CONSOLIDATION OF THE NHRCK (2003–2007) 
The Republic of Korea will make a new beginning as a model human rights country, and 
we will absolutely become a human rights seonjin country [. . .] It is meaningful in many 
aspects for Korea to host this Conference. I would like to think of this as an indication 
that the international community is recognizing Korea as a country of human rights and 
democracy. 
—President Roh Moo-Hyun’s opening remarks at the 
7
th
 International Conference of National Human Rights Institutions 
September 14, 2004, Seoul (Presidential Secretariat 2005, 319) 
 
5.1 Introduction 
As the previous chapter described, the long process of establishing the NHRCK took 
place during Kim’s government, and the NHRCK became operational toward the end of his term. 
In February 2003, Roh Moo-hyun was inaugurated; his policies in large measure worked toward 
Korea’s becoming a human rights–respecting seonjin nation, and under his administration, the 
NHRCK developed into a credible institution with a solid standing. 
Under Roh, the process of changing Korea’s image from that of an undemocratic 
developing country to that of an advanced democratic country accelerated, in part through 
economic growth (Korea became one of the largest economies in the world), and in part through 
Roh’s attempt to obtain moral legitimacy at the regional and international levels by proactively 
internalizing globally accepted human rights norms. During this period, numerous policies and 
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orientations aimed to show the world that Korea was a human rights country and one of the 
“good” rich, developed countries were put in place. 
During this time, the NHRCK experienced rapid development, and the Roh Moo-hyun 
government’s support for the NHRCK’s independence was reflected its commitment to abide by 
the Paris Principles. At the domestic level, the NHRCK spoke up on many critical (and political) 
human rights issues, meeting the expectations for a solid, independent human rights institution 
(Chung 2011c, 209). The NHRCK risked political pushback by directly opposing some 
government policies, such as the deployment of troops to Iraq. Taking these contentious stands 
firmly established the NHRCK’s independence from the government, increasing its credibility. 
At the regional and international levels, the NHRCK became a model NHRI in a short 
period of time, and an increasing number of governments, especially Asian countries, recognized 
the NHRCK’s model status. At the international level, Korea hosted the 7th International 
Conference of the National Institutions in September 2004; this landmark international 
conference focused the world’s attention on South Korea’s human rights records and 
achievements and on the young NHRCK. A number of prominent political figures participated in 
the meeting, including President Roh and Louise Arbour, the UN High Commissioner for 
Human Rights. At a later stage, the NHRCK took up important positions at the regional and 
international levels as a leading human rights country. For instance, the chairperson of the 
NHRCK served as the chairpersonship of the Asia–Pacific Forum (APF) in 2006, only four years 
after Korea became a full member of the APF. The NHRCK chairperson was also elected vice-
chair of the UN’s International Coordinating Committee of NHRIs in 2007 in recognition of the 
NHRCK’s status as a credible and legitimate institution. 
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In this chapter, I argue that Korea’s promotion of the NHRCK, an act that seemingly 
restrained the state’s own power, actually enabled Korea to strengthen its soft power in the 
international sphere by reinventing itself as a seonjin human rights state. The results of the 
Korean government’s efforts to be a good seonjinguk and to gain the respect of the international 
community resulted in tangible outcomes. For example, under Roh’s administration, several 
Koreans took up high-level positions at the UN, including the position of the UN Secretary-
General and the UN Deputy High Commissioner for Human Rights, and in 2006, Korea was 
elected as one of the inaugural members of the UN Human Rights Council; these diplomatic 
achievements would have not been possible if Korea had not had a reputation as a good human 
rights seonjin country, and they are evidence that the government’s attempts to become 
seonjinguk were successful. 
This chapter will demonstrate how the NHRCK was consolidated under Roh’s regime 
(between 2003 and 2007), and it will investigate how Korea actively sought international 
legitimacy by embracing global human rights norms and promoting the NHRCK. In other words, 
Korea’s desired identity, that of a seonjin state, was expressed in its behavior, which supported 
international human rights norms and standards. This chapter also demonstrates how the country-
specific context—the inauguration of Roh’s human rights–friendly government—helped 
consolidate the NHRCK. In other words, the NHRCK might have not prospered as it did if its 
development had taken place under a different regime with different policy goals. 
 
5.2 Inauguration of the New Human Rights–Friendly Administration of Roh Moo-hyun 
In December 2002, Roh Moo-hyun was elected the sixteenth president of Korea. The 
election of Roh, a former human rights lawyer who had defended human rights and labor rights 
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under dictatorships for decades, was regarded as signaling the arrival of a new generation of 
democracy, in part because Roh was largely backed by young voters and by the so-called 386 
Generation.
36
 With the inauguration of Roh Moo-hyun, Korea entered into “a new era in Korean 
democracy ending the post-three Kim politics, i.e., one-man rule based upon regional factions. It 
also overcame authoritarian practices and introduced new democratic procedures” (Kim 2014, 
161). With Roh’s success, it seemed that there was no going back—that Korean democracy 
would continue to flourish without halt or fail. Although Roh’s political roots were not as solid 
as those of career politicians, during his administration, Korea became the eleventh largest 
economy in the world and achieved a GDP of $20,000 USD per capita for the first time in 
Korean history. 
Under Roh’s regime, the NHRCK enjoyed a vast amount of autonomy and the 
developmental state mentality also intensified. The country’s policies were geared toward 
becoming a better developmental country, a status that is respected by its Asian peers and by 
other developed countries. 
5.2.1 Desire to Be Seonjinguk and the Use of Human Rights 
5.2.2 Becoming Seonjinguk under Roh 
An analysis of statements made by President Roh during his five-year term reveals the 
deeply rooted desire that Korea be a seonjin state, and shows how deeply embedded the notion of 
human rights was in the Korean concept of seonjinguk. Roh’s statements in all areas of public 
policy—economy, trade, military, social welfare, education, technology, education, and human 
rights—are grounded in the concept of seonjin. For example, a government publication notes that 
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 386 Generation is the generation of people, then in their thirties, who were born in the 1960s and who had gone to 
university in the 1980s. 
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Korea fulfills all the criteria required to be a seonjin state except that of the annual per capita 
GDP reaching $20,000 USD;
37
 it also notes some other specific requirements that Korea must 
meet to be classified as seonjinguk, such as the ratio of expenditure on social welfare to GDP, the 
maturity of social capital, and the effective use of women in the labor force. The report argues 
that Korea is one step away from being seonjinguk, and that in order to achieve its goal, it needs 
to implement new strategies for development (Presidential Secretariat 2007, 2–6). 
Analysis of Roh’s statements shows that he regularly used the rationale that Korea should 
do what other developed states do to become one of those developed states; this analysis thus 
offers empirical evidence that Korea subscribed to the logic of appropriateness. Roh saw that 
Korea was at a critical juncture in its shift from developing country to developed country, and he 
persistently stressed the need for Korea to leap forward and become a seonjin state. Roh used 
this strong drive to become seonjin to persuade the society to close the gaps that remained 
between Korea and developed countries and to leave developing countries behind. For Roh, the 
seonjin state appears to be primarily defined by the size of the economy ($20,000 USD GDP), 
with a strong emphasis on comparative rankings (the world’s first, second, third largest 
economies, etc.), but the concept of seonjin was broad enough to encompass all areas of society, 
including its human rights policies. For example, a statement made by Roh at a high-level 
meeting at the 60th session of the UN General Assembly recognizes Korea’s “responsibility and 
role” to resolve various global issues, including advancement of human rights, and he positions 
Korea as a model nation: it has realized the values of the UN and has built the 11
th
 largest 
economy in the world and a remarkable democracy out of a war-torn country (Presidential 
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 The Korean government elaborates the four general criteria for seonjinguk: (1) IMF classification, (2) OECD 
membership, (3) above $20,000 USD GDP per capita, and (4) above 0.9 score in Human Development Index. The 
report stated that Korea’s per capita GDP was expected to exceed $20,000 USD in 2007 (Presidential Secretariat 
2007, 2–3). 
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Secretariat 2006, 381). This statement puts Korea on par with other large, rich democratic 
seonjin states that lead on global issues. 
 
5.3 Human Rights Embedded in Becoming Seonjinguk 
The Roh regime’s desire to join the seonjinguk club is clearly visible in its emphasis on 
human rights, which became a priority policy issue during Roh’s time. The following statements 
from President Roh stress the advancement Korea has made in transitioning from a dictatorship 
to a human-rights-respecting democratic state, and emphasize Korea’s current efforts to become 
a human rights seonjin state. The statements also show how deeply human rights were embedded 
in the country’s developmental agenda and in its attempts to become seonjinguk. 
Korea has become the world’s twelfth most prosperous country, overcoming the 
aftermath of the war. Freedom, human rights and democracy are bursting into full 
blossom after defeating the long oppression of dictatorship (Presidential Secretariat 2004, 
37). 
I fully support the vision and activities pursued by the UN. I will proactively participate 
in international cooperative efforts aimed at advancing democracy and human rights, and 
in all efforts to resolve global problems, including terrorism and poverty (Presidential 
Secretariat 2004, 117). 
We cannot delay the adoption of an Employment Permit System for foreign labor any 
longer [. . .] If we were to drive those who came to Korea with a Korean dream into 
becoming criminals, we could not be regarded in the world’s eyes as a legitimate human 
rights state (Presidential Secretariat 2004, 284). 
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Our troops are growing as a seonjin military who are defending freedom and human 
rights, as we have deployed peacekeeping forces all over the world, including Iraq, 
Afghanistan, and East Timor (Presidential Secretariat 2004, 403–404). 
The results of [the democratization movements] led to the expansion of freedom, human 
rights, and democracy for the common people and normal citizens, not for those in power 
and the privileged. [. . .] Let’s move forward without vacillation to become [. . .] the 
world’s first-class country where all Koreans enjoy prosperity with a GDP of $20,000 
USD (Presidential Secretariat 2004, 608–609). 
We need a collaborative effort to safeguard world’s peace, security and human rights. We 
need to live up to our responsibility as a legitimate actor in the international community 
(Presidential Secretariat 2004, 614). 
The Roh regime’s focus on human rights (including the promotion of the NHRCK) as a 
means of pursuing international legitimacy is particularly well evidenced in Roh’s remarks at the 
7th International Conference for National Human Rights Institutions, which was hosted by the 
NHRCK in September of 2004. Roh states that the creation of the NHRCK was a turning point in 
Korean human rights history, marking the moment that Korea began to deal with human rights 
issues that had accumulated over the past decades. He affirms that he will lead Korea to be a 
“human rights seonjin state” and that it will become a “model human rights state” by resolving 
its past human rights violations. He further asserts that the NHRCK’s hosting of the conference 
means that “the international community is regarding Korea as a country of human rights and 
democracy” (Presidential Secretariat 2005, 320–321). Participants in the conference include the 
UN High Commissioner, Louise Arbour; the chairperson of the International Coordinating 
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Committee of National Institutions for the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, Morten 
Kjaerum; the UN Special Rapporteur on human rights defenders, Hina Jilani; and many global 
human rights figures, including representatives of more than seventy NHRIs and of a number of 
global and local NGOs. 
Over time, Roh’s regime showed increasing confidence in Korea’s status as a democratic 
human rights state. His statements, examined chronologically from 2003 to the end of his term, 
increasingly reiterate that the world is recognizing Korea as a democratic seonjin human rights 
state: 
It is different now. Korea has sufficient ability to keep our safety and pride. We have a 
strong military no country can overlook, and it is supported by the world’s twelfth largest 
economic power. We are recognized as a legitimate democratic human rights state 
(Presidential Secretariat 2008, 112). 
We have grown to have enough capacity to protect ourselves. We have become 
recognized by the world as a democratic human rights state, in which revival of 
dictatorship is unimaginable (Presidential Secretariat 2008, 340). 
We are recognized as a democratic human rights state by the world. We still have a long 
way to go, but at least all of those shameful phases such as dictatorship [and] torture [. . .] 
are all in the past (Presidential Secretariat 2008, 390). 
We have made a great advancement in democracy. Freedom House, a global human 
rights organization, rated Korea’s political freedom as [being on] the level of [the] 
world’s best. Korea received a better rating than the US and Japan in press freedom, 
according to Reporters without Borders. The democracy and economic development we 
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have accomplished is an achievement that is rarely found in world history. No country 
has entered into becom[ing] a seonjin state like we did, [although] [. . .] around 100 
countries became independent after World War II (Presidential Secretariat 2008, 451). 
Your home, Korea, has now become a country you can feel proud of everywhere. We 
have the twelfth largest economy in the world; [we] have power to defend ourselves; and 
we are recognized as a democratic human rights state by the world. The [country’s] 
reputation in the international community is high enough to elect a Korean UN Secretary-
General (Presidential Secretariat 2008, 497). 
The apparent boost in confidence may be, in part, because Roh was nearing the end of his 
term, and he may have felt the need to show off the achievements of his regime. Or, as some 
scholars argue, it may be because he realized the legitimizing possibilities of Korea’s taking on a 
leadership role in promoting and protecting human rights. According to Soh Changrok, Korea 
was able to take up a leadership role in promoting human rights governance in Asia because of 
its economic development and democratization; its status as one of the largest economies in Asia 
made it a model country from which other Asian countries could learn (Soh 2013, 13). 
Considering the timing of these statements, Roh’s increasing confidence may also have been 
related to the appointment of Ban Ki-moon as the UN Secretary-General. Perhaps the 
appointment of a Korean national to the top UN position conferred enough legitimacy for Roh to 
feel that Korea had almost achieved seonjinguk status. 
5.3.1 Do What Other Seonjin Human Rights States Do 
Korea’s attempts to become a seonjin human rights state by doing what other seonjin 
states do is demonstrated through a newspaper campaign entitled “The Way to Seonjin Human 
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Rights State,” co-hosted by the NHRCK and the Seoul Newspaper between July 18, 2005, and 
September 20, 2005. The purpose of the campaign was to “explore ways for Korea to join the 
ranks of the seonjin human rights states by exploring other seonjin human rights states’ advanced 
experiences and policies” (Seoul Newspaper 2005). The campaign introduced specific areas of 
human rights issues (disability rights, women’s rights, the rights of conscientious objectors to 
military service, migrant rights, elder rights, and prisoners’ rights) in eight select advanced 
countries: the United States, the United Kingdom, New Zealand, the Netherlands, Germany, 
France, Japan, and Taiwan. This campaign exemplifies the way that human rights norms came to 
be incorporated into seonjinguk discourse. It reflects Koreans’ idea that to become seonjinguk, 
one must follow the human rights polices of other seonjinguk. 
 
5.4 Consolidation of the NHRCK (2003–2007) 
5.4.1 Achievements of the NHRCK at the Domestic Level 
The NHRCK launched in November 2011 and immediately consolidated its presence and 
accelerated its activities. It expanded and grew into an independent institution with a clear 
direction and voice, actively speaking up on various human rights issues in Korea, making 
recommendations to various government bodies, and handling an enormous number of cases of 
human rights violations. It also actively engaged in international cooperation, taking up a 
leadership role in both international and regional bodies (e.g., ICC and APF) and assisting in the 
establishment of NHRIs in other countries. Through these efforts, the NHRCK became a credible 
and legitimate institution at both the domestic and international levels. 
This was largely made possible because the government let the NHRCK perform its 
functions without intervening, despite the fact that, in a few notable, highly political cases, the 
110 
NHRCK directly opposed the views of the government and the president. The government 
responded by saying that it is the NHRCK’s duty to express its view on any matter, even if it 
means challenging the president. 
In this section, I show how the NHRCK became established as a credible institution in 
Korean society between 2003 and 2007 by describing its achievements during this period. The 
NHRCK had the strong support of the government during this time; there was a general culture 
of accepting the NHRCK’s recommendations—a culture that cannot be forced and must rely on 
the good will of the recipients of those recommendations. This culture is demonstrated by the 
high acceptance rate of NHRCK recommendations presented to various government bodies, 
including relevant ministries, competent courts, and legislative bodies.
38
 As Figure 4 shows, the 
number of recommendations made by the NHRCK
39
 steadily increased between 2001 and 2008, 
going from 6 in 2001 to 25 in 2002, and increasing from 31 in 2005 to over 51 in 2006; the 
number remained above 50 until 2008. 
                                                             
38
 Sub-paragraphs 1, 4 and 7 of Article 19 of the National Human Rights Commission Act (NHRC Act) mandates 
that the Commission 1) conduct research on statutes, legal systems, policies, and practices related to human rights, 
and make recommendations and opinions on them to improve human rights; 2) conduct surveys on human rights 
conditions; and 3) research and make recommendations and opinions about the feasibilities of acceding to and 
observing international human rights treaties. 
39
 The total number includes recommendations, expressions of opinion, and presentations of opinion. 
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Figure 4 Trends in human rights policy recommendations 
 
Source: Human Rights Statistics 2015, National Human Rights Commission of the Republic of 
Korea, p. 2. 
 
 
Not only did the number of human rights policy recommendations increase between 2001 
and 2008, but the acceptance rate of the recommendations remained high despite the rise in the 
number of recommendations (see Figure 5). The cumulative acceptance rate for NHRCK 
recommendations between 2001 and 2008 was 89.1% (Kim 2009b). This indicates that 
government bodies had a culture of taking NHRCK recommendations seriously. 
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Figure 5 Number of recommendations and acceptance rates 
 
Source: Human Rights Statistics 2015, National Human Rights Commission of the Republic of 
Korea, p. 2. 
The issues covered by the NHRCK recommendations were often highly political and 
sensitive; in 2003, NHRCK recommendations covered the NEIS (National Education 
Information System), the war in Iraq, migrant workers, the Hoju (Family Registry) System, and a 
bill on the amendment to the Terror Prevention Act, all of which were highly sensitive political 
issues at the time (NHRCK 2003, 14). In 2004, NHRCK issued twenty-seven recommendations 
or opinions on statutes, legal systems, and policies relating to human rights. Out of those twenty-
seven recommendations, only six were not accepted (NHRCK 2004, 21). In 2005, eight cases 
were accepted fully or partially; only one case was rejected out of the total twenty-two cases 
(NHRCK 2005, 25–26). See Table 2. 
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number increasing each year, from 7,738 in 2005 to 8,311 in 2006 and 10,693 in 2007 (NHRCK 
2007a, 46). Between 2001 and 2007, the NHRCK accepted a total of 28,854 complaints 
(NHRCK 2007a, 46). In 2006, NHRCK processed a total of 34,382, cases including 4,187 
complaint cases, 10,737 counseling cases, and 19,558 general cases. The NHRCK’s case-
handling capacity drastically improved over the years; the 2006 total is an increase of 1,045 
cases over 2005 and an increase of 10,000 cases over 2004 (NHRCK 2006, 43–44). NHRCK 
states that the increased number of complaints that it received implies “that the public is 
increasingly interested in human rights and has rising expectations of the Commission” (NHRCK 
2003, 13). 
 
Table 2. Number and Acceptance Rate of NHRCK Recommendations 2003–2007 
 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Accepted and partially accepted 14 6 8 5 10 
Not accepted  5 6 1 1 1 
Under review 4 15 13 11 2 
Total  23 27 22 17 13 
Acceptance rate 62% 22% 36% 29% 77% 
 
Source: Annual Reports of the NHRCK from 2003 to 2007.  
The NHRCK also actively engaged in implementing international human rights treaties 
and standards in Korea; it made recommendations to the government to improve laws, policies, 
and practices to ensure compliance with international human rights standards, including urging 
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the government to implement recommendations from international human rights bodies. For 
example, the NHRCK recommended to the Prime Minister, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and 
the Ministry of Justice the full implementation of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights and the International Convention of Racial Discrimination and the Convention 
Against Torture (NHRCK 2003, 40). Furthermore, the NHRCK reviewed state reports on 
international human rights treaties “to seek ways to improve domestic laws and current systems 
related to the international treaties and covenants and to check whether the government is 
practically fulfilling its duties under the treaties beyond superficial application of the law and 
establishment of institutions” (NHRCK 2003, 39–40). For example, the Commission accessed 
the Korean government’s report to the Human Rights Committee, which monitors 
implementation of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and opined that the 
government report did not sufficiently resolve some reported issues and omitted reporting on 
others. The recipient entity, the Ministry of Justice, partially accepted the opinions of the 
NHRCK, saying that it planned to submit a revised report to the committee (NHRCK 2004, 43). 
As Table 3 shows, the NHRCK has made comments on state reports to the monitoring bodies on 
almost all treaties ratified by the Korean government. 
 
Table 3. Number of NHRCK Opinions about State Reports to International Human Rights Bodies 
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Human Rights Council 1 ─ ─ ─ 1 ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ 
International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights 
2 ─ ─ ─ ─ 1 ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ 1 ─ ─ 
International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights 
2 1 ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ 1 ─ ─ ─ ─ 
International Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of 
Racial Discrimination 
3 ─ ─ ─ ─ 1 ─ ─ ─ ─ 1 ─ ─ ─ 1 
Convention against Torture and 
Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment  
3 ─ ─ ─ 1 ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ 1 1 
Convention on the Elimination 
of All Forms of Discrimination 
against Women 
4 1 ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ 1 ─ ─ ─ 1 ─ 1 ─ 
Convention on the Rights of the 
Child 
2 ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ 1 ─ 1 ─ ─ ─ ─ 
International Convention for the 
Protection of All Persons from 
Enforced Disappearance 
0 ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ 
International Convention on the 
Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities 
1 ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ 1 ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ 
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Total 18 2 ─ ─ 2 2 1 1 1 ─ 3 1 1 2 2 
Source: NHRCK (2015, 4).  
The NHRCK’s treaty advice (advising the government to ratify or withdraw reservations 
from international human rights treaties) has also been largely accepted. The purpose of the 
NHRCK’s treaty advice was to “improve domestic laws and legal systems relating to human 
rights, [and] ultimately to bring Korea up to par with international standards” (NHRCK 2004, 
43). Although the NHRCK’s advice and recommendations may not have always determined the 
government’s compliance with international treaties, certainly NHRCK’s recommendations at 
least influenced the government’s decisions. For example, the government acceded to the 
Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against 
Women
40
 on October 18, 2006, following an NHRCK recommendation made in 2003 (NHRCK 
2003, 39–40); the government acceded to two Optional Protocols41 of the Convention on the 
Rights of the Child (CRC) on September 24, 2004, following an NHRCK recommendation made 
on December 8, 2003; and the government signed and ratified the Convention on the Rights of 
Persons with Disabilities on March 30, 2007, and on December 11, 2008, respectively, after 
NHRCK recommended ratification in 2007 (NHRCK 2007b). 
The NHRCK accomplished all these achievements despite challenges such as staffing 
(many staff working at the Commission were bureaucrats with no background in human rights) 
and internal politics (there seemed to be more internal struggle between commissioners and the 
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 Acceding to the Optional Protocol means that individuals can file a complaint related to the CEDAW directly to 
the committee monitoring the implementation of CEDAW. 
41
 Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the involvement of children in armed conflict 
(2000); Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the sale of children, child prostitution and 
child pornography (2000).  
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Secretariat than between the NHRCK and the government bodies; Choi 2010). The Commission 
also continued to disagree with some human rights NGOs, with gaps created during the NHRCK 
establishment process going unresolved. The biggest challenge to the NHRCK, which persists 
into the present day, is its weak institutional standing. The original proposal to establish the 
Commission as a constitutional body was not accepted, and the Commission’s functions and 
status are therefore based on a single document, the NHRCK Act. As the Commission’s status 
was not firmly rooted in law, its consolidation, development, and success depend on the 
government, and often on the political will of the president. 
5.4.1.1 Consolidation through Challenging the Government: Deployment to Iraq 
The NHRCK consolidated its status through a few defining moments of challenge in 
which it publicly criticized the government on highly political issues.
42
 The NHRCK’s 
opposition to the president’s decision to deploy military aid to Iraq, which was one of the most 
critical diplomatic issues for Korea that year,
43
 is one of the most defining moments for the 
Commission, and it is worth treating the incident in detail, both because the case made the 
general public aware of the role of the NHRCK and because the incident initiated a debate in 
Korea about how far the Commission could challenge the government and the president. 
According to Kim, staffers at the NHRCK also perceived this as a defining moment for the 
organization; no public body had so publicly disagreed with the president before, especially on 
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 Kim says that the issues caused by the Iraq deployment are considered the most representative case of the 
NHRCK showing the public its independence from the government (Kim 2010a, 55). At the tenth anniversary of the 
NHRCK, experts agreed that the Commission’s opinion opposing the war in Iraq was one of the top five agendas set 
by the NHRCK (others were its recommendations to amend NEIS, abolish the National Security law, and to 
establish the National Action Plan for Promotion and Protection of Human Rights). 
43
 The final statement lays out the NHRCK’s position as opposing the war in Iraq, which is a softened version of 
specifically opposing the deployment. 
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such a crucial issue, and the Commission did not easily come to the decision to do so (Kim 
2010b). 
The public debate between the NHRCK and the government over Korea’s deployment of 
troops to Iraq shows Roh’s deep commitment to the Commission’s independence. 44 After the 
events of 9/11 and the United States’ subsequent declaration of war on terrorism, concern grew 
in Korea over the possibility of war in Iraq. Beginning in November of 2002, the United States 
began to inquire through diplomatic channels about whether Korea might support the United 
States in this conflict, providing humanitarian assistance, helping to rebuild Iraq, and deploying 
noncombatant troops (NHRCK 2008, 7). The NHRCK’s opposition to Korean support of action 
in Iraq is regarded as one of its biggest challenges to the Korean government, and the 
chairperson of the NHRCK risked losing his position in making this stand; however, in the end, 
the incident helped the NHRCK to establish its independence from the government (Chung 
2011c, 209–210). 
After two phone calls between President Roh and President Bush, on March 10 and 
March 20, 2003, it became clear that a decision must be made about how to answer the United 
States’ request for support for the war (NHRCK 2008, 7). President Roh convened a meeting of 
the National Security Council on March 20, 2003, and made his position public: he planned to 
support the war in Iraq and provide the United States with forces for reconstruction and medical 
assistance (NHRCK 2008, 9). President Roh stated that he was aware of opposition to the 
deployment, but he concluded that his decision was a pragmatic one, considering Korea’s past 
and future relations with the United States. He asked the members of the National Assembly to 
approve his request for troop deployment to Iraq (NHRCK 2008, 7). 
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 For more information on the deployment to Iraq, see Juang (2015) and NHRCK (2008). 
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On March 26, 2003, a few days after the president’s statement had drawn nationwide 
attention, the NHRCK issued a public statement opposing the war in Iraq. The president’s 
decision, they said, violated the values and principles of human rights. In its statement, NHRCK 
recommended that “the government and the National Assembly approach the issue using the 
principles of anti-war, peace, and human rights” as laid out in the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, and it pointed out its “duty to protect the right to life and safety of the citizens of 
Korea, and to promote the principles and values of the Constitution of the Republic of Korea, 
which promotes world peace and renounces wars of aggression” (NHRCK 2003, 35–36). 
Furthermore, it suggested that “the South Korean government and the National Assembly must 
take future national interests and humanitarian issues into consideration on the war on Iraq” 
(NHRCK 2003, 36). 
The NHRCK’s statement voicing opposition to the war from its new position as a public 
body came as a surprise to everyone in Korea; it created a “national debate” over whether the 
NHRCK could or should publicly issue an opinion that contradicted the public positions of the 
government and the president.
 
Several civil society organizations welcomed the statement, but 
most politicians—from both the ruling and the opposing parties—criticized the NHRCK’s action 
as inappropriate.
 Some academics argued that the NHRCK’s statement presented a challenge to 
the authority of the government; these scholars argued that, while different governmental bodies 
can hold diverse opinions, government bodies should not publicly oppose decisions proposed by 
the president for the approval of the National Assembly. Others, like Tae-ho Lee from People’s 
Solidarity for Participatory Democracy, welcomed the statement, saying that it represented a 
break between an institution charged with promoting human rights and a government that was 
attempting to deploy forces without consolidating public opinion behind their position. 
120 
President Roh supported the Commission’s independence and its right to publish a 
differing view, even one that publicly embarrassed the president, by saying, “It is the role of the 
government to be in charge of all matters related to foreign affairs and security, but the body that 
deals with human rights protection and promotion may have different views on these issues, as 
the government may miss things out.” President Roh again confirmed the independence of the 
NHRCK from the government on December 10, 2003, at the fifty-fifth anniversary of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, where he said that the NHRCK’s opposition was “a 
commendable phenomenon.” He pointed out that democracy works by respecting those with 
different views and trying to understand them, and that in a democracy, it is normal for a 
government and an NHRI to have opposing views (Presidential Secretariat 2004, 554–555). Roh 
further praised the NHRCK’s importance and independence on September 14, 2004, at the 7th 
International Conference of National Human Rights Institutions, hosted by the NHRCK; Roh 
said that the establishment of the Commission was a “turning point” for Korean human rights 
history and pointed out that although the “chairperson and the commissioners are appointed by 
the president [. . .] their functions and roles are completely independent from the government. 
Sometimes the NHRCK has put the president in a troubling position by publicly opposing the 
policy approved by the president,” but the “National Institutions are created to express different 
views from the president” (Presidential Secretariat 2005, 320). This statement seems to be a clear 
defense of the NHRCK’s actions on the matter of troop deployment to Iraq. 
Despite the opposition of the NHRCK, the National Assembly passed the president’s 
proposal on April 2, 2003, with 179 in favor, 68 against, and 9 abstaining (Voice of Korea 2003). 
However, this very political gamble on the part of the NHRCK, and President Roh’s reaction (or 
nonreaction) to it, increased the NHRCK’s confidence and cemented its status as an independent 
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and legitimate organization in the minds of the Korean public. The former Secretary-General of 
the NHRCK, Choi Young-ae, said that Roh clearly understood that NHRIs exist to speak up 
against the government, and that Roh let the NHRCK do its work without interference.
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 The 
NHRCK’s statement on the Iraq war helped consolidate the NHRCK’s status both domestically 
and internationally; the statement and Roh’s reaction to it showed the rest of the world that 
seonjin Korea respected human rights and guaranteed the independence of its NHRI, even in 
highly political and contentious situations. 
5.4.2 Consolidation of NHRCK at the International Level 
During this period, the NHRCK also gained a positive international reputation. The 
Commission increased its cooperation at the international and regional levels, quickly becoming 
a linchpin of the worldwide network of NHRIs and gaining a good reputation with the 
international human rights community, including the UN. The NHRCK became a model NHRI 
that was imitated and studied by other seonjin countries, such as Japan, India, and China, and 
other developing countries in Southeast Asia and Africa (Chung 2011c, 218). 
The NHRCK hosted some key meetings, which contributed to building its good 
international reputation. The former Director-General of the NHRCK said that the Seventh 
International Conference for National Human Rights Institutions, hosted by the NHRCK (an 
honor for which it lobbied actively), was the event at which the relatively new NHRCK made its 
successful debut to the world.
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 The meeting was expected to “raise the profile and international 
standing of both the Commission and the Republic of Korea,” and it appears to have done so 
(NHRCK 2003, 17). The then-chairperson of the Commission, Kim Chang-guk, stated in the 
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outcome report for the conference that “Korea was able to raise its reputation in the international 
human rights community through this International Conference, at which human rights people 
from around the world [. . .] gathered together. It did so by publicizing Korea’s efforts and the 
progress that has been made toward consolidating democracy and advancing human rights” 
(NHRCK 2004, 5). NHRCK also hosted the ninth annual meeting of the Asia–Pacific Forum of 
National Human Rights Institutions in September 2004. 
In addition to hosting meetings during this period, NHRCK also actively participated in 
key human rights meetings and advocated for global human rights concerns. NHRCK 
independently participated (not as a representative of Korea, but as an independent body) in the 
UN Commission on Human Rights, the UN Human Rights Council, and various treaty body 
meetings, where it gave information about human rights situations in Korea. The Commission 
also actively participated in regional and international NHRIs meetings; for example, the 
NHRCK began representing the Asia–Pacific region at the ICC Sub-Committee on Accreditation 
in 2006, a position that it still holds (NHRCK 2007a, 22). The NHRCK was also very vocal 
about regional and global human rights issues during this period. For instance, in 2003, NHRCK 
sent a total of fourteen letters to the governments of countries where human rights violations 
took place, urging the governments to take appropriate measures; the recipient countries included 
India, Sri Lanka, Thailand and Mongolia (NHRCK 2003, 120). NHRCK also assisted in the 
establishment of NHRIs in Nepal and Pakistan (NHRCK 2005, 19). 
The NHRCK also stepped into several high-profile leadership roles during this period, 
reflecting both the international community’s recognition of the NHRCK as a credible and 
respected NHRI and the NHRCK’s international legitimacy-seeking behavior. Following the 
2006 military coup in the Fiji Islands, the NHRCK took over the chairmanship of the Asia–
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Pacific Forum, just four years after it became a full member of the organization; it has served in 
the role ever since. It was a remarkable advancement that recognized the NHRCK’s credibility at 
the regional level (NHRCK 2007a, 98). At the nineteenth ICC conference, in March 2007, the 
NHRCK was elected as the vice chair of the ICC, and it served in that position for two years.
47
 
These appointments at the regional and international levels demonstrate the international human 
rights community’s rapid recognition of the NHRCK as a credible and respected institution. As 
the NHRCK’s self-assessment states, its election to these roles implies that “the Commission 
successfully solidified its status as a National Human Rights Commission in the international 
community” (NHRCK 2007a, 96). The NHRCK also compared its assumption of the vice chair 
position at the ICC to the election of Ban Ki-moon as the UN Secretary-General and Kang 
Kyung-wha as the UN Deputy High Commissioner for Human Rights, seeing all of these as 
important achievements for Korea in the international arena (NHRCK 2007c).
 
 
The fourth chairperson of the NHRCK, Ahn Kyung-whan, connected the regional and 
international recognition of the NHRCK to Korea’s ambition to become a human rights seonjin 
state in his inauguration speech, given on October 20, 2006, 
The Republic of Korea is praised by the international community as being the only 
country that has achieved both democratization and economic development in a short 
period of time after independence. The fact that one small country, which the UN built 
upon ashes of war, produced the chief of the UN demonstrates the current status of the 
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 In this position, the NHRCK carried out substantial work for NHRIs participating in the ICC Bureau, which is 
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Secretariat. In assuming important positions such as the ICC vice chairpersonship and Asia–Pacific representative 
member to the ICC Sub-Committee on Accreditation, the NHRCK further contributed to the protection and 
promotion of human rights in the international arena. The new ICC chairs are expected to greatly contribute to the 
protection and promotion of the national human rights by introducing and applying international human rights 
standards; they are also expected to contribute to international human rights issues, including the recruitment of the 
ICC Geneva representative, through close relationships with the international community. 
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Republic of Korea in the international community. [. . .] We should let the world know 
about the human rights achievements made in Korea. Furthermore, we should build a 
stable foundation to leap toward being seonjinguk, leading the world in the field of 
human rights by sharing responsibility for hujinguk (underdeveloped and developing 
countries) (Ahn 2006). 
The rise in the NHRCK’s international reputation was also remarked upon by President 
Roh. During the NHRCK’s report to the president on August 21, 2007, President Roh expressed 
his thanks to and support for the NHRCK’s work, specifically congratulating the organization for 
its successful work in its roles as the vice chair of the ICC and the chair of the APF, roles that 
consolidate its status “as an advanced organization”; in the same discussion, he asked the 
NHRCK to continue to strengthen its international capacity (NHRCK 2007a, 44). 
The international human rights community also positively evaluated the NHRCK. For 
instance, after visiting Korea, the UN Special Rapporteur, who is responsible for promoting and 
protecting the right to freedom of opinion and expression, stated that he “commends the work of 
the National Human Rights Commission of Korea, particularly in finding a violation in over a 
dozen cases related to freedom of opinion and expression and freedom of assembly between 
2004 and 2010” (LaRue 2011a, ¶ 102). 
 
5.5 International Legitimacy-Seeking through Other Means 
5.5.1 Membership on the UN Human Rights Council 
On May 9, 2006, Korea won 148 votes to become one of the first members of the UN 
Human Rights Council, which was established in 2006 to replace the Commission on Human 
Rights. According to the government’s self-assessment, it was “a demonstration that Korea has 
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secured its reputation as one of Asia’s leading promoters of human rights and a democratic 
nation, and represents recognition in the international community that Korea played a 
constructive role in the Commission on Human Rights, the predecessor body of the Human 
Rights Council” (MOFAT 2007, 120). For Korea, becoming a member of the council, both 
fulfilled its desire to be a respected human rights seonjinguk and indicated that the international 
community recognized it as such. Korea’s pledge for candidature illustrates how Korea feels 
about itself as a country with a good human rights record: 
The Government of the Republic of Korea (ROK) places great importance on human 
rights as a universally shared value steadfastly advanced by the United Nations for six 
decades. The promotion and protection of human rights is a priority in the ROK’s 
national as well as foreign policy goals. 
Having been inspired by the UN’s commitment to human rights and fundamental 
freedoms throughout its own process of democratization and economic development, the 
Republic of Korea attests to the imperative of human rights in the betterment of societies. 
The Government is making every effort to achieve continued improvements in the human 
rights situation within the Republic of Korea. It also endeavors to spread democracy and 
human rights worldwide (Republic of Korea 2006). 
In this pledge, Korea appeals to its strong human rights records, highlighting its 
ratification of international human rights treaties and extensively discussing the NHRCK and its 
activities. This indicates that Korea recognized that having a credible NHRI would influence the 
international community to see Korea as a potential legitimate member of the council. The 
pledge continues thus: 
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In the Republic of Korea, the National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) was 
established in November 2001 with the mandate to investigate and remedy human rights 
violations, to provide education and raise public awareness in the field of human rights, 
to conduct research, and to recommend legislative, institutional, or policy initiatives 
relating to human rights. The Commission has become a vital force for the promotion and 
protection of human rights in the Republic of Korea. In particular, in January it put 
forward its own proposal for a “National Human Rights Plan of Action (NAP)” for the 
period 2007–2011 to serve as a guideline for a comprehensive national plan for the 
advancement of human rights (Republic of Korea 2006). 
5.5.2 Appointments of Koreans to High-Level Positions 
Other examples of international legitimacy-seeking efforts under Roh Moo-hyun include 
the government’s efforts to have a number of Koreans appointed to high-level positions at the 
UN and at international meetings. The efforts were largely successful, resulting in Koreans 
taking up an unprecedented number of high-level positions during this time, including the 
Secretary-Generalship of the UN. A similar case of international legitimacy-seeking can be 
found in Kathryn Sikkink’s case study of Argentina, which describes the successful restructuring 
of the country and its movement “from pariah state to global protagonist” in human rights. After 
cementing its status as a global human rights leader, several Argentines were appointed or 
elected to high-level positions in the field of international human rights (Sikkink 2008, 15). 
Like Argentina, Korea worked hard to have its nationals appointed to high-level positions 
at international organizations and meetings, including those related to human rights. According 
to a diplomatic white paper issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, the government 
encouraged “Korean nationals to assume high-profile positions on Executive Committees and 
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senior positions in major international organizations,” and worked to expand “the participation of 
Korean nationals in the Secretariats of various international organizations” to make that 
participation commensurate with Korea’s “growing economic power and status” (MOFAT 2007, 
124). The Ministry further states that it will continue with these efforts to meet “the expectations 
of the international community and also further [enhance] the national image” of Korea 
(MOFAT 2007, 124). Korea used so-called Summit Diplomacy,
48
 which aims to illustrate 
“Korea’s diplomatic vision to the international community and encourage Korean nationals 
abroad” to work for international organizations in order to enhance “the national image” and 
“national interests” of Korea (MOFAT 2007, 88). These government statements and policies 
clearly show that the appointment of Koreans to positions in international organizations was seen 
as a way for Korea to become respected by the international community, an element of Korea’s 
desired seonjinguk identity. 
During this period, Korea was elected by UN member states to serve in major UN 
meetings and bodies. For example, in 2001, for the first time since Korea had become a member 
to the UN, a Korean national, Han Seung-soo, was elected the president of the fifty-sixth session 
of the UN General Assembly. In 2005, Korea was appointed to chair the First Committee of the 
60th session of the UN General Assembly, and the Korean government was elected to the 
Executive Committee and the Commissions of twelve international organizations, including 
several human rights–relevant bodies: the Committee on the Rights of the Child (member), the 
UN Commission on the Status of Women (member), the UN Commission on Crime Prevention 
and Criminal Justice (member), the United Nations Children’s Fund (Executive Board member), 
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Governing Body of the International Labour Organization (member); and the Executive 
Governing Body of the Food and Agriculture Organization (member) (MOFAT 2006, 109). 
Koreans were also appointed to as judges to several international courts, including the 
International Criminal Court (ICC), the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia, and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (MOFAT 2006, 112). Clearly, 
efforts to place Koreans in positions of international leadership were successfully being made, 
efforts that were aimed at building “a firmer basis for Korea to further reflect its national 
interests in the said international organizations” (MOFAT 2006, 110). 
The year 2006 marked the high point of Korea’s successes in appointments to high-level 
UN positions. In September 2006, Kang Kyung-hwa, Director-General of International 
Organization at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, was appointed the UN Deputy High 
Commissioner for Human Rights at the level of Assistant Secretary-General (United Nations 
2006a). According to the Korean government, her appointment to this position could “be seen as 
a reflection of the remarkable achievements of Korea in the protection and enhancement of 
human rights and recognition by the international community of these endeavors” (MOFAT 
2007, 124). On October 13, 2006, Ban Ki-moon was appointed the UN Secretary-General, a 
landmark appointment that was celebrated as a Korean national victory. On October 24 of that 
year, President Roh spoke at the banquet organized to celebrate Ban’s appointment: 
I believe this happy occasion contains the assessment and expectation of the international 
community for Korea. We have achieved the world’s tenth largest economy and 
democratic development in a half-century, from poverty and war-torn ruins. I believe we 
have developed into a model country that meets the objectives of the UN, such as peace, 
development, and human rights. In this process, we have received a lot of assistance from 
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the UN and the international community. Now, we intend to play a more proactive role in 
resolving various contentious issued faced by the international community (Presidential 
Secretariat 2007, 383). 
Ban’s appointment was not only seen as his personal achievement, but as a national 
accomplishment—the fruit of years of effort. Behind this success were tireless years of political 
and diplomatic efforts on the part of the government to get him elected; the regime saw a Korean 
becoming the UN Secretary-General as a means for Korea to become seonjinguk. The 
appointment implied “a reflection of the ardent wish of the Korean people not only to assume a 
larger role in the international community but also to rise to the expectations of Korea in the 
international community, building upon its national capabilities and its experience of having 
successfully managed the situation on the Korean Peninsula and achieved economic 
development and democratization” (MOFAT 2007, 129). 
Korea had begun to consider presenting a candidate for UN Secretary-General in mid-
2005, knowing that the next UN Secretary-General would come from one of the Asian countries 
(MOFAT 2007, 128). The then-Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ban Ki-moon, was chosen as the 
most suitable candidate for the position, and the regime formulated a nationwide task force to 
campaign for Ban’s election—a task that Roh himself participated in. Until Ban was appointed 
Secretary-General, he was not well known to the international community or even to the Korean 
general public; his success was achieved through the well-crafted strategy and political will of 
the Korean government. The key was not to promote as a candidate anyone who might be 
objected to either by China or the United States; the UNSG cannot be elected if any of the 
Permanent Five countries exercises its veto power, and Ban Ki-moon, a career diplomat, was 
Korea’s safest choice: “first and foremost, he was the only candidate acceptable to all five 
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permanent members of the Security Council” (Bertrand 2016, 2). The Security Council voted to 
recommend Ban Ki-moon to the General Assembly, and on October 13, 2006, the General 
Assembly elected Ban Ki-moon the UN’s eighth Secretary-General (United Nations 2006b). 
The Korean government’s extensive efforts to get Ban elected included taking domestic 
political risks. Amid the UNSG election campaign, then-Foreign Minister Ban was met with a 
domestic demand to resign as Foreign Minister because of the Ministry’s failure to rescue Kim 
Sun-il. Kim, a crew member of a Korean commercial ship, was abducted and killed by a militant 
group on June 22, 2004, after the Korean government refused to grant the group’s demand that 
Korea withdraw its forces from Iraq. All eyes in Korea were on Kim’s abduction, hoping for his 
safe return home; when he was killed, there was a strong call from the public and from 
politicians that the government be held accountable for his death (Hong 2004).
 
Many expected 
that the Minister of Foreign Affairs would be sacked as a result of its failure at diplomatic 
negotiation, and Ban indeed submitted a letter of resignation in July 2004. However, Roh, with 
Ban’s candidacy for UNSG in his mind, is believed to have taken all the blame upon himself; he 
refused to accept Ban’s resignation (Park 2015). 
The Korean government also strategically appealed to UN Security Council countries to 
promote Ban’s candidacy. Ban Ki-moon was the only candidate who traveled to all fifteen 
members of the Security Council (Bertrand 2016). Ban also accompanied President Roh on his 
visit to Africa in March—a visit that Roh undertook to favorably position Ban as a candidate. 
The announcement that Korea would increase their Official Development Assistance (ODA) to 
Africa, from $31 million USD to $100 million USD, which came around the same time, is also 
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associated with Ban’s campaign.49 Many, though, see Ban Ki-moon’s service as the UNSG as 
being one of the Korea’s contributions to the international human rights community (NHRCK 
2011, ix). 
5.5.3 Ratification of International Treaties 
During the period 2001–2006, Korea’s ratification of treaties increased drastically. 
Between 1948 and 1960, Korea had ratified only 129 treaties, 88 bilateral and 41 multilateral; in 
contrast, between 2001 and 2006, 470 treaties—367 bilateral and 103 multilateral—were ratified 
and became effective. Of those 470 treaties, 106 of them—90 bilateral and 16 multilateral—were 
completed in a single year, 2006 (MOFAT 2007, 182–183). The increase in the number of 
treaties ratified by Korea demonstrates the country’s intention to be an active part of the global 
community. During this period, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs also published, in March of 2006, 
a guidance book on the treaty-making process and, in October 2006, organized a meeting aimed 
at promoting understanding of the treaty-making process in government agencies, local entities, 
scholars, and students (MOFAT 2007, 186–187). 
 
5.6 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I established how the NHRCK consolidated its position, becoming firmly 
rooted in the fabric of Korean domestic society; I also described how the NHRCK gained 
prominence as a model institution at the regional and global level. Roh Moo-hyun vigorously 
pursued the goal of becoming seonjinguk, and Roh’s concept of seonjinguk was deeply bound up 
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with the notion of human rights; the NHRCK was seen as a way to further the state’s goal of 
joining other advanced countries. The government thus ensured that the NHRCK was not 
interfered with, even when their position on very controversial issues challenged the authority of 
the president himself. The government’s promotion of human rights enabled the NHRCK to 
quickly gain a good international reputation, and it was recognized as a model NHRI, taking up 
leadership roles in international meetings of NHRIs. As this chapter has shown, Korea’s pursuit 
of seonjinguk status resulted in the appointment of several Koreans to high-level positions in 
international organizations. 
This chapter endeavored to answer not just what makes a government promote NHRIs 
but how and why a government might actually help an NHRI (in this case, the NHRCK) prosper 
and develop. In this chapter, I established how the developmental idea of becoming seonjinguk 
provided a baseline that encouraged Korea to promote the NHRCK’s independent activities, 
because having a strong, independent NHRI was an appropriate thing for a seonjinguk to do. 
Through a detailed ethnographic analysis of events and of statements from the government, the 
NHRCK, and key domestic and international actors, this chapter showed how important 
seonjinguk status was to Korea and what intense efforts they put into attaining that status by 
increasing Korea’s international legitimacy. Although there are several explanations of why 
states comply with international human rights norms, this chapter provided another explanation 
to the discussion: Korea was willing to allow the NHRCK to restrain the state’s power because 
they saw the organization as one way to obtain international legitimacy and thus to achieve its 
long-term goal of being recognized as seonjinguk.   
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CHAPTER 6 
DIMINISHMENT OF THE NHRCK (2008–2012) 
[T]here is no hope for the situation that the NHRCK is in now. 
— (MINBYUN 2010) 
 
6.1 Introduction 
As previous chapters have shown, under the progressive governments of Kim Dae-jung 
and Roh Moo-hyun, the NHRCK enjoyed autonomy and firmly rooted itself in both the domestic 
and international space. With the inauguration of the new conservative regime headed by Lee 
Myung-bak, the NHRCK went into its first period of recession.
50
 The new regime’s attempts to 
weaken the NHRCK —some successful and some unsuccessful—began immediately after the 
election in early 2008 and persisted for years. These attempts included an attempt to place the 
NHRCK under the office of the president and an attempt to downsize the Commission by 21%. 
Lee’s government faced strong resistance to these tactics, and both domestic NGOs and various 
international human rights actors, including the UN, the ICC, and international human rights 
NGOs, pressured him to reinstate the strong, independent NHRCK. These voices used the 
appeals to Korea’s desire to be seonjinguk that had succeeded before, but these rhetorical appeals 
did not succeed with Lee. How do we understand this situation? 
This chapter offers the following explanation: this rhetoric did not work with the Lee 
administration because Lee’s government redefined what it meant to be seonjinguk according to 
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its own conservative political identity and preferences. The Lee government and its conservative 
allies not only attempted to reverse the “leftist” policies of the past ten years (Kim 2014, 161), 
they also modified Korea’s desired national identity. This new national identity was based on a 
redefinition of the concept of seonjinguk that stressed pure economic growth rather than 
socioeconomic growth that included human rights. Both progressive and conservative 
administrations sought international legitimacy in order to reconstruct Korea’s national image 
and become seonjinguk, but the means of achieving these goals were quite different: the former 
embraced human rights in its seonjinguk rhetoric, while the latter excluded human rights in its 
pursuit of becoming seonjinguk.
51
 
Lee’s regime still pursued the goal of being seonjinguk—a desire that was demonstrated 
through many other means. Some previous efforts even intensified: for example, Korea became a 
chair of the G20 and a member of the OECD-Development Assistance Committee. Lee’s 
seonjin-based policies, however, generally excluded concerns over human rights, and they often 
suppressed human rights in the domestic sphere. This chapter discusses how the NHRCK was 
weakened between 2008 and 2012 and how a different type of seonjin regime reshaped the 
country’s human rights policy, resulting in the diminishment of the once-acclaimed NHRCK. By 
the end of Lee’s term, the NHRCK had lost its independence from the government and its 
credibility with both domestic and international human rights communities. 
The changed position of the NHRCK poses an interesting implication for the study of 
global norm diffusion. The case of the NHRCK demonstrates that norms continue to develop, 
being deconstructed and reconstructed even after they have been domesticated. It offers further 
                                                             
51
 In general, I agree with Kim’s argument that Roh and Lee were similar in several ways, especially their economic 
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evidence for the importance of taking seriously the domestic context and changes in that context 
when examining the diffusion of global human rights norms, which continue to change over time. 
In this regard, Korea’s modified identity and Lee Myung-bak’s policy preferences excluding 
human rights offer an interesting empirical case of how norms relating to NHRIs get diffused 
and either strengthened and weakened over time by changes in the domestic context. 
 
6.2 Inauguration of the Conservative Administration of Lee Myung-bak 
Lee Myung-bak, a conservative former CEO of the construction unit of Hyundai and a 
former mayor of Seoul, was inaugurated as the seventeenth president of Korea in February 2008. 
He entered politics in 2002 as the mayor of Seoul, where he earned the nickname “The Bulldozer” 
for his development-oriented determination. As a successful businessman who was expected to 
make the country economically prosper, he rose quickly through the political ranks and 
eventually won the presidential election in December 2007. The Korean public hoped that Lee’s 
pro-business policies would invigorate Korea’s economy and help it to overcome the challenges 
of the global economy (Yang 2008, 128). His inauguration marked the end of ten years of 
progressive government under Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun, returning Korea to a 
conservative government premised on “pragmatism” and “promises of economic recovery” 
(Snyder 2009, 1). 
6.2.1 Desire to Be Seonjinguk and the Exclusion of Human Rights 
6.2.1.1 Lee’s Seonjinguk: A “Truly Advanced and Globally Prestigious Country” 
Lee’s election seemed to accelerate Korea’s desire to seek international legitimacy and 
reconstruct the country as a seonjinguk. Although Lee’s definition of seonjinguk differs from that 
of the previous two regimes, the underlying desire to become a seonjinguk seems be no different 
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than that of the previous progressive regimes, especially Roh’s: Lee, too, praised Korea’s 
economic achievements and emphasized the need to move forward to become a genuine 
seonjinguk. Excerpts from Lee’s inauguration speech show his version of the country’s desired 
identity very well: 
We are welcoming the sixtieth anniversary of the establishment of the Republic of Korea 
this year. We reobtained lost land and built a country, and we sacrificed lives to secure 
that country. We all worked hard. As a result, we have achieved both industrialization 
and democratization in the shortest time in the world. It was accomplished by our will 
and hard work only. [. . .] What was once the poorest country in the world has become 
the world’s tenth largest economy. Korea has become a country offering help from a 
country receiving help. Now we can stand shoulder to shoulder with other seonjin states. 
Some call this a “miracle.” It is also referred to as “mythology.” [. . .] But while we 
relaxed our attention, the world began to overtake us. Hujin states are close on our heels. 
National competitiveness is going down, and we are threatened by [. . .] unstable 
resources and financial markets. 
I will step up the efforts to keep peace and protect the environment through 
international cooperation. I will contribute to realizing the universal values of the human 
being through diplomacy that is commensurate with Korea’s economic size and 
diplomatic capacity. We will actively participate in the UN peacekeeping operations and 
expand official development assistance. [. . .] Our great leap forward, our historical duty, 
toward making the country seonjin has started. Let’s move forward together to create a 
new mythology beyond the miracle of the Han river (Lee 2008a). 
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According to Snyder, Lee’s “willingness to undertake new obligations that contribute to 
the spread of peace and the safeguarding of global stability” could be seen as an effort to gain 
“international recognition as an expression of national pride” and “international affirmation of 
South Korea’s progress” (Snyder 2009, 28). This reading seems confirmed in a diplomatic white 
paper from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs stating that Korea’s diplomatic goal of “enhancing 
the national image” would be pursued through international cooperation in a wide range of areas, 
including multi-dimensional diplomacy, ODA, and cultural diplomacy; this white paper does not 
mention the promotion of human rights, which was not a considered enough of a priority to be 
included in Korea’s goals for international cooperation under Lee (MOFAT 2008, 129–154). 
This is an enormous difference from the previous regime, whose foreign policy primarily 
focused on human rights. It appears that during this period, Korea focused on strengthening its 
ODA procedure as a way of becoming seonjinguk—it aimed to match its ODA support to that 
offered by other advanced countries. For instance, for the first time, the government created a 
new office within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that was “entirely responsible for 
implementing grant aids (Bureau for Development Cooperation within the Office of Multilateral, 
Global and Legal Affairs), strengthening the legal framework for ODA, and seeking to join the 
OECD-Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of advanced donors by 2010” (Snyder 2009, 
24). The efforts of the government to become a leading ODA donor country bore fruit when 
Korea finally joined the OECD-DAC in 2010; the government attributed their success—Korea 
was the first DAC member “emerging from the ranks of the least developed countries”—to “part 
of the nation’s grand vision of a Global Korea” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2011; OECD n.d.). 
The government asserted that by joining the DAC in the OECD, Korea had “increased its role 
and contribution in the international community” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2011). 
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Another illustration of Lee’s vision of seonjinguk is found in his diplomatic priority areas. 
The 2008 Diplomatic Paper states, 
In diplomacy, it is important to strike a harmonious balance between continuity and 
change. In particular, 2008 is the year of the launch of the Lee Myung-bak administration. 
Pursuant to the theme of “creative pragmatism,” the Ministry will earnestly pursue still 
more active diplomacy, promoting our national interest and embracing a balanced 
perspective in an era of constant change. Furthermore, we will focus on nurturing Korea 
into a “truly advanced and globally prestigious country,” the vision embraced by the new 
government, taking us closer to fully realizing the goal of building a truly “Global Korea” 
(MOFAT 2008, 5). 
Lee’s newly introduced branding of Korea as “Global Korea” deserves further analysis, 
as it provides an entry point into understanding Lee’s identity construction and the desires that 
lay behind the regime’s goal to be a genuine seonjin state. Some argue that slogan represents 
Korea’s desire to be seonjinguk: “one of the striking themes in contemporary South Korean 
foreign policy is a strong emphasis on achieving seonjinguk status in international affairs, as 
articulated in the slogan ‘Global Korea’” (John 2015, 38). John also contends that the “discourse 
of Global Korea was not merely a point of departure in Korean diplomatic practice but was also 
the key site of Korean national identity construction, as manifest in the discourse of achieving 
seonjinguk (advanced nation) status through development” (John 2015, 40). Other scholars argue 
that Global Korea represents a state-driven Korea’s national interest and national security as a 
response to globalization (Watson 2011). Under the Lee administration, the Global Korea 
rhetoric reached beyond diplomacy and into almost all areas of Korean public policy. What it 
meant to become seonjinguk under the banner of the Global Korea was explicitly elaborated by 
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the Foreign Minister Yu Myung-hwan: “we will focus on nurturing Korea into a ‘truly advanced 
and globally prestigious country,’ the vision embraced by the new government, taking us closer 
to fully realizing the goal of building a truly ‘Global Korea’” (MOFAT 2008, 5). 
Another indication of the government’s definition of a seonjin state is Korea’s hosting of 
G20 and assumption of the G20 presidency. In the run-up to hosting G20 in Seoul, President Lee 
stated that “Korea will come into global focus as a host of the G20 summit and, by taking on that 
responsibility, will become a genuinely developed nation” (Oliver 2009). Korea saw the G20 
summit as an opportunity to shift its national image from hujinguk to seonjinguk; the government 
commented that “Korea hopes to act as a bridge between advanced and developing countries” 
(Oliver 2009). Korean media, too, saw Korea’s hosting of G20 as an indication that the 
international community recognized Korea as a seonjin state, and saw Korea as meeting “its 
ambitious goal of becoming a ‘top-notch, advanced’ nation through the historic hosting of the 
G20 summit” (Lee 2010). In its self-evaluation after the first three years of Lee’s government, 
MOFAT stated that Korea, “as the first non-G8 Asian country” to host G20, contributed to 
“elevating Korea’s international stature by making diplomatic breakthroughs” and secured 
“historic momentum in elevating Korea’s international stature” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
2011).
52
 
6.2.1.2 Exclusion of Human Rights from the Concept of Seonjinguk 
As discussed in the previous section, Lee enthusiastically pursued a seonjin state, partly 
through enhancing Korea’s ODA system to make it comparable to that of other seonjin states and 
partly through policies focusing on neoliberal economic growth: Global Korea projects, hosting 
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 The G20 Summit was met with strong opposition from civil society organizations, mostly because of the 
government’s actions in preparation for the meeting. Several CSOs protested the government’s crackdown on 
immigrants and homeless people and offensive searches of common people without probable cause. Not all Koreans 
agreed with the principles that drove G20. 
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the G20, and serving as the president of the G20. Although “enhancement of human rights 
diplomacy” was included as one of his hundred priority tasks, policies around human rights were 
marginalized and did not rise as a priority issue (Presidential House 2008). To some extent, 
human rights were even oppressed under Lee’s administration. Why did Lee’s regime, which had 
the same desire to be a seonjinguk as other previous regimes, employ other means of being 
recognized seonjinguk (e.g., ODA, Global Korea, G20) while ignoring human rights—previous 
administrations’ primary means of becoming like other rich, advanced countries? 
Some scholars argue that seonjin discourse under Lee’s regime completely denied certain 
aspects of human rights, especially those relating to economic and social rights. According to 
Kim Jong Seo, the core of Lee’s seonjin policies focused on deregulating corporate activities to 
help corporations grow and thereby increase national income, create jobs, and resolve poverty; 
these policies privatized education and medical services, traditionally regarded as public services 
in Korea (Kim 2012a, 61). The privatization of public policies dissolved the minimum level of 
social rights that had previously been protected and exacerbated the already-extreme inequality 
in Korean society (Kim 2012a, 61). In general, economic and social inequality worsened under 
Lee (Kim 2014, 151), as did civil and political rights, including freedom of opinion and 
expression, freedom of assembly and association, and the freedom of the media. These rights 
may have been seen as hindrances to becoming seonjinguk (Park 2011). 
Even had Lee not actively weakened certain human rights in Korea, his kind of neoliberal 
seonjin state would have not been compatible with human rights.
53
 Chung argues that a 
politician’s ideological bent can shape their attitude toward human rights, especially those that 
are seen as embodying “progressiveness” (Chung 2011c, 213). Kim Jong Seo argues that Korean 
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 Park Lae-goon argues that Lee’s administration attempted to bring down all human rights at one time by 
discrediting the general discourse on human rights rather than taking a sectoral approach. See Park (2008, 350).  
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democratic values, including respect for procedure, protection of freedom of expression, and 
appropriate use of state power, were greatly reduced over the five years of Lee’s rule (Kim 
2012a, 74–77). Lee’s administration generally was not interested in promoting human rights—
indeed, it had almost an aversion to human rights, based on its conservative identity, which 
conventionally does not fit with the inherent “progressiveness” of human rights. 
The regime’s priority change can be clearly seen in the president’s record of participation 
in human rights–relevant meetings. For instance, President Lee Myung-bak did not participate in 
the December 10, 2008, meeting organized to celebrate the sixtieth anniversary of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, although he was invited by the NHRCK, who organized the event; 
Lee Myung-bak declined, citing other commitments. The two previous presidents, who 
prioritized human rights events, both attended the two anniversary celebrations held during their 
administrations: President Roh Moo-hyun participated in the fifty-fifth anniversary of the UDHR 
in 2003 and President Kim Dae-jung participated in the fifth anniversary of the NHRCK in 2006 
(Lee December 15, 2008). 
Some critics worry that human rights are often disregarded in the name of “law and order,” 
a notion that was emphasized by Lee Myung-bak’s government (Lee December 15, 2008). The 
government’s promotion of law and order over human rights (notions that are supposed to 
complement one another) may have given government agencies tacit permission to ignore human 
rights in favor of law and order.
54
 In the lead-up to the Korea G20, a series of newspaper articles 
ran, focusing on “the way to become seonjinguk” through establishment of “law and order.”55 
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 Despite this, several scholars argue that both the rule of law and respect for human rights have decreased during 
Lee’s administration. See, for instance, Chung (2009). 
55
 This is contradictory to the campaign carried out by the NHRCK and Seoul Newspaper in 2005 under the title 
“The Way to Seonjin Human Rights State.” Both campaigns aimed at becoming seonjinguk by doing what other 
seonjinguk do, but they used different approaches: the 2005 campaign argued that respecting human rights was the 
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While civil society organizations spoke out against the government’s suppression of freedom of 
association and assembly around the G20 summit, this series advocated that Korea should stop 
the “hujinguk”-style protests if it aimed to be seonjinguk, making its point by referring to the 
cases of other advanced countries, such as Japan and Germany (Lee 2010, Yoo 2010, Park 2010). 
The chairperson of the NHRCK, Anh Kyung-hwan, targeted the government’s tactic of opposing 
law against human rights, saying that “In democratic society, rule of law and human rights are 
not competing with each other, but [. . .] are running together as the front wheel and back wheel 
of a bicycle. Therefore, it is a setback to push back human rights in the name of rule of law in a 
democratic society, and it would mean the recession of human rights” (Ahn 2008). 
 
6.3 Recession of the NHRCK (2008–2012) 
The status of the NHRCK declined quickly and sharply after Lee Myung-bak’s 
government was inaugurated. A long-standing NGO called MINBYUN–Lawyers for a 
Democratic Society criticized Lee’s administration, saying, “From the beginning of the current 
administration, the Korean government ignored human rights, considering the concept of human 
rights to be a rebellious idea. The Korean government did not welcome the fact that the 
independent human rights body had been established by the recommendation of the UN—that 
the NHRCK belonged neither to the legislative branch, the judicial branch, nor the administrative 
branch” (MINBYUN 2010). Not only did the NHRCK see its international reputation deteriorate 
during Lee’s time, the rate of acceptance for NHRCK recommendations also declined drastically 
in all areas, including human rights violations, discrimination cases, and policy advice. The rate 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
way to be seonjinguk, while Lee saw respecting human rights (i.e., protection and promotion of freedom of 
association and assembly) as a hindrance to becoming seonjinguk. 
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of acceptance of policy advice, which had stayed at 75% during the administrations of Kim Dae-
jung and Roh Moo-hyun (2001–2007), dropped to 38% under Lee’s regime (Cho 2011, 182). 
Table 4 shows the change of acceptance rate over time. The plummeting acceptance rate implies 
that the culture of acceptance that had existed in previous governments is now gone and that 
government bodies no longer respect the authority of the NHRCK (Shin 2011). 
 
Table 4. Acceptance Rate of Policy Advice and Expression of Opinions 
  Number of policy 
recommendations 
and opinions 
Fully 
accepted 
(number) 
Fully 
accepted 
(rate) 
Partially 
accepted 
(number) 
Partially 
accepted 
(rate) 
Not 
accepted 
(number) 
Not 
accepted 
(rate) 
2001 1 0 0% 1 100% 0 0% 
2002 25 15 60% 6 24% 4 16% 
2003 28 14 50% 8 29% 6 21% 
2004 28 6 21% 14 50% 8 29% 
2005 25 6 24% 9 36% 10 40% 
2006 24 3 13% 14 58% 7 29% 
2007 32 7 22% 11 34% 14 44% 
2008 32 9 28% 6 19% 5 16% 
2009 30 5 17% 3 10% 1 3% 
2010 22 2 9% 1 5% 3 14% 
2011 (as of 
June) 
13 2 15% 2 15% 2 15% 
Source: Shin (2011). 
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Lee’s administration clearly saw the NHRCK not as a means to become seonjinguk, but 
as a hindrance to becoming seonjinguk as Lee defined it. By the end of Lee’s administration, 
civil society members had almost given up on reinstating the NHRCK to its former glory; the 
NHRCK had become an institution with little credibility in the eyes of the domestic or 
international human rights community. 
It is not unusual for an NHRI to weaken after a change in administration; governmental 
political preferences also shape the destiny of NHRIs in “other wealthy, developed states with 
stable democracies” (Renshaw and Fitzpatrick 2012, 176). For instance, in 1998, the Australian 
Human Rights Commission released a report entitled “For Those Who’ve Come across the Sea” 
criticizing the treatment of detainees under Prime Minister John Howard, who served the office 
from 1996 to 2007. The report found that the treatment of children was in violation of human 
rights and made a recommendation to the government to take alternative measures other than 
detention. However, the government dismissed the report by stating, “the Chief General Counsel 
of the Australian Government Solicitor has advised that detention of asylum seekers is not in 
principle an infringement of Australia’s human rights obligations” (Sidoti 1999); under the 
conservative government, the Australian Commission’s budget was cut by AU$7.3 million 
between 1996 and 1999. Despite the Commission’s recommendation, Australia’s practice of 
detention continued, changing only after the installation of a new government in 2007. 
According to Renshaw and Fitzpatrick, this Australian case illustrates that domestic political 
preference can determine governmental receptiveness to NHRIs’ recommendations (Renshaw 
and Fitzpatrick 2012, 176–177). 
However, the extent of the NHRCK’s decline after the regime change in Korea was quite 
extraordinary. The case of Korea’s NHRI, which experienced drastic ups and downs depending 
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on the political regime in power, shows that NHRIs do not function in a political vacuum—they 
are highly susceptible to domestic policy preferences. Lee’s administration excluded the 
NHRCK from preference in its policies, downsizing the Commission and compromising its 
independence. This shows the importance of delving into the domestic context in which NHRIs 
exist; this domestic context, which is constantly constructed, deconstructed, and reconstructed, is 
where norms are diffused and reshaped over time. In addition, the example of Korea shows the 
malleability of international human rights norms when the domestic political terrain changes. 
In this section, I describe in detail the process of the NHRCK’s diminishment in Korea: 
first, its independence was compromised by the government’s attempt to place the NHRCK 
under the office of the president; next, a severe budget cut of 21% was implemented, reducing 
the institution’s effectiveness; then, a new chairperson was appointed, and the NHRCK was 
reinstitutionalized as a political government agency serving the preference of the political regime. 
These changes led to the severe deterioration of the NHRCK’s reputation, which was reflected in 
the international human rights community’s campaigns and statements. 
6.3.1 Attempts to Place the NHRCK under the Office of the President 
The attempts to weaken the NHRCK started as soon as Lee Myung-bak was elected. Cho 
states that these actions were intended by the conservative government to restore the “lost ten 
years” that were ruled by progressive governments (Cho 2011, 176). As mentioned, Lee’s 
conservative political ideology did not allow for the NHRCK’s independent functioning. During 
the transitional period, on January 16, 2008, the Presidential Transition Committee 
recommended that the NHRCK be placed under the direct supervision of the office of the 
president. The rationale for this recommendation was that placing it under the president’s direct 
supervision would make the NHRCK more powerful; the move was bundled under a general 
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restructuring to increase the efficiency of governmental organizations. This proposal, which put 
the independence of the Commission in jeopardy, was immediately met with criticism from the 
domestic and international human rights communities. 
Domestic human rights experts and civil society organizations went public with their 
strong opposition to the proposal. On January 23, 2008, a group of human rights organizations 
demanded that the government guarantee the independence of the NHRCK and repeal the 
proposal, arguing that the plan implied an intention to weaken the functioning of the NHRCK 
and indicated that the human rights situation in Korea was likely to deteriorate. A group of 
NGOs argued that the proposal was based on political intentions rather than on objective 
judgment, and they strongly urged the government to retract the proposal. The NGOs also 
cautioned against the ruling party’s proposal to limit the mandate of the NHRCK to only North 
Korean human rights issues; one scholar, Kim Jong Seo, argued that the Commission would 
become a North Korean Human Rights Commission, not the NHRCK (Kim 2012a, 60). The 
NGOs stated that they would not tolerate the attempt to reduce the NHRCK to a servant of the 
regime, aimed at realizing a specific political ideology (Pressian 2008). 
The international human rights community paid a great deal of attention to this issue and 
called for the proposal’s repeal. On January 17, 2008, the UN High Commissioner for Human 
Rights, Louise Arbour, expressed her concerns about the proposal. In her open letter to the 
chairperson of the transition committee, she urged the committee to reconsider its decision 
because “the intended placement could negatively influence the international standing of the 
NHRCK and could erode its national position. It could also impact on public perceptions of its 
independence and compliance with the internationally accepted benchmarks for NHRIs, the Paris 
Principles (UN GA resolution 48/134). This could in turn affect the NHRCK accreditation with 
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the ICC and the Republic of Korea’s excellent reputation in the international human rights 
system.” She went on to praise the current NHRCK, calling it “an internationally highly regarded 
national human rights institution (NHRI), indeed a model for other countries,” and pointing out 
its status as a key member of the Asia–Pacific Forum and a vice chair of the ICC (Arbour 2008). 
The High Commissioner’s letter was sent one day after the government made its plan public. 
This immediate, strong recommendation from a top UN human rights official demonstrates the 
intensity of the international human rights community’s concern over the NHRCK. 
On January 18, 2008, Amnesty International also strongly opposed the proposal, urging 
the president-elect to retain the NHRCK’s independent status in a public statement entitled 
“Grave Concerns for the Future Independence of the National Human Rights Commission of 
South Korea.” The organization stressed the importance of the NHRCK’s independence, arguing 
that the proposed restructuring would be “a setback for the promotion and protection of human 
rights in South Korea,” as the NHRCK’s compromised independence “would undermine the 
objectivity and authority of the NHRC to speak out on human rights concerns in the country 
without fear of censorship” (Amnesty International 2008). 
Pressure to maintain the NHRCK’s independence also came from regional human rights 
NGOs. The Asian NGOs Network on National Human Rights Institutions (ANNI)
56
 gave a 
statement, dated January 22, 2008, that strongly criticized the Korean government’s plan to 
change the status of the NHRCK and called for the proposal to be immediately withdrawn. It 
stated that the NHRCK “has been regarded as a model for other countries” and that the 
restructuring proposal “threatens the very existence of a body that has always been a beacon of 
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The Asian NGOs Network on National Human Rights Institutions (ANNI), established in December 2006, is a 
network of Asian NGOs and human rights defenders working on issues related to NHRIs. ANNI has thirty-three 
members from twenty-one countries or territories. The organization works toward strengthening NHRIs in Asia and 
advocates for the improved compliance of Asian NHRIs with international standards, including the Paris Principles. 
See https://www.forum-asia.org/?page_id=19132&nhri=1. 
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independence and credibility among other national institutions in Asia and the world” (ANNI 
2008). 
Faced with this strong and immediate opposition from international and domestic human 
rights communities, the government withdrew its plan to place the NHRCK under the president’s 
office. An unnamed staff member from the NHRCK commented that the government had 
changed its plan because of the outcry from international communities (Lee 2008b). Although 
this plan was not implemented, the government did not stop its attempts to weaken the NHRCK; 
as Chung rightly points out, Lee’s regime was only taking a break from its long-term efforts to 
weaken the NHRCK (Chung 2011c, 212). The government’s policies against the Commission 
became more aggressive and systematic as the NHRCK kept speaking out against the 
government. 
6.3.2 Downsizing the NHRCK 
In March 2009, the Minister of Public Administration and Security proposed a significant 
downsizing of the NHRCK aimed at increasing “organizational efficiency.” The Ministry’s 
proposal entailed cutting the NHRCK staff by 21% (reducing the number of staff from 208 to 
164), closing down three of the NHRCK’s regional offices (Busan, Gwangju, and Daegu), and 
merging the policy and education divisions. This proposal triggered concerns about the recession 
of democracy in Korea, and, specifically, concerns that the NHRCK would become an alibi 
institution. The Ministry’s announcement of this proposal came after the NHRCK had expressed 
critical opinions about the government’s use of force in dealing with mass protests the United 
States beef trade deal
57
 and about the death of six protesters during a forced eviction operation.
58
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 Between May and September 2008, a series of mass candlelight vigils were held to protest the government’s 
decision to approve importation of beef from the United States. Chung argues that the NHRCK’s opinion on the 
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This proposal brought another wave of criticism against the government from both inside 
and outside the country. The UN reacted again: on February 25, 2009, the UN High 
Commissioner for Human Rights, Navanethem Pillay, sent a letter to the Foreign Minister, Yu 
Myung-hwan, urging the government to guarantee the independence of the NHRCK and to 
reconsider its proposal, saying that “any measure that will negatively impact on the NHRCK will 
directly influence its regional and international reputation and functioning as well” (NHRCK 
2009b). The network of global NHRIs also added its voice to the criticism of the Korean 
government. The chair of the ICC, Jennifer Lynch, and the Chair of the Asia–Pacific Forum, Tan 
Sri Abu Talib Othman, also delivered their concerns regarding the government’s decision 
through an official letter to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade. Both stressed that, should 
the government go ahead with its plan, the NHRCK’s independence would be compromised and 
its effective functions would be negatively impacted. In addition, they stressed that the action 
would adversely affect the reputation of the NHRCK and would have negative consequences on 
Korea’s candidacy for the ICC chair position, which was to be voted on in 2010 (Chung 2011c, 
211). 
International and domestic human rights NGOs expressed their concerns as well. 
Amnesty International issued a statement on March 29, 2009, urging the president’s cabinet to 
reconsider the proposal. It warned that the proposal would jeopardize the NHRCK’s 
effectiveness and independence and compromise the NHRCK’s international reputation of being 
“an exemplary human rights institution in the Asia–Pacific region” (AmnestyInternational March 
29, 2009). The ANNI also sent a letter to the ICC urging it to take action against the Korean 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
protest, which called for the government to protect the human rights of the protesters, was one of the key incidents 
that upset the government (Chung 2011b, 25). 
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 The Yongsan eviction and demolition of January 20, 2009, in which six people died. 
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government’s decision to downsize the NHRCK. Notably, most of these opposing voices 
highlighted the good international and regional reputation of the NHRCK. 
The NHRCK itself also reacted strongly against the government’s restructuring proposal. 
The chairperson, Ahn Kyung-whan, made a public statement urging the president to not approve 
the Ministry’s tabled proposal to cut the budget of the organization (Kang 2009). The NHRCK 
took further action, asking the Constitutional Court to adjudicate the matter as a jurisdictional 
dispute and alleging abuse of power and procedural problems (MINBYUN 2010). However, the 
Constitutional Court dismissed the case in October 2010 on the grounds that the NHRCK was 
not a body established by the Constitution, and that it therefore had no legal right to file a case to 
the Constitutional Court (Chung 2011c, 213). 
The various coordinated efforts of international and domestic human rights communities 
urging the government not to downsize the NHRCK were in vain. The government approved the 
plan on March 30, 2009, and officially announced that the NHRCK would have its staff reduced 
by 21% on April 6, 2009 (Cho, 196–197). Chung argues that the NHRCK’s downsizing was 
“revenge,” meant to paralyze and tame the Commission; compare the NHRCK’s cut of 21.1% to 
cuts made under the plan to other government bodies, which had their personnel reduced by 2% 
to 0.02% (Chung 2011c, 212). 
6.3.3 Appointment of New Chairperson of the NHRCK 
The NHRCK was further weakened with a change of chairperson in July 2009. The 
struggle between the government and the NHRCK, which continued to escalate, was highlighted 
by the resignation of the then-chairperson Ahn Kyung-whan. On July 8, 2009, in his farewell 
speech, Ahn said that he felt “strongly about the responsibility for a series of unfortunate 
incidents taking place since the inauguration of the new government,” and stated, “I wish to offer 
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a turning point for Korea to recover its human rights reputation [which has] [. . .] been seriously 
damaged in the international community and [for it] to renew its status as a human rights seonjin 
state with an appointment of a new chairperson” (Ahn 2009b). Ahn’s resignation, which came 
with more than a year of his term left, was tendered “in protest of the efforts to weaken the 
NHRCK that have persisted throughout the administration’s term”; it aimed to force the 
government to reconsider its perceptions about the NHRCK and appoint a new chairperson, 
suitable to serve as chair of the International Coordinating Committee of National Institutions for 
the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights—a position that the NHRCK was scheduled to 
fill (Hankyoreh 2009a).
59
 However, after the resignation that was intended to normalize the 
NHRCK, President Lee Myung-bak controversially appointed Hyun Byung-chul, a law professor 
with no human rights experience, as the new chair of the NHRCK in July 2009. 
Subsequently, the NHRCK did not put itself forward as a candidate for the chairmanship 
of the ICC and the APF, losing its very likely appointments to these important positions. The 
standing committee of the NHRCK reached a unanimous agreement “not to put up a 
representative for South Korea in the upcoming elections being held at the annual general 
meeting of the Asia–Pacific Forum of National Human Rights Institutions (APF) on August 3” 60 
because “we need human and material resources in order to carry out the role of the chair nation 
successfully, but NHRCK’s capacity has been diminished due to layoffs” (Hankyoreh 2009b).  
The appointment of Hyun Byung-chul was controversial even at the nomination stage. A 
group of concerned experts and human rights NGOs released a “guideline on competencies of 
chairperson of the NHRCK” on July 13, 2009; it laid out eight key requirements for the new 
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 Ahn clearly stated that “his resignation was to avoid being elected leader of an international human rights body for 
which he is one of the strongest candidates” (Park 2009). 
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 The chair nation, selected by the APF, is supposed to serve as the next ICC chair nation. 
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chairperson and concluded that Hyun was critically flawed in most of these crucial areas (Chung 
2011c, 212). Hyun himself revealed that he had no experience in human rights and did not 
understand that the NHRCK was meant to be independent of the government. For instance, he 
said in an interview that he believed that the National Security Law should not be abolished, 
although the NHRCK had recommended in 2004 that the government abolish the law (Chung 
August 11, 2009). He denied the independence of the NHRCK at the National Assembly on 
September 18, 2009. Yu Nam-young, one of the three standing commissioners of the NHRCK, 
expressed his regret that Hyun had been appointed to the chairperson position and resigned his 
commission as a consequence. In a detailed resignation statement, given on November 1, 2010, 
Yu stated that his resignation was closely related to Hyun’s management of the NHRCK, citing 
the following breaches: (1) Hyun’s statement at the National Assembly denying the 
independence of the NHRCK, (2) Hyun’s rejection of a request to convene a meeting of 
commissioners, (3) Hyun’s abuse of authority in demoting, laying off, and disciplining staff 
according to his preference on various occasions, and (4) Hyun’s delivering an opinion, privately 
held by himself and few commissioners, to the National Assembly as if that opinion was an 
official opinion of the NHRCK (People's Solidarity for Participatory Democracy, 2010). 
Cho argues that by appointing Hyun Byung-chul, President Lee treated the NHRCK as 
one of the government branches, which are not concerned with human rights, but with serving 
the political preference of the regime; the NHRCK therefore became helpless to make 
interventions into various urgent human rights issues (Cho 2011, 176). The NHRCK’s new focus 
on serving the political agenda of the regime can be seen in its increased activities on North 
Korean human rights issues. In principle, the NHRCK Act does not mandate that the NHRCK 
work on human rights issues in North Korea, but, it appears, Chairperson Hyun proactively 
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changed the institution’s focus to comply with the president’s preference (Chung 2011a, 166). 
The budget allocated for North Korean human rights issues doubled during Lee Myung-bak’s 
time; in 2010, when all other NHRCK budgets were cut, the budget for North Korean issues 
remained at the same level as the previous year (Chung 2011a, 170). 
The situation of the NHRCK deteriorated. On November 1, 2010, two standing 
commissioners, Yu Nam-young and Mun Kyung-Ran, decided to resign from their positions in 
protest of the government’s efforts to further weaken the NHRCK by introducing revised 
managerial regulations and reducing the rights of the standing commissioners (MINBYUN 2010). 
After these two resignations, Commissioner Cho Kuk and sixty experts and advisors associated 
with the NHRCK also submitted their resignations (Donga Newspaper 2010, Kim 2010c). In 
December 2010, the winners of the Commission’s Human Rights Award rejected the awards and 
demanded that Chairperson Hyun step down (Kim 2010b). A number of human rights groups 
also demanded Hyun’s resignation and the reinstatement of the Commission’s previous status. 
Despite the protests coming from inside and outside the Commission, President Lee and 
Chairperson Hyun continued to run the Commission as they had been, filling the vacant positions 
with even more problematic people. 
6.3.4 Changed Reputation of the NHRCK at the International Level 
6.3.4.1 ICC Review 
Under Lee’s regime, NHRCK was on the verge of having its ICC rating downgraded.61 
When it joined the ICC (now called GANHRIs) in 2004, NHRCK received an A rating, and its 
rating was renewed at the A level at its reevaluation in November 2008. Despite the NHRCK’s 
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A rating at reevaluation, the ICC Sub-Committee on Accreditation expressed its concern about 
Lee’s attempt to place the NHRCK under the office of the president and the Lee government’s 
interventions in the institution’s financial and administrative matters. At reevaluation, the 
accreditation committee made a number of recommendations to the NHRCK. First, the SCA-ICC 
observed that “the NHRCK is considered as a ‘central government institution’ under the National 
Fiscal Act and as such does not enjoy complete functional autonomy from the government. This 
is in contrast to ‘independent institutions,’ which are constitutionally entrenched.” The SCA 
further recommended that the NHRCK adopt “a broad and transparent appointment process,” 
because “the process of appointing commissioners, which relies on nomination from the 
president, the National Assembly, or the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, does not provide 
for formal public consultation in the recruitment and scrutiny of candidates, nor for the 
participation of civil society.” Lastly, the SCA recommended that the government provide the 
NHRCK with “more autonomy to appoint its own staff in a manner that does not unnecessarily 
delay the fulfilment of the NHRCK needs,” and expressed its concern about “the recent proposal 
to place the Commission directly under the office of the president and subsequent interventions 
in the Commission’s financial and administrative affairs” (ICC 2008). 
As early as 2009, NGOs began persistently requesting the ICC to downgrade the status of 
the NHRCK. The Asian Human Rights Commission, an NGO based in Hong Kong, sent a letter 
to the ICC chairperson expressing its view that the NHRCK should be downgraded because it no 
longer complied with the Paris Principles (Bae 2009). ANNI also called on the ICC to reconsider 
the status of the NHRCK, stating that it believed that “recent events and those that occurred in 
the last 2 years deeply impact the ability of the NHRCK to effectively fulfill its mandate” (ANNI 
2011a). In June 2014, a coalition of eighty-six Korean NGOs released a report entitled “The 
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Opinions of Korean NGOs on the National Human Rights Commission of Korea to the ICC-SCA” 
urging the ICC not to reaccredit the NHRCK with status A. It elaborates its rationale: 
For the past six years, the NHRCK has retreated in promoting human rights and 
preventing human rights violations while its independence has been increasingly 
undermined. If the NHRCK retains status A despite the fact that it [has] lost the 
confidence of civil society, it will negatively impact not only [. . .] domestic human rights 
situations, but also [. . .] the general missions of the NHRIs in the international 
community. In this regard, the ICC-SCA should downgrade the status of the NHRCK to 
emphasize the fact that its functions as a[n] NHRI have been weakened and to enforce 
it[s need] to refurbish itself, rather than reaccrediting it with status A [. . .] (NHRCK 
Watch 2014, 35). 
In response to these exhortations from the NGOs, the SCA-ICC decided in 2014 to defer 
the NHRCK’s accreditation review and recommended that the NHRCK implement a transparent 
appointment process, based on pluralism, for its commissioners, as they had been recommended 
to do in October 2008 (2017, 248). The final decision was deferred to October 2014; the 
accreditation decision was at that time again deferred to March 2015. Yu states that the reason 
for deferral might have been to provide the NHRCK with an opportunity to implement the 
recommendations before downgrading their status (Yu 2014, 15). After a couple of years, the 
NHRCK finally received an A rating by including the SCA recommendations in the 2016 revised 
NHRCK Act. However, the years of review required for the NHRCK to regain its A status show 
the drastic drop in its international reputation; it had gone from a “model institution” to an 
institution under heavy criticism from domestic, regional and international human rights 
communities. 
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6.3.4.2 Continued Concerns of International Human Rights Community 
In addition to the ICC, other UN human rights bodies and mechanisms who had once 
praised the NHRCK as a model institution began to raise alarms about its weakening 
independence and effectiveness after 2008. 
Two UN Special Rapporteurs, who visited Korea in 2010 and in 2013, expressed a 
considerable amount of concern over the Korean government’s weakening of the NHRCK. The 
UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression and Opinion, Frank La Rue, who visited 
Korea in May 2010, stated that he regretted not being allowed to meet collectively with the 
commissioners of the NHRCK, despite numerous requests; he also expressed his disappointment 
over the NHRCK’s lack of recent activity relating to protection and promotion of freedom of 
expression and opinion. The NHRCK had not intervened in several major human rights cases, 
including “the defamation lawsuits filed against the producers of Munhwa Broadcasting 
Corporation (MBC)’s PD Notebook; the prohibition of assemblies and demonstrations after 
sunset; and the case of Mr. Park Won-soon.” La Rue encouraged the government to improve “the 
appointment process of the Commissioners” as per the recommendation of the SCA-ICC (LaRue 
2010). 
Another UN Special Rapporteur working on the situation of human rights defenders, 
Margaret Sekaggya, expressed concerns over the situation of the NHRCK in her report of her 
visit to Korea. She noted that the “NHRCK has played a key role in the consolidation of 
democracy in the Republic of Korea and the establishment of a solid human rights institutional 
framework,” but that “the institution has in recent years received criticism from civil society with 
regard to its independence from the Government, which is at times perceived to be compromised.” 
The Special Rapporteur urged the “NHRCK to do its utmost to regain the confidence of human 
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rights defenders and be a strong, independent institution capable of credible and impartial 
scrutiny of the State’s human rights obligations”; she called on the Korean government to 
“ensure the full independence and effectiveness of NHRCK, including by amending existing 
provisions to allow for public participation in the nomination and appointment process of 
Commissioners and to ensure that the Commission has full autonomy in selecting its own staff” 
(LaRue 2011b).  
Several human rights law monitoring bodies also expressed their concerns about the 
NHRCK, especially about the government’s attempts to weaken its independence and 
effectiveness by attempting to place it under the office of the president and by cutting its staff. 
On December 17, 2009, the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights published its 
observations of the human rights situation in Korea, which included concerns over the NHRCK:  
The Committee is concerned about the limited jurisdiction of the National Human Rights 
Commission of Korea over Covenant rights and the lack of its investigative power. The 
Committee is deeply concerned about the downsizing of the Commission by 21 per cent, 
whereas for all other ministries, it has been of 2 per cent at the most. The Committee is 
particularly concerned about recent developments in the State party that have put the 
independence of the Commission under severe pressure (United Nations Economic and 
Social Council 2009, ¶ 8). 
Following these observations, the committee recommended that the Korean government 
“ensure that the national human rights commission of Korea remains compliant with the Paris 
Principles; strengthen and expand the mandate of the commission to cover all ICESCR rights; 
allocate adequate human and financial resources, including human rights experts, in accordance 
with the National Human Rights Commission of Korea Act; and allow individuals to file 
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complaints on violations of economic, cultural and social rights directly to the commission” 
(United Nations Economic and Social Council 2009, ¶ 8). 
On August 1, 2011, the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women 
(CEDAW) observed that 
while appreciating the contribution of the national human rights commission of Korea to 
the reporting process and the data on the number of human rights violations and 
discrimination petitions filed before the Commission per year, the committee shares the 
concern of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (see e/c.12/kor/co/3) 
that the Commission was downsized by 21%, whereas all the other ministries were 
downsized by 2% at the most, and that recent developments in the state party have put the 
independence of the commission at risk (CEDAW/C/KOR/CO/7). 
Having expressed its concerns about the NHRCK, CEDAW made the following 
recommendation to the Korean government: 
The committee reminds the state party of its responsibility to ensure that the National 
Human Rights Commission of Korea remains compliant with the Paris Principles, in 
particular with respect to its independence. It urges the state party to allocate to the 
Commission adequate human and financial resources, including human rights experts, in 
accordance with the National Human Rights Commission of Korea Act, and to strengthen 
its monitoring functions, including in the area of gender and women’s rights, with a view 
to regaining credibility, public confidence and legitimacy (CEDAW/C/KOR/CO/7). 
On February 2, 2012, the Committee on the Rights of the Child also stated its concerns: 
“the committee is further concerned at the National Human Rights Commission having been 
downsized by 21% in March 2009, and, despite previous recommendations by the committee, [at 
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the NHRCK’s] remaining without a specialization in child rights” (CRC/C/KOR/CO/3–4). 
Another human rights–monitoring body, the Committee on Elimination of Racial Discrimination, 
raised concerns on October 23, 2012, over the situation of the NHRCK, pointing out that while  
the budget of the National Human Rights Commission of Korea (NHRCK) has increased 
by more than 4% in the current year, the committee is concerned that the increase does 
not compensate for the downsizing of 21% which occurred a few years ago. [. . .] The 
committee notes that some experienced commissioners resigned in the recent years and 
that the NHRCK did not provide an independent report on the implementation of the 
convention to the committee, but rather provided comments to the draft report of the state 
party (CERD/C/KOR/CO/15–16). 
The committee further reminded the government “of its responsibility to ensure that the 
National Human Rights Commission of Korea remains compliant with the Paris Principles, in 
particular with respect to its independence,” and urged the government “to provide [the NHRCK] 
with adequate financial resources and experienced human rights experts so as to enable it to 
carry out its mandate effectively, including promoting and monitoring the rights under the 
convention” (CERD/C/KOR/CO/15–16). 
International and regional human rights NGOs strongly opposed the government’s 
decision to downsize the NHRCK, warning that it would damage the Commission’s good 
reputation. In March 2009, Amnesty International urged the Korean government to reconsider 
the plan to put the NHRCK under the president’s office and warned that, should the government 
proceed with its plan, it would “jeopardise the Commission’s effectiveness and independence” 
(Amnesty International 2009). In 2011, the organization once again demanded that the 
government ensure a transparent and fair appointment process for the commissioners, a process 
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that is a critical requirement for “an independent and fully empowered national human rights 
institution which enjoys the trust and confidence of civil society, particularly the local human 
rights community.” In 2012, Amnesty International expressed its concerns over the proposal to 
reappoint Hyun Byung-chul as the chairperson of the NHRCK, again urging the government “to 
ensure that members of the NHRCK are appointed through a transparent process and in 
consultation with civil society groups and other relevant stakeholders, and that those appointed 
have relevant human rights-based knowledge and expertise” (Amnesty International 2012). 
In addition, ANNI explained their intention to conduct a mission of inquiry to the 
NHRCK in order to monitor the crisis affecting the Commission, stating, “the NHRCK has been 
considered a model national human rights institution in Asia, [located as it is] in a country 
respected for its democratic transformation and economic prosperity. However, since 2008, the 
ANNI has been made aware of developments within the NHRCK which have adverse 
implications on the independence, pluralism and effectiveness of the Commission” (ANNI 
2011b). It expressed its frustration over the unsuccessful efforts of the organization to normalize 
the NHRCK: “there has not been any change for the better on any of these issues and further, 
there is reasonable cause for belief that these trends may continue, if not worsen, leading to a 
collapse in confidence of the NHRCK as an institution committed and capable of protecting and 
promoting human rights in South Korea” (ANNI 2011b). After conducting its mission of inquiry, 
which took place from May 11 to May 13, 2011, the ANNI delegation reiterated its extreme 
concern over the problems at the NHRCK and the consequences the proposed changes would 
have for the integrity and reputation of the NHRCK at both the national and international levels. 
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6.3.5 Public Perception of the NHRCK: 2011 Survey Results 
In a survey conducted in 2011, 80% of participating experts gave negative feedback on 
the Korean government’s leadership in human rights, saying that the human rights situation of 
Korea had deteriorated and the Korean government did not apply human rights considerations in 
its policies. One of the major reasons given for the poor leadership human rights record was the 
weakened authority of the NHRCK (NHRCK 2011, viii–ix). 
The survey identified the need to recover the credibility of the NHRCK and strengthen its 
capacity. It discovered that the NHRCK’s international reputation had started to decline with the 
Lee Myung-bak government’s attempt to place the NHRCK under the president’s office, and 
noted that the intense conflicts between civil society and the government around the issue of the 
NHRCK contributed to the precipitous crash of the NHRCK’s international reputation and its 
plunge in credibility in Korean society. The survey found that awareness of the NHRCK had 
somewhat increased over the years, but that only 40% of experts and the general public said that 
the activities of the NHRCK made a positive contribution. It is notable that the general public 
(62.0%) and the expert group (81.3%) agreed that the authority and capacity of the NHRCK 
should be strengthened. Furthermore, 67.6% of the expert group expressed that it was 
inappropriate to downsize the NHRCK (NHRCK 2011, xv). 
The survey revealed the negative perceptions of Korea’s international human rights 
contribution under the Lee administration. 80% of experts responded that Korea’s contribution is 
inadequate and called for making Korea’s human rights sensitivity commensurate with its 
economic size. The remaining 20% said that Korea was contributing to human rights issues of 
the international community; those who provided positive feedback noted Korea’s membership 
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on the Development Assistance Committee of OECD and Ban Ki-moon’s role at the UN 
(NHRCK 2011, ix). 
 
6.4 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I examined in detail how the NHRCK was weakened under Lee Myung-
bak, whose conservative political identity allowed no room for the NHRCK to operate. The 
government’s deliberate attempts to weaken the NHRCK—cutting the budget and staff and 
appointing a controversial chairperson and commissioners—eventually made the NHRCK 
plummet to its lowest levels of credibility, independence, effectiveness, and reputation since its 
inception. During Lee’s rule, the NHRCK shifted from a model intuition extolled by 
international human rights community to a subject of criticism from that same community. 
Despite strong and persistent complaints from domestic and international human rights 
communities, which called for the government to change its policies, the regime did as it pleased. 
However, the diminishment of the NHRCK did not mean that Korea had abandoned its decades-
long desire to become seonjinguk; indeed, this chapter offered several other examples of how the 
regime aggressively endeavored to be recognized as seonjinguk, mainly through neoliberal 
economic policies rather than compliance with international human rights standards. 
The recession of the NHRCK and the regime’s deliberate policy choice to disregard 
human rights in its pursuit of becoming seonjinguk evidence the importance of taking the 
domestic context into account when studying norms diffusion; even once successfully diffused, 
norms may change and be reshaped by domestic political identity and policy preferences. This 
chapter established how the components of the seonjinguk identity changed from internalizing 
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human rights (exemplified through the creation and promotion of the NHRCK) to excluding 
human rights (demonstrated through government policies that weakened the NHRCK).   
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CHAPTER 7 
CONCLUSION 
 
7.1 The NHRCK after 2012 
The NHRCK continued to experience a downturn in power and status under Park Geun-
hye, who succeeded Lee Myung-bak in February 2013. Some argue that the NHRCK improved a 
bit when a new chairperson, Lee Sang-ho, took office in August 2015; however, the NHRCK’s 
reputation, which had drastically declined in the previous few years, did not show signs of 
recovery despite Lee’s appointment. Park’s policy preference toward the NHRCK did not differ 
much from that of Lee Myung-bak. The NHRCK managed to obtain another A status from the 
ICC in 2016, but that did not seem to boost the organization’s reputation, and the international 
community continued to express concern over the NHRCK’s situation (see LaRue 2011b; and 
United Nations Economic and Social Council 2017); Park’s government remained unresponsive. 
I have not offered here a separate analysis of the NHRCK under Park, as her presidency has not 
changed the NHRCK very much, unlike that of previous governments. It is also difficult to 
describe the desired identity of the Park Geun-hye government and its relationship to seonjin; the 
regime was guided under somewhat irrational conditions, which led to Park Geun-hye’s 
impeachment in March 2017. 
 
7.2 Conclusion of the Dissertation 
Why and how do norms get diffused? States comply with international human rights 
norms and create NHRIs for various reasons: because they are receiving pressure from domestic 
or international agents; because they need to create an “alibi institution” to avoid criticism; 
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because they wish to project a certain national image; and, sometimes, simply because they want 
to do the right thing. Previous studies examining state compliance with NHRI norms broadened 
our understanding of what makes states comply with and create NHRIs, but there has been little 
research on how and why states comply with international norms. I filled this gap by doing an in-
depth analysis of one country, Korea; I examined its identity construction and reconstruction, 
and I unraveled the ways that Korea’s desired identity—that of a seonjinguk—drove Korea to, at 
times, actively embrace global human rights norms through the NHRCK and, at other times, to 
disregard these norms. This empirical study of Korea and the NHRCK thus attempts to broaden 
the scope of our understanding of compliance issues by contending that desired national identity 
is one of the key components in why states comply with international human rights norms. 
How do international norms and domestic context interact with one another? This 
dissertation opens up space for broader questions about the interplay between domestic politics 
and the international sphere—the way that domestic politics influence international norms and 
institutions, and they way that they influence the diffusion and acceptance of international norms. 
In the case of Korea, the international norms remained the same, but the domestic political 
context and the state’s desired identity changed, and these changes determined whether the state 
accepted or rejected those international norms; this study thus shows that international norms 
could have different effects in a single country as the domestic political context changes over 
time. The NHRCK, which was originally created according to international norms and reflected 
Korea’s desire to pursue international legitimacy, rose and fell in a relatively brief time period as 
the domestic regime changed, and it is thus an excellent case study in the effect of domestic 
contexts on international norm diffusion. This dissertation confirms that structures and agents at 
the domestic level are the crucial factors that determine the compliance or disregard of global 
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norms. The case of Korea also provides empirical evidence of how compliance with international 
human rights norms strengthened a country’s power and legitimacy rather than limiting them. 
 
7.3 Suggestions for Future Studies 
The weeks leading up to the impeachment of former Korean president Park Geun-hye 
were a collective and forceful journey for the hundreds of millions of Koreans who protested for 
weeks on the streets of all major cities in Korea, demanding that she step down and restore 
democracy. The demonstrations were different from previous protests: they were orderly and 
peaceful, and they were made up of common people who participated voluntarily rather than the 
activists who had led such political mobilizations in the past (Tharoor 2017). It is believed that 
the success of this “people power” built the confidence of the Korean people, making them feel 
like citizens of a real democratic country (Dudden 2017). In other words, it may have enabled 
Korean citizens to transform their intersubjective identities: instead of constantly seeking 
recognition or endorsement from others, they no longer required outside recognition. Future 
studies on state identity might examine how the Korean national identity changed after Park 
Geun-hye, and how that change might also affect Korea’s compliance with international human 
rights norms, including any changes that occur in the NHRCK. It may be possible that Korea’s 
long- desired seonjinguk identity, which was always based on comparison with other countries, 
is no longer valid. 
Hope for the NHRCK under Moon Jae-in. Moon Jae-in, the current Korean president, is a 
former human rights lawyer who served in the cabinet of former president Roh Moo-hyun; Moon 
was sworn in as the nineteenth president of Korea on May 10, 2017, and his election represents 
the hope to restore democracy and normalize the country after Park’s impeachment. One of his 
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commitments is to strengthen the NHRCK—a promise that the Commission welcomed (NHRCK 
2017). Moon introduced several specific measures to restore the NHRCK, including an 
assessment of government bodies’ acceptance rates for NHRCK recommendations; this is 
intended to ensure that government bodies are again taking the NHRCK seriously (Kim 2017a). 
In addition, there is some expectation that the NHCRK could become a constitutional body in the 
coming years (Kim 2017b). Moon’s presidency will also offer an interesting case study for 
examining how domestic political contexts determine the acceptance or rejection of global norms. 
NHRIs studies taking the identity and domestic context seriously. My study analyzes 
Korea’s desired identity of seonjinguk to show how international human rights norms on NHRIs 
were first widely diffused and accepted in the country, but changed over time, becoming less 
accepted, as the Korean domestic context changed. The study marshaled evidence to show the 
establishment of an NHRI is not an end of the story of how human rights norms are adopted; the 
changing domestic context must also be examined in order to fully understand the permanent 
institutional arrangement that exists between a state and its NHRI—how the state’s interests 
shape and change its policies, how and when the relationship does and doesn’t work, and most of 
all, why states enter into this arrangement voluntarily. 
I hope that other researchers will conduct similar in-depth studies on NHRIs in particular 
countries, each based on the host state’s unique identity and examining how its changing 
interests shape and change its policies. Such studies will enrich our understanding on NHRIs and 
contribute to the body of empirical studies of theories on compliance.   
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APPENDIX A 
Chronology of NHRCK Building Process (1993–2002) 
 June 1993—Domestic NGOs participated in the 1993 Vienna Conference on Human Rights 
and introduced NHRIs to Korea 
 July 1994—Domestic NGOs called for the establishment of an NHRI in Korea, following 
their participation in UN Workshop for the Asian and Pacific Region on Human 
Rights 
 November 1995—Domestic NGOs and transnational human rights NGOs reiterated the call 
for creating an NHRI 
 February 1998—Kim Dae-jung inaugurated, officially announces his intention to create an 
NHRI 
 February 1998—Amnesty International welcomed the political commitment of President 
Kim Dae-jung and urged that the new NHRI be in conformity with the Paris 
Principles 
 May 1998—Amnesty International issued a paper entitled “Proposed Standards for a 
National Human Rights Commission” 
 September 17, 1998— Thirty Domestic NGOs launched the Joint Committee of the Korean 
NGOs Coalition for Enacting the Human Rights Law and Establishing the National 
Human Rights Commission 
 September 25, 1998—Ministry of Justice released a draft law relating to the establishment of 
the NHRCK 
 October 23, 1998—Amnesty International sent an open letter to President Kim Dae-jung 
urging him to reconsider the draft bill proposed by the Ministry of Justice 
 October 29, 1998—Kim Dae-jung met with Korean human rights NGOs and promised to 
draft a proper law; he instructed the ruling National Congress for New Politics 
(NCNP) to draft new legislation in accordance with the UN Paris Principles 
 November 3, 1998—NCNP proposed a bill guaranteeing the independence of the NHRCK 
 November 28, 1998—Ministry of Justice proposed an amended version of its earlier draft bill 
without substantial changes 
 March 22, 1999—the government and the ruling party unexpectedly agreed on the Ministry’s 
amended proposal making the NHRC a private institution 
 April 6, 1999—Thirty activists from eighteen NGOs staged a week-long hunger strike 
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 April 6, 1999—Eleven International Human Rights NGOs issued a public statement 
supporting those NGOs and criticizing the government for its failure to meet the 
Paris Principles 
 April 7, 1999—the Cabinet meeting submitted the government bill unchanged to the National 
Assembly 
 April 9, 1999—Amnesty International issued its third Open Letter to President Kim Dae-jung 
in support of the Korean NGOs and pointed out that the current form of NHRC 
would not receive the respect of the international community 
 June 16, 1999—Joint Committee finalized its own version of the bill, but the ruling party still 
had to deal with the recalcitrant Ministry 
 October 1999—UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Mary Robinson, stressed the 
importance of an NHRI being an independent government institution during her 
meeting with President Kim 
 December 20, 1999—The government and the ruling party decided to postpone the passing 
of the bill until the following year 
 January 1999—September 2000—Negotiation for the bill remained largely dormant 
 October 13, 2000—President Kim Dae-jung was selected the winner of the Nobel Peace 
Prize 2000 
 October 17 and 28, 2000—NCNP sought to harmonize the differences between NGOs and 
the Ministry 
 January 19, 2001—NCNP finalized the Draft National Human Rights Commission Act 
 February 27, 2001—Draft National Human Rights Commission Act was tabled at the 
National Assembly 
 April 30, 2001—National Human Rights Commission Act was passed 
 May 24, 2001—National Human Rights Commission Act came into effect 
 November 25, 2001—The National Human Rights Commission was launched and the first 
chairperson, Kim Chang-guk, was appointed 
 November 26, 2001—NHRCK started to receive complaints (122 cases received on first day) 
 December 3, 2001—The Commission heard complaints in person for the first time at 
detention facilities (Cheongsong Custody Office and Daegu Correctional Institution) 
and investigated an unnatural death case at Ulsan Detention Center 
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 February 19, 2002—Choi Young-ae appointed as Secretary-General of the NHRCK 
 February 20, 2002—NHRCK submitted an opinion opposing the Anti-terrorism Act being 
prepared by the National Security Agency 
 June 2, 2002—NHRCK delegation visited APF and New Zealand NHRI to facilitate 
cooperation with NHRIs in Asia–Pacific 
 July 23, 2002—NHRCK expressed regrets to the police over the infringement of rights to 
freedom of association and assembly during the World Cup  
 November 9, 2002—Chairperson and NHRCK delegation participated in the APF 7th 
meeting in New Delhi, India 
 November 18, 2002—NHRCK stated “It is inappropriate for the NHRCK, an independent 
institution, to seek prior approval from the Office of the President to travel abroad” 
over the warning from the president’s office for not seeking prior travel approval 
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APPENDIX B 
Chronology of NHRCK consolidation process (2003–2007) 
 January 11, 2003—NHRCK participated in 32nd session of the Committee on the Rights of 
the Child and visited the UN OHCHR 
 February 3, 2003—NHRCK published a report on Korea’s implementation of international 
human rights treaties 
 March 16, 2003—NHRCK submitted an opinion supporting the abolishment of Hoju system 
to the Constitutional Court 
 March 26, 2003—NHRCK expressed an opinion regarding the Iraq war 
 September 13, 2004—Chairperson Kim Chang-guk appointed to chair the 9th Annual 
Meeting of the APF 
 September 17, 2003—NHRCK hosted the 7th APF meeting 
 September 14, 2004—UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Louise Arbour visited the 
Commission 
 December 24, 2004—2nd Chairperson Choi Young-do was appointed 
 January 7, 2005—Kwak No-hyun appointed as Secretary-General of the NHRCK 
 April 4, 2005—3rd Chairperson Cho Young-hoang was appointed 
 April 6, 2005—The Commission issued an opinion supporting the abolishment of capital 
punishment 
 April 14, 2005—The Commission issued an opinion supporting legislation to protect 
irregular workers 
 June 29, 2005—Kwak No-hyun takes part in the UN investigation into the human rights 
situation in Nepal at the request of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights 
 July 18, 2005—NHRCK carried out a campaign with Seoul Newspaper on “Ways to become 
human right seonjinguk” 
 September 14, 2005—The Commission hosted the 7th International Conference of National 
Human Rights Institutions 
 October 5, 2005—The Commission opened regional offices in Busan and Gwangju 
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 December 26, 2005—The Commission recommended the government to recognize the right 
of conscientious objection to compulsory military service and to introduce 
alternative ways to complete military service duties 
 April 9, 2006—NHRCK participated in the 17th ICC meeting and APF meeting 
 October 24, 2006—NHRCK participated in the International Conference of NHRIs in 
Bolivia 
 October 30, 2006—Fourth Chairperson Ahn Kyung-hwan was appointed 
 November 24, 2006—NHRCK celebrates its fifth anniversary 
 January 29, 2007—Kim Chil-jun appointed Secretary-General of the NHRCK 
 September 3, 2007—NHRCK invites commissioners from developing countries for a 
workshop (Nigeria, Afghanistan, East Timor, etc.) 
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APPENDIX C 
Chronology of NHRCK recession process (2008–2012) 
 January 16, 2008—The Transition Committee proposed placing the NHRCK under the 
Office of the President 
 January 17, 2008—The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights sent a letter to the 
Chairperson of the Committee recommending reconsideration of the proposal 
 January 18, 2008—Amnesty International made a public statement urging the government to 
reject the Transition Committee’s proposal 
 January 22, 2008—ANNI publicly criticized the proposal of the Transition Committee 
 January 23, 2008—A group of domestic NGOs urged the government not to accept the 
proposal of the Transition Committee 
 March 2009—Ministry of Public Administration and Security proposed to reorganize the 
NHRCK and cut the budget by 21% 
 February 25, 2009—The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights wrote a letter to the 
Minister of Foreign Affairs and urged the government to reconsider the proposal of 
the Ministry of Public Administration and Security 
 March, 2009—chair of the ICC and the Chair of the Asia–Pacific Forum each sent a letter to 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs expressing their concern over the proposal to 
downsize the NHRCK 
 March 23–27, 2009—NHRCK participated in the annual meeting of the ICC 
 April 6, 2009—NHRCK staff reduced from 208 to 164 
 July 8, 2009—Chairperson Ahn Kyung-hwan resigns 
 July 17, 2009—Fifth Chairperson Hyun Byung-chul appointed 
 October 5, 2009—Kim Ok-shin appointed Secretary-General of the NHRCK 
 November 24, 2009—Secretary-General of Amnesty International, Irene Khan, visits the 
NHRCK to discuss the independence of the Commission 
 July 21, 2010—Son Sam-gil appointed Secretary-General of the NHRCK 
 November 1, 2010—Two standing commissioners, Yu Nam-young and Mun Kyung-ran, 
resigned 
 November 10, 2010—Non-standing commissioner Cho Kuk resigned   
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